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 THE EXTERNAL AUDITOR'S ROLE IN BANK REGULATION 
AND SUPERVISION: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS BETWEEN 
THE UK, GERMANY, ITALY AND THE US 
7.1 Introduction 
This comparative analysis discusses the differences between the structure and systems of bank 
regulation operating in the UK, Germany, Italy and the US. The importance of harmonisation in 
achieving stated supervisory objectives is also emphasised. The main objective of this chapter is to 
illustrate how the external auditor's role could be harnessed more efficiently in the UK banking 
regulatory and supervisory process. This is of particular importance given the reduced supervisory 
role which the Bank of England has assumed since banking regulatory and supervisory powers and 
functions were transferred to the Financial Services Authority. External audits and in particular 
external auditors, have a greater role to play in bank regulation and supervision than was the case 
over 20 years ago. This is so mainly as a result of globalisation. The need for a single regulator 
which regulates not just the banking sector, but also the insurance and securities sectors, has arisen 
principally because of the rise of conglomerate firms. Single regulators are able to manage more 
effectively cross sector services' risks. Correspondingly, the functional overlaps between banking, 
insurance and securities business and their universal scope make it more difficult for a regulator to 
observe and comprehend such businesses.1 The difficulty of measuring and assessing risk within 
such institutions along with the speed with which assets can be adjusted in derivatives markets has 
led to more emphasis being placed on internal managerial control. 2 Consideration is also being 
given to the structures that can be put in place to re inforce the incentives of all parties involved – 
not just to management but all parties including auditors and regulators.3 
Because banking has evolved to a stage where conglomerates now have a significant presence  and 
provide a range of services (and not just banking services), and because of the growing presence of 
international firms, the role of the external auditor has become so important. 
Since 2001, large listed companies in Germany have increasingly used US or International 
                                                 
1 CAE Goodhart,  (ed)  'The Emerging Framework of Financial Regulation   ( Central Banking Publications Ltd   
 London 1998) 95-96 
2 ibid 
3 ibid 
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Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs) accounting for their consolidated statements.4 The presence 
of international accounting firms calls for greater harmonisation efforts in relation to international 
accounting standards as this would facilitate better and more effective enforcement procedures.5 
However, there are various obstacles to harmonisation (and in particular, to EU harmonisation) 
because of the nature of the audit profession in various EU jurisdictions nature of the audit 
profession contributes to the type of accounting that is practised and that could be practised.6  A 
1975 Decree in Italy which required listed companies to have extended audits similar to those 
operating in the UK and the US could only be brought into effect during the 1980s because of the 
substantial increase in the number of international accounting firms.7 
Effective supervision on a global consolidated basis and the internationalisation of banking 
generally, calls for close co-operation between national supervisors. It is therefore of great 
significance that although several obstacles have been encountered, immense progress has been 
made over the past decade in developing a multilateral framework based on the Basel Committee 
Banking Regulatory and Supervisory practices.8  
This chapter amongst other objectives, aims to show why it is important for the FSA to use 
specialists such as external auditors to make up for (but not substitute for) the Bank of England's 
reduced presence in the supervision process. The benefits of the central bank's involvement in 
banking supervision in jurisdictions such as Germany, Italy and the US will be considered as part of 
the first main investigational objective, which is, the rationale for a single regulator.  
The perceived advantage of the German system over the UK system of financial supervision is due 
to the fact that Germany's central bank, the Bundesbank still retains supervisory functions (naturally 
as well as monetary policy setting functions) whilst benefiting from attributes of a single regulator 
(one of such attributes being the ability of a single regulator to manage cross sector services' risks 
                                                 
4 C Nobes and R Parker, Comparative International Accounting  (Prentice Hall London , Ninth Edition) 569 
5 Major reasons for foreign banks establishing their physical presence in the early 60s in the UK resulted from 
the prominence of London as an international financial centre, the absence of entry restraints and a flexible regulatory 
treatment. The number of foreign banks steadily grew between 1962 and 1982 from 51 to 232. The economic potential 
and performance of the German economy, the strong presence of foreign owned non-financial enterprises and the 
importance of German foreign trade have played a part in motivating the establishment of foreign bank offices in 
Germany. In Italy, the servicing of multinational corporations and trade financing have been the principal initiatives for 
the growth of foreign banking presence there. See RM Pecchioli, 'Trends in Banking Structure and Regulation in OECD 
Countries, The Internationalisation of Banking: The Policy Issues  [1983] 68 
6 C Nobes and R Parker, Comparative International Accounting p 27 
7 Ibid p 27 
8 'Trends in Banking Structure and Regulation in OECD Countries'  [1987]  14-15  
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more effectively). In contrast, the UK system of financial services supervision comprises a system 
whereby banking supervisory functions of the central bank have been transferred to its single 
regulator, the Financial Services Authority. However, certain disadvantages also feature within the 
German system of banking regulation and supervision as will be seen later on in this chapter. 
Through an analysis and comparison of primary sources such as the Financial Services and Markets 
Act (FSMA) 2000, das Gesetz ueber das Kreditwesen, Gesetz ueber die Bundesanstalt fuer 
Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht, the Italian Legislation, Law 262 of December 2005 and relevant US 
federal and state statutes, a basis will be provided as to how important the central bank's role is in 
the bank supervisory process. The historical background of banking institutions of the jurisdictions 
being investigated, objectives of the central banks and bank regulators of these jurisdictions will 
also be considered. In addition to the primary sources already mentioned, other primary and 
secondary sources such as annual reports from the central banks will also be considered.  
Other aspects of the jurisdictional analysis relating to Germany, Italy and the US include the second 
main investigational aim of this chapter, their approaches to risk-based supervision. Risk based 
regulation is a growing phenomenon across several jurisdictions and external auditors can play an 
important role not only in risk based regulation, but also in the Basel II process. They can assist in 
the validation process of the advanced techniques used for measurements under the Basel II 
Accord.9 
In addition to this role, external auditors can also help the regulator in the process of obtaining 
information which the regulator needs to assess whether a regulated institution is complying with 
required standards. If the external auditor's roles in bank regulation and supervision are to be 
effective, then safeguards and measures need to be in operation in order to protect his 
independence.  
The third major investigational aim explores safeguards in place to protect the external auditor's 
independence in these jurisdictions. Ethical guidance issued by international bodies such as La 
Federation des Experts Comptables Europeens (FEE), the International Federation of Accountants 
(IFAC) and activities of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and Independent 
Standards Board in the US have facilitated discussions on the issue of the independence of the 
                                                 
9 E Huepkes, 'The External Auditor and the Bank Supervisor: Sherlock Holmes and Doctor Watson?'  (2005)  
No1/2 Journal of Banking Regulation 7 
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external auditor.10  
Safeguards to auditor independence in some countries are considered to be barriers to promoting a 
single European audit market. The Italian position on the issue of auditor independence differs 
considerably from that adopted by the UK profession and such differences have understandably led 
to difficulties in harmonisation11. The European Commission issued a Consultative Paper dealing 
with fundamental principles on statutory auditor independence to be adopted by Member states into 
their own regulation.12 This EC Paper, has to a large extent, been influenced by the UK position on 
the issue of auditor independence.13  
It had been intended that the EC's Eighth Council Directive would harmonise the regulation of 
auditors in the European Union.14 The Directive considers the harmonisation of the conditions for 
the approval of auditors.15 It also deals with auditor competence, integrity, independence and 
liability.16 As regards the issue of auditor independence, the Directive assigns authority to Member 
States for making sure that statutory auditors are sufficiently independent of clients whom they are 
auditing.17 The Green Paper, which was published in 1996, deals with the role, position and liability 
of statutory auditors in the EU.18 The Federation des Experts Comptables Europeens  (FEE) which 
represents major European professional accounting bodies also contributed a paper to this debate. 
Categories of threat to auditor independence include: 
Self Interest 
This arises when auditors have financial or other interests which might result to them being 
                                                 
10  J Stevenson, 'Auditor Independence: A Comparative Descriptive Study of the UK, France and Italy' [2002] 
International Journal of Auditing 155 
11 Also see C Nobes and R Parker, Comparative International Accounting at p 95,100 
12  J Stevenson, 'Auditor Independence: A Comparative Descriptive Study of the UK, France and Italy' [2002] 
International Journal of Auditing 155 
13  ibid 
14  Ibid p 156 
15 L Evans and C Nobes, 'Harmonisation of the Structure of Audit Firms : Incorporation in the UK and Germany' 
(1998) 7 The European Accounting Review 125 
16   J Stevenson, 'Auditor Independence: A Comparative Descriptive Study of the UK, France and Italy' [2002] 
International Journal of Auditing 156 
17  ibid 
18  ibid 
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reluctant to take actions that would be adverse to the interests of the audit firm.19 
Self Review 
This arises when the results of a non audit service performed by the auditors or by others within the 
audit firm are included in the figures disclosed in the financial statements.20 As a result of providing 
non audit service, the audit firm is associated with aspects of the preparation of the financial 
statements and may be unable to give an objective view of relevant aspects of those financial 
statements.21 
Other threats to objectivity and independence include:22 
 Management threat, advocacy threat, familiarity threat and intimidation threat. 
Safeguards which may reduce these threats include a combination of personal qualities (integrity 
and reputation) and protective measures ensuing from both the practice environment and the 
profession itself.23 Protective measures could include staff training, encouragement to discuss 
concerns between staff, second partner review, audit partner rotation in assignments, meticulous 
screening of all new engagements or existing ones before re-accepting.24 Small firms in the UK are 
advised to consult the Institute of Chartered Accountants in Scotland (ICAS) if some of the 
mentioned safeguards are inappropriate.25 In addition, firms should consider the involvement of 
third parties where there is perception of a significant threat to objectivity.26 The UK audit 
profession has established certain independence safeguards which include the support for members 
through an Ethics Secretariat and Committee, the monitoring of audit work and policing of 
complaints and the ethical code.27 In addition, the Working Party Review (ICAEW 2000) has made 
                                                 
19 Ethical Statement 1 Integrity, objectivity and independence paragraph  28 
<http://www.asb.co.uk/apb/publications/index.cfm> (last visited 12 January 2007) 
20 ibid 
21 ibid 
22 ibid 
23   J Stevenson, 'Auditor Independence: A Comparative Descriptive Study of the UK, France and Italy' [2002] 
International Journal of Auditing 165 
24  ibid 
25  ibid 
26  ibid 
27  Ibid p 166 
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numerous recommendations aimed at strengthening the ethical guidance.28 
As the fourth main investigational aim, the expectations gap will also be discussed but would only 
be considered briefly. Comparisons of the aspects being investigated will be undertaken between 
the UK, Germany, Italy and the US. An assessment will then follow with a conclusion which 
embraces proposals for reforms on the topics being considered. 
Limitations of this Research 
Generally, more in depth analysis and comparisons will be carried out between the UK and 
Germany since Germany is the only country out of all three (itself, Italy and the US), which has 
adopted a single financial services regulator. However, some other comparative aspects will also be 
discussed in greater detail between the UK and the remaining jurisdictions being investigated. 
Because of the importance attached to investor protection in the UK and the US, the issue of audit 
independence will be explored in greater depth, on a comparative level between the US and the UK. 
The roles of external auditors in investor protection being greater in these jurisdictions than in 
Germany or Italy. For an in-depth analysis of the role of the external auditor in general, please refer 
to chapter five. 
7.2 Some Causes of International Differences in Auditing 
Cultural Differences  
An approach which may well explain the international differences in the behaviour of auditors is 
explained through Gray's contrasting pairs of accounting values namely:29 
Professionalism versus statutory control 
Uniformity versus flexibility 
Conversatism versus optimism 
Secrecy versus transparency 
Whilst the first two relate to authority and enforcement, the second two relate to measurement and 
                                                 
28  Ibid  
29 Ibid p 18 
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disclosure.30 In addition to cultural differences, there also exist colonial differences. 
Legal Systems 
The influence of common law (the UK and the US) and codified Roman law (Italy and Germany) 
on the nature of a jurisdiction's accounting rules is evidenced by the fact that common law systems 
influence commercial law – which traditionally does not prescribe rules to cover the behaviour of 
companies or how they should prepare their financial statements.31 Accounting within such 
common law systems, are to a large extent, not dependent upon law as was evidenced by the UK till 
the UK Companies Act 1981 came along.32 Accountants establish rules which may later become 
recommendations or standards and the difference between this and codified systems exists in that 
company law or commercial codes for codified systems need to establish rules for accounting and 
financial reporting.33 In Germany, for example, company accounting constitutes to a large extent, a 
branch of company law.34 
However, Cairns35 questions the appropriateness of trying to classify and identify causes of 
international differences since these cannot be depended upon in order to explain differences in 
practice. The appropriateness of classifying certain accounting practices as 'Anglo-American' or 
'Continental European' is also addressed and he highlights the fact that some French and German 
companies are moving towards US or international practices where the issue of financial reporting 
was concerned.36  
As a result of these arguments, six observations are made by Cairns namely that:37 'The distinction 
between Anglo-American accounting and Continental European accounting is becoming less and 
less relevant and more and more confused'; secondly, 'Those who continue to favour these 
classifications are ignoring what is happening in the world and how companies actually account for 
transactions and events' ; thirdly, 'It is increasingly apparent that the different economic, social and 
legal considerations which have influenced national accounting do not necessarily result in different 
accounting'; fourthly, 'There are now probably far more similarities between American and German 
                                                 
30 Ibid p 19 
31 Ibid p 20 
32 ibid 
33 ibid 
34 Ibid p 20 
35 See D Cairns,  'The Future Shape of Harmonisation: A Reply' (1997) 6 (2) European Accounting Review 316-
317 
36 Ibid at pp 307-308 
37 Ibid pp 316-317 
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accounting than there are between American and British accounting'; fifth, 'The futility of 
attempting to classify accounting was well demonstrated' ; and finally, 'In their attempts to maintain 
the distinction between Anglo-American and Continental European accounting, Flower and Nobes 
have started to clutch at straws. The[y] both make offensive attacks on the people involved in the 
work of the IASC.' 
Nobes responds to these observations and particularly the fourth observation, by referring to the 
1996 annual report of Daimler which stated that German and US accounting principles were based 
on different perspectives.38 The principle of caution and creditor protection is identified by the 
German Handelsgesetzbuch (HGB) as being of greater emphasis and this is distinguished from the 
main objective of US accounting – which is the availability of relevant information for shareholder 
decision making.39 It is therefore concluded that comparability of financial statements are of greater 
importance under US accounting than under the HGB.40 Whilst Cairns may be right to conclude 
that there are more similarities between American and German accounting, it may be more difficult 
establishing his claim that those similarities are greater than those which exist between American 
and British accounting. As discussed at the beginning of this chapter,  large listed companies in 
Germany are increasingly using International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs) accounting for 
their consolidated statements. However, to say that similarities between German and US firms are 
greater than those which exist between UK and US firms, would be to discount and discredit the 
fundamental importance placed in the objectives of accounting – as determined by the users of 
financial information in these jurisdictions. Whilst German objectives may focus on creditor 
protection as per the German Handelsgesetzbuch, UK and US accounting, being capital market 
systems place greater value on audits (as will be shown later on during the comparative section of 
this chapter) and this is largely as a result of the composition of the users of financial information in 
these jurisdictions. As a result of the existing similarities attributed by users of financial information 
in the UK and the US, similarities also prevail between the UK and the US in terms of the providers 
of finance. 
 
                                                 
38 See C Nobes, 'The Future Shape of Harmonisation: Some Responses'  (1998) 7(2) European Accounting 
Review 326 
39  ibid 
40 ibid 
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Another blurring area of the Anglo-American and the Continental European distinction is due to the 
fact that it is increasingly the case that shares in the UK and the US are held by institutional rather 
than individual shareholders – however, this still contrasts with state, bank or family holdings.41 
Differences between UK and US accounting (as will be discussed later on during the chapter), 
amongst which are principles based versus rules based accounting may provide further support for 
Cairns argument that similarities between German and US firms are greater than those similarities 
between UK and US firms. 
7.3 First Investigative Aim: The Rationale for a Single Regulator 
Since the UK and Germany are the only jurisdictions (amongst those being investigated), who have 
actually adopted a single financial services regulator, the main focus of jurisdictional comparison 
will be between these two countries. The most important differences to note between Germany and 
the UK are: The degree of involvement of Germany's central bank in the supervisory process and 
the fact that Germany has not yet implemented an integrated supervisory approach between its 
banking, insurance and securities sectors. An “umbrella type” of supervision exists here whereby 
these sectors operate functionally under one regulator, the Federal Financial Supervisory Office, 
Bundesanstalt fuer Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht – BaFin. In addition to highlighting the 
importance of historical, cultural and economic factors in determining the structure of financial 
regulation across the four jurisdictions being investigated, this section considers the importance of a 
coherent and “truly integrated” approach in achieving stated supervisory objectives. The role of the 
central bank in supervision is also emphasised. 
7.3.1 Germany 
As far back as the early 1990s, the issue of financial conglomerates supervision had been prominent 
in various academic literature.42 The objective of supervising such conglomerates was to capture 
effectively risks generated by various types of businesses and their associations.43 In response to the 
blurring distinction between bank, insurance and investment sectors, many countries including 
Germany, have created a single financial services regulator. The rise of conglomerates has led to 
growing internationalisation of accounting and hence the growing importance of transparency and 
                                                 
41 C Nobes and R Parker,  Comparative International Accounting  at p 22  
42 See Deutsche Bundesbank, ‘Supervision of Financial Conglomerates in Germany’ Monthly Report (April 
2005)  47 
43 ibid 
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increasing reliance on financial statements in countries such as Germany and Italy where fewer 
listed companies exist in comparison to the UK and the US.44 At international level, the Joint 
Forum on Financial Conglomerates established in 1996, was created in response to the issue.45 The 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), the International Association of Insurance 
Supervisors (IAIS) and the International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) work 
together within the Joint Forum.46 
The lack of a significant body of private shareholders and public companies in countries such as 
Italy and Germany obviates the reduced role played by auditors in these jurisdictions when 
compared to such jurisdictions such as the UK and the US.47 However there is growing realisation 
of the importance of audits in Germany and Italy in that the respective governments have 
recognised the importance of requiring public or listed companies to publish detailed, audited 
financial statements even though there are fewer listed companies when compared to the UK and 
the US.48 
Today, prudential regulations in Germany are based to a great extent on international standards and 
on the Basel Capital Accord and the EC Directives in particular.49 The Deutsche Bundesbank has 
been a member of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision since its inception and also works 
with other international banking supervisory bodies such as the Banking Supervision Committee of 
the ESCB ( the European System of Central Banks), the Banking Advisory Committee, Groupe de 
Contact, the International Organisation of Securities Commissions, the Financial Stability Forum 
and the Committee on the Global Financial System.50 
7.3.2 Banking Supervision in Germany 
Banking supervision in Germany is carried out by its central bank, the Deutsche Bundesbank in 
close collaboration with the Federal Financial Supervisory Office, Bundesanstalt fuer 
Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht – BaFin). Prior to this present model, Germany had a separate 
agency, the Bundesaufsichtsamt fuer das Kreditwesen (BAK – federal banking supervisory office) 
                                                 
44 C Nobes and R Parker, Comparative International Accounting  p 20 
45 See Deutsche Bundesbank, ‘Supervision of Financial Conglomerates in Germany’ Monthly Report (April 
2005) 47 
46 ibid 
47 C Nobes and R Parker, Comparative International Accounting  p 27 
48 Ibid p 23 
49 Deutsche Bundesbank's Involvement in Banking Supervision p 39 
50 Ibid p 40 
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and supervision arrangements were not like those which existed then in the UK where supervision 
was organised as a department within the central bank, the Bank of England.51 As with the Federal 
Banking Supervisory Office (Bundesanstalt fuer Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht – BaFin), the 
Bundesaufsichtsamt fuer das Kreditwesen was also required to collaborate with the Bundesbank and 
relied on information from the Bundesbank.52  The Bundesbank enjoys such independence that 
neither the government nor legislature are willing to grant it powers beyond those contained in the 
Bundesbank law.53 The Bundesaufsichtsamt fuer das Kreditwesen enjoyed wide powers but was 
still controlled by the Ministry of Finance.54 The Bank of England's relationship with the 
government, in contrast, was not clearly defined – even though it was nationalised in 1946, it still 
occupied an independent position between the market and the state.55 
The Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht -  
BaFin) was established on 1 May 2002 and the legal basis for its creation is the "Act Establishing 
the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority " (Gesetz über die Bundesanstalt für 
Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht - Finanzdienstleistungsaufsichtsgesetz - FinDAG) of 22 April 2002.56 
BaFin is an amalgamation of the three former Federal Supervisory Offices responsible for banking 
(the Bundesaufsichtsamt für das Kreditwesen - BAKred), the insurance industry (the 
Bundesaufsichtsamt für das Versicherungswesen - BAV) and securities trading (the 
Bundesaufsichtsamt für den Wertpapierhandel – BAWe). BaFin is a public-law institution with legal 
capacity reporting directly to the Federal Government and subject to the legal and functional 
supervision of the Federal Ministry of Finance.57 It is funded entirely out of fees and contributions 
from the institutions and companies that it supervises and is independent of the Federal budget.58 
BaFin was set up in response to global changes and developments within the financial services 
sector, fundamental changes which required a legislative response in order to secure the future 
                                                 
51 See HR Vieten, ‘Banking Regulation in Britain and Germany Compared: Capital Ratios, External Audit and 
Internal Controls’ (PhD thesis, London School of Economics 1996) 62, 63 
52 Ibid p 71 
53 Ibid pp 62, 63 
54 Ibid p 71 
55 ibid 
56 http://www.bafin.de/bafin/aufgabenundziele_en.htm#n1 (26 Dec 2007) 
57 ibid 
58 ibid 
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stability of the German financial system.59  
The  Banking  Act Gesetz  ueber das Kreditwesen (Kreditwesengesetz – KWG), is  the legal basis 
for banking  supervision in Germany  and  it aims  at safeguarding  the  viability of the banking  
industry – which is  particularly sensitive  to fluctuations, by protecting  creditors. The German 
Banking Act consists of six parts, each part subdivided into divisions. There are sixty – four 
sections covering the six parts of  the Act (Kreditwesengesetz , KWG  last  amended  through 
Article 5 of  the  law of  5th April 2004, BGBI.IS.502). 
It is however interesting to note that the substantive law, the Banking Act (Gesetz ueber das 
Kreditwesen) was not replaced – as is the case with the UK where the Financial Services and 
Markets Act 2000 came into force, replacing previous banking legislation. 
Section 6 of the Banking Act delegates the central role in banking supervision to the Federal 
Financial Supervisory Office. In addition to licensing, monitoring and (where necessary), closing 
individual institutions, the tasks of the Federal Authority also include issuing general instructions 
which lay down rules for carrying out banking business and providing financial services and for 
limiting risks.60 It can do this by issuing principles and regulations.61 The Federal Authority's duties 
also include resolving issues in the banking and financial services sector which could endanger 
assets entrusted to institutions, disrupt the orderly conduct of banking business or the orderly 
provision of financial services or lead to considerable problems for the economy as a whole. 
The legislature provided for the Bundesbank to be  involved  in  banking  supervision  having  
recognised that functions of the authority responsible for banking  supervision  and those of the 
central bank are interconnected.62 Participation of the Bundesbank was considered necessary since 
the then Federal Banking Supervisory Office had no substructure of its own.63  It  was only the  
Bundesbank system, with its main offices  and  branch  offices that  permitted efficient  and  cost-
effective supervision, at local level, of the over 4000 credit institutions  in  the  Federal  Republic of  
                                                 
59 K Mwenda and J Mvula, 'A Framework for Unified Financial Services Supervision: Lessons from Germany 
and Other European Countries' (2003) 5 Journal of International Banking Regulation  37 
60 <http://www.bundesbank.de/bankenaufsicht/bankenaufsicht_bafin.en.php> 
61 ibid 
62  T Filipova,  ‘ Concept  of  Integrated Financial  Supervision  and  Regulation  of Financial Conglomerates : 
The Case of  Germany and the UK’  (2003 ) 1 
63  ibid 
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Germany.64 
There is clear division of functions between the Federal Financial Supervisory Office and the 
Bundesbank in the area of banking supervision.65 When asked what made the German  approach so  
special,  Jochen  Sanro, President  of  the  Federal Banking Supervisory Office of Germany 
responded  by  saying: - The answer, of course, is  the significant  role the Bundesbank  will  play  
in  banking  supervision, and that  is  the reason, why I  would  like  to  call  the  new  BaFin a 
‘modified’ single regulator as compared to the British FSA, for example…-66   
BaFin  has  3  main  objectives :67 
To  ensure  the  functioning  of  the  entire  financial  industry  in  Germany.  From this 
objective, 2 others can be inferred: 
To  safeguard  the  solvency  of  banks,  financial  services  institutions  and  insurance  
undertakings 
To protect clients and investors. 
BaFin maintains that as a unified regulatory agency, it would be able to develop more effective 
rules in managing risk – as compared to all previous financial regulators.68 
According to the Banking Act section 6, the objective of banking regulation is “ ...to counteract 
undesirable developments in the banking and financial services sector which may endanger the 
safety of the assets entrusted to institutions, impair the proper conduct of banking business or 
provision of financial services or involve serious disadvantages for the economy...”69 The insurance 
and securities industry also have their separate objectives.70 
 
                                                 
64  ibid 
65  ibid 
66   Mwenda and  Mvula,  ‘ A Framework for Unified Financial Services Supervision’  (2003)  5  Journal of  
International  Banking Regulation  39 
67  ibid p 37; Also see <http://www.bafin.de/bafin/aufgabenundziele_en.htm#n1> 
68  ibid p 38 
69 T Filipova (2006) 89 
70 See VAG section 81 and WpHG section 41 respectively 
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7.3.3 Development of Banking Supervision in Germany 
Since the introduction in Germany of general state banking supervision, the central bank the 
Deutsche Bundesbank, has played an integral role in supervision.71  This prominent role has 
continued over the years and the Banking Act facilitates the Bundesbank's participation in the 
monitoring of institutions72. One of the early examples of official banking regulation can be traced 
back to the Nuremberg Bancomat in 1621.73  The Reichsbank was established in 1875 and 
proposals for state supervision of banks were discussed – however, these were abandoned.74 This 
was so even though Germany had witnessed a series of bank failures over the past decades. The 
Rheinisch – Westfaelische Bank and the Vereinsbank Berlin failed in 1891 and the Dresdner Credit 
Anstalt and Leipziger Bank had collapsed in 1901.75  As a result of the importance of credit 
institutions  financing the German industrial revolution, the Reichsbank extended its powers from 
monetary policy to controlling the credit sector.76  In 1931, the Austrian banking crisis extended to 
Germany and led to the collapse of Danatbank.77 That same year, the banking crisis triggered the 
adoption of state supervision of all banks carrying out operations in Germany.78 A banking 
supervisory body  governing all the German banks was set up for the first time on September 19 
1931 by the Emergency Decree of the Reich President on Companies Law, banking Supervision 
and Fiscal Amnesty.79 In addition to specifying licensing criteria, the supervisory authority also 
arranged for regular monitoring of the banks.80 The New York stock market crash of 1929, “Black 
Friday”, had negative effects on the Great Depression which in turn, worsened the 1931 banking 
crisis.81  Taking into consideration all the surrounding events, the German Reich's Government 
issued out various emergency decrees which included the Ordinance Governing Stock Corporation 
Law, Banking Supervision and Tax Amnesty in September 1931.82 These became the foundation 
                                                 
71 See 'Bundesbank – Banking Supervision-Motives and Aims' < 
http://www.bundesbank.de/bankenaufsicht/bankenaufsicht_motive.en.php> 
72  Deutsche Bundesbank, ‘The Deutsche Bundesbank's Involvement in Banking Supervision' Monthly Report 
(September 2000)  31 
73 See HR Vieten, ‘Banking Regulation in Britain and Germany Compared: Capital Ratios, External Audit and 
Internal Controls’ (PhD thesis, London School of Economics 1996)  57 
74 ibid 
75 See Vieten p 58 
76 ibid 
77 ibid 
78 See 'History of Banking Supervision ' < http://www.bafin.de/bafin/historie_ba_en.htm> 
79 Deutsche Bundesbank, ‘The Deutsche Bundesbank's Involvement in Banking Supervision' Monthly Report 
(September 2000) 32 
80 ibid 
81 'History of Banking Supervision ' < http://www.bafin.de/bafin/historie_ba_en.htm> 
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for a uniform system of state supervision – applicable to all banks.83 Prior to this, only particular 
groups84 or targeted fields of banking85 had been supervised.86 Up till the start of the 1930s, 
Germany's banking sector had been operating in accordance with the principle of 
“Gewerbefreiheit”, which meant the freedom of trade and commerce – which was of great 
importance in the German Industrial Code of 1869.87 The occurrence of the 1931 German banking 
crisis led to the establishment of the emergency decree of September 1931 – its aim being the 
stabilisation of the whole financial sector.88 A more detailed legislative framework for banking 
supervision was introduced as part of the Banking Act (Kreditwesengesetz – KWG) which was 
adopted on the 5th December 1934 and it superseded the Emergency Decree.89  After World War II, 
banking supervision was at first carried out by the individual states within Germany's new federal 
system. There was no uniform regulatory framework till the Banking Act of July 10 1961 was 
passed.90 
 The years following the Second World War saw the Banking Act of 1934 amended in several 
instances. These amendments resulted from difficulties connected to the implementation of 
framework regulations, lack of clarity regarding certain areas of jurisdiction and proposals 
suggested by western allies.91  The Banking Act of 1939 gave powers of prudential responsibilities 
to the Reich Banking Supervisory Office which reported directly to the Reich Minister of 
Economics.92 The Bundesbank was established as an independent monetary body in 1957 – with the 
establishment of the Bundesausichtsamt fuer das Kreditwesen (BAK) following in 1961.93 After 
many years of work, Germany's new “Gesetz ueber das Kreditwesen” (Banking Act version of 10 
July 1961) was eventually adopted on 1 January 1962.94 This Act was aimed at fostering order 
within the financial system at a general level whilst preserving the efficiency and stability of the 
                                                 
83 ibid 
84 Public savings banks in Prussia since 1838 - as well as mortgage banks since 1899 ; ibid  
85 Those under the Safe Custody Act and the Exchange Act of 1896; ibid 
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92 Deutsche Bundesbank, ‘The Deutsche Bundesbank's Involvement in Banking Supervision' Monthly Report 
(September 2000) 32 
93 Vieten at pg 58 
94 See 'History of Banking Supervision' < http://www.bafin.de/bafin/historie_ba_en.htm> 
 15 
  
financial sector.95 The Banking Act of 1961 resulted in responsibility for banking supervision 
becoming centralised once again – after decentralisation had occurred by the Western military 
governments after the end of the Second World War.96 Despite opposition by a number of 
Bundeslaender as to the concentration of banking supervisory powers within a single federal body, 
the Federal Constitutional Court ruled that the Banking Act was in accordance with the provisions 
of the Basic Law, Grundgesetz, in June 1962.97  The Federal Banking Supervisory Office was 
granted sovereign responsibility with the Act making provision for the Bundesbank participation in 
the monitoring of credit institutions.98 The Sixth Act Amending the Banking Act of 1997 broadened  
the scope of the Bundesbank's involvement in prudential supervision to embrace the monitoring of 
financial services institutions.99 
The First Act Amending the Banking Act brought about minor changes – however, undertakings 
subject to official supervision and sections relating to supervisory jurisdiction were gradually 
expanded.100 Following the Second Act Amending the Banking Act and its adoption on 1 May 
1976, the Federal Banking Supervisory Office was authorised to issue a moratorium on a bank 
considered to be in jeopardy101 or request for an audit to be undertaken without special reason.102 
Other amendments included the adoption of internal control mechanisms and more thorough 
provisions regarding large exposures.103 It has been said that this amendment of the Banking Act 
was prompted after weaknesses within the bank supervisory process became apparent – following 
the failure of Herstatt Bank in 1974.104 After the collapse of Herstatt Bank, the law was changed to 
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allow German regulators to commission special reports without specific reasons.105 
In addition to considering extensive revision of the Banking Act and establishing a Commission of 
Inquiry into “Basic Banking Questions” for this purpose in November 1974, the Federal Ministry of 
Finance also examined whether the framework of the German banking system should be 
reformed.106 It was held in its report submitted in May 1979, that even though the German banking 
system had proved efficacious, adjustments would have to be made to the Banking Act to reflect 
changes in the credit institutions' risk position.107  In addition to concluding that findings of the 
inquiry were in line with the demands which the banking supervisory authorities had been making 
in the light of their practical experience, the issue of ensuring that individual institutions and groups 
of institutions had adequate capital had to be addressed.108  
The Third Act Amending the Banking Act upon its coming into force on 1 January 1985, 
introduced a consolidation process for prudential purposes in addition to the existing supervision of 
individual credit institutions.109 The Third Act Amending the Banking Act was also based on a 
report published by the Inquiry Commission established after the collapse of Herstatt, regarding 
basic issues within the banking sector, “Grundsatzfragen der Kreditwirtschaft”.110 Around the end 
of 1992, the Fourth Act Amending the Banking Act led to transposition of the Second Banking 
Coordination Directive and the Directive on the Own Funds of Credit Institutions into German 
law.111  
As well as re defining the concept of own funds, the Fourth Act Amending the Banking Act also 
introduced the principle of shareholder monitoring and placed restrictions on non-bank ownership 
interests.112 The Fifth Act Amending the Banking Act was adopted in September 1994 and saw the 
transposition of the Large Exposure Directive and the Second Consolidation Directive into German 
                                                 
105 See Deutsche Bundesbank, Geschaeftsbericht ( 1974) 68 
106 See  'Bundesbank – Banking Supervision-Motives and Aims' 
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law.113 Further amendments, the most recent being the Sixth Act Amending the Banking Act as of 1 
January 1998, served to implement Directives of the European Union and thereby harmonise 
banking supervision legislation in the European Economic Area (EEA).114 These have resulted to 
legal conditions being created for the freedom of banking activities and financial services within the 
single European market.115  
In September 2001, the Federal Ministry of Finance published a first draft of the Fourth Financial 
Markets Enhancement Act.116 A new draft Act then followed in 2002 – the purpose of this Draft 
Act being the improvement of the protection of private investors and to help extend the scope of 
capital market activities in Germany.117  It does not completely codify financial markets laws but 
amends present laws – including the German Banking Act.118 Amendments to the German Banking 
Act include:119 The issue of credit cards and traveller cheques (given that the issuer is not at the 
same time the offeror of the services paid for through such instruments) being subject to a licence 
requirement; “ e money business” becoming subject to a banking licence requirement; the powers of 
German regulatory authorities being extended in a number of areas to give full effect to the Basel 
Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision 1997. 
The measures in the Fourth Financial Market Promotion Act (“ the Act” ) consider the impact of 
international standards in banking supervision.120 The Act also brings the present law in alignment 
with major technological developments, particularly within the banking and financial services 
sectors.121 The Fourth Financial Market Promotion Act also implements the EC E Money Directive 
and facilitates the increased use of online and internet banking.122 
On the 1st January 2004, an entirely new Investment Act and a new Investment Tax Act came into 
                                                 
113 Ibid; See also Deutsche Bundesbank,  'The Fifth Act Amending the Banking Act' Deutsche Bundesbank 
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114 See  'Bundesbank – Banking Supervision-Motives and Aims' 
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operation in Germany.123 This Act not only implements the amended UCITS ( Undertakings for 
Collective Investment in Transferable Securities), but also implements innovations such as hedge 
funds in order to increase the competitiveness of Germany as an international financial market 
centre.124 One of the reasons prompting this near complete revision of the German investment law 
was the need to implement the amended UCITS Directive by February 13 2004.125  The new 
Investment Act covers what was governed by the previous Investment Companies Act and the 
Foreign Investment Act with exception of the tax provisions of the Foreign Investment Act which 
are within the Investment tax Act.126 Improved clarity is one of the features of the structure of the 
new Investment Act and the new Investment Tax Act – however the taxation provisions of the new 
Investment Tax Act are still ambiguous.127  
Unlike other European investment companies, German investment companies, being credit 
institutions, are subject not only to the provisions of the Investment Act, but also to the Banking 
Act.128 German investment companies are obliged to manage investment funds solely in the unit 
holders' interests and the objective of protecting the integrity of the markets is now clearly stated in 
the Investment Act.129 Investment companies must also provide BaFin with information on asset 
portfolio and specified information on all securities and derivatives in order to facilitate supervision 
of compliance by BaFin.130 According to the Investment Act, outsourcing by an investment 
company is only allowed if basic requirements for outsourcing under the Banking Act are met and 
if delegation does not restrict the investment company from acting in the unit-holders' interests.131  
The new Investment Act undoubtedly signifies a significant change for the German investment 
industry since the Investment Companies Act first regulated investment funds in 1957.132 The 
flexibility demonstrated by the new law whilst striving to achieve the objective of investor 
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protection, has been applauded.133 
Whilst some single financial services regulators in countries like Denmark are not closely 
associated to their central bank operations, the UK cooperates with its central bank, exchanging 
information through a Memorandum of Understanding. As stated by Llewellyn, any country setting 
up the structure of a regulatory system, should consider such factors as the necessary number of 
agencies, the appropriate structure of those agencies, how the objectives for each agency should be 
defined, the degree of coordination and information haring between different agencies, the 
independence and accountability of the regulatory agencies and other factors.134 Historical factors 
should also be considered. 
7.3.4 Reasons  for Creation of a Unified Services Regulator in Germany. 
Reasons for integrated financial market supervision include:135 
The growth of financial conglomerates. The regulator is challenged in having to capture 
risks arising from cross-shareholdings and intra-group  transactions within conglomerates; 
The increasing integration of the financial markets requires a holistic view of the system 
which can be provided only by an integrated financial supervisory authority; 
Banking; insurance and investment groups compete for the savings of private households 
with similar or even identical products. 
Even though financial services has been brought under one roof, BaFin still recognises the 
differences which exist between the industries and the government did not amend the substantive 
law136 forming the basis of the three previously separate areas.137 In addition, BaFin's 
organisational structure also recognises these industry differences.138 
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7.3.5 Collaboration between the Federal Ministry of Finance, the Deutsche 
Bundesbank and the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority. 
At first, it might seem that collaboration within the German Banking Act is a two way affair 
between the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority and the Deutsche Bundesbank. However, the 
Federal Ministry of Finance is involved in various consultations with the Deutsche Bundesbank and 
also delegates, in various instances, certain duties to the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority. In 
carrying out and delegating certain duties, the Federal Ministry of Finance usually does so by way 
of a regulation. 
7.3.5.1 Collaboration relating to definitions within the German Banking Act 
Under section 1 ( 3 ) KWG, the Federal Ministry of Finance, the Bundesfinanzministerium, consults 
with the Deutsche Bundesbank and after doing so, may designate certain enterprises as financial 
enterprises by way of a regulation. According to section 1 ( 12 ), and in order to determine the 
definition of the trading book, the Federal Ministry of Finance also consults with the Deutsche 
Bundesbank and after this, may issue more detailed provisions regarding the definition of the 
trading book by way of a regulation. The Federal Ministry of Finance may, by way of a regulation, 
also delegate this authority to the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority provided that the 
regulation is issued in agreement with the Deutsche Bundesbank.  
7.3.5.2 Collaboration relating to exemptions from certain provisions of the Banking Act and 
the issue of more detailed provisions in relation to sections of the Act.  
The Federal Ministry of Finance is also authorised to permit, by way of regulation and without 
requiring consent of the Upper House of Parliament (the Deutscher Bundesrat) exemptions from 
certain obligations for individual payment types and individual payment systems. The Federal 
Ministry of Finance may by way of delegation, also delegate this authority to the FFSA ( section 25 
b ( 4 ) KWG.  
According to Division 7, section 31 of the KWG, the Federal Ministry of Finance, after consulting 
with the Deutsche Bundesbank, may by way of a regulation, exempt all institutions or certain 
types/classes of institutions from the duty to report specific exposures and facts. It may also 
delegate this authority to the FFSA, by way of a regulation - so far as the regulation is issued in 
consultation with the Deutsche Bundesbank. 
In relation to the special duties of the auditor, the Federal Ministry of Finance, in agreement with 
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the Federal Ministry of Justice (Bundesministerium der Justiz) and after consulting with the 
Bundesbank, may issue more detailed provisions on the object of an audit, the time at which it is 
carried out and the contents of auditors' reports by way of regulation (Section 29 ( 4 ) KWG). This 
is so far as it is necessary for the performance of the FFSA's duties and also particularly to enable it 
identify inconsistencies which may endanger the assets entrusted to the institution or which may 
affect proper execution of banking business or provision of financial services and to obtain 
consistent records for assessing the business conducted by institutions. It may also delegate this 
authority to the FFSA.   
Under section 2(5) of the KWG, the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority may decide in certain 
cases, after consulting with the Deutsche Bundesbank, that an enterprise which mainly carries out e 
money business is not subject to certain sections of the German Banking Act. Such ruling is 
published in the Federal Gazette. The Federal Ministry of Finance, after consulting with the 
Deutsche Bundesbank, may by way of a regulation, issue more comprehensive provisions regarding 
conditions whereby such exemption from the Banking Act may be granted. The Federal Ministry of 
Finance could also by way of a regulation, delegate this authority (the issue of more detailed 
provisions) to the FFSA provided that the regulation is issued in agreement with the Bundesbank. In 
a way, this tripartite arrangement is comparable to that which exists in the UK between the FSA, the 
Bank of England and the Treasury. However, there is a more direct relationship between the Federal 
Financial Supervisory (FFSA) and the Deutsche Bundesbank.  
7.3.6 Functions of the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority 
The Banking Act of 1961 transferred responsibilities for the monitoring of credit institutions and 
with the coming into force of the Sixth Act Amending the Banking Act, the monitoring of financial 
services institutions as well, to the Federal Banking Supervisory Office (now known as the Federal 
Financial Supervisory Authority).139  The Federal Banking Supervisory Office reported directly to 
the Minister of Economics and since 1972, to the Federal Ministry of Finance.140   
In addition to deciding whether certain enterprises are bound by the provisions of the German 
Banking Act (section 4 KWG), the FFSA also: 
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supervises institutions pursuant to the provisions of the German Banking Act ( Division 2, 
section 6 ( 1 ) ) 
Seeks to prevent developments within the banking and financial services sector which may 
endanger the safety of assets under the control of institutions, affect the proper conduct of 
banking businesses or lead to serious advantages for the economy of the nation ( Division 2, 
section 6 ( 2 ) ) 
Issues orders to institutions and their managers in order to prevent violations of regulatory 
provisions, to prevent incidences which could endanger the safety of assets entrusted to an 
institution or prevent incidences which could affect the proper conduct of its banking 
business or provision of financial services ( Division 2, section 6 ( 3). 
7.3.7 Division 3. Information and Audits 
Section 44 involves information from and audits of institutions, ancillary banking services 
enterprises, financial holding companies and enterprises included in supervision on a consolidated 
basis. 
Upon request, an institution, members of its governing bodies, its employees are required to provide 
information to the FFSA, to agencies and persons used by the FFSA in carrying out its functions 
and to the Bundesbank about all business activities and also submit documentation ( section 44 ( 1 
)). The FFSA may perform audits at the institutions without special reason and may entrust the 
Deutsche Bundesbank with the duty of carrying out these audits. Staff of the FFSA, the Deutsche 
Bundesbank and other persons used by the FFSA to carry out its audit may enter and inspect the 
institution's business premises during usual business hours. (note: basic right within the 
Grundgesetz is not restricted to this extent. However, when prosecuting unauthorised banking 
business and financial services (section 44c ), basic right restricted). 
Those enterprises domiciled abroad which are part of a group are to allow the FFSA carry out audits 
upon request from the FFSA – particularly those checks relevant to the accuracy of the consolidated 
accounts ( section 44 ( 3 ) KWG ).  
Under section 44 ( 4 ) KWG, the FFSA is empowered to send representatives to shareholders' 
meetings, general meetings or partners' meetings, meetings of the supervisory bodies of institutions 
organised in the form of a legal person. 
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In relation to prosecution of unauthorised banking business and financial services, section 44c (1) 
KWG requires an enterprise whose facts are known to point to the assumption that it carries out 
banking business or provides financial services without licence required by the KWG or that it 
carries out business prohibited under section 3 of the KWG, to provide information on the business 
activities of the enterprise. The enterprise is also required to give documentation to the FFSA and 
the Deutsche Bank. 
The FFSA has the power to carry out inspections on the enterprises's site and on the premises of any 
persons and enterprises required to provide information and documentation and it may entrust to the 
Deutsche Bundesbank the duty of performing such inspections ( section 44c ( 2 ) KWG). For this 
purpose, the FFSA and the Deutsche Bundesbank are empowered to enter and inspect these 
premises during usual customary business hours. In order to avoid apparent risks to public order 
and safety, they are also authorised to enter and inspect the premises also outside customary office 
and business hours and can also enter and inspect areas serving as residential quarters. As a result, 
the basic right contained within Article 13 of the Constitution (Grundgesetz) is restricted to this 
extent. Under section 44c ( 3 ), staff of the FFSA and the Deutsche Bundesbank are empowered to 
carry out searches on the premises of the enterprise and of the persons and enterprises required to 
provide information and present documentation to subsection (1 ) sentence 1 of section 44c. The 
basic right contained within Article 13 of the Constitution is restricted to this extent and searches of 
business premises require a judicial warrant except in the cases of imminent risk. Staff of the FFSA 
and the Deutsche Bundesbank are allowed to safe keep items which could be of importance as 
evidence in their investigations (section 44c (4)). 
7.3.8 The Bundesbank’s Involvement in Banking Supervision 
 
The Bundesbank has extensive knowledge of the financial sector, well-trained, qualified staff with 
expertise due to its business relationships with credit institutions, its local presence and general 
proximity to the market.141 Parliament therefore had good reasons for involving the Bundesbank 
through section 7 of the Banking Act in the banking supervision process.142 The Bundesbank is 
involved in basically all aspects of banking supervision and these include:143 The issuing of general 
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rules such as principles and regulations; undertaking regular surveillance which excludes sovereign 
and isolated measures directed at institutions – as these are reserved for the Federal Financial 
Supervisory Authority; banking supervisory audits; ongoing monitoring of institutions; international 
cooperation in coordination of prudential matters and crisis management roles. 
Functions performed through collaboration between the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority 
(FFSA) and the Deutsche Bundesbank comprise: 
Ongoing monitoring of institutions by the Deutsche Bundesbank. This involves the 
evaluation of documents submitted by institutions; auditors' reports pursuant to section 26 
KWG, annual financial statements, as well as performing and evaluating audits of banking 
operations in order to assess the adequacy of institutions' capital and risk management 
procedures and the appraisal of audit findings (Division 2, Section 7 of KWG). Ongoing 
monitoring of institutions are to be performed by the Bundesbank's regional offices. 
Collaboration with the FFSA is involved in the monitoring performed by the Bundesbank as 
the Bundesbank is required to observe guidelines issued by the FFSA. The guidelines are 
also issued in agreement with the Deutsche Bundesbank. If no agreement can be reached 
within a certain period, the Federal Ministry of Finance issues guidelines in consultation 
with the Deutsche Bundesbank (section 7 ( 2 ) KWG. 
The FFSA and the Deutsche Bundesbank are to communicate to each other any observations 
and findings deemed necessary for the performance of their duties ( Section 7 ( 3 ) KWG. 
Against this background, the Bundesbank is required to provide the FFSA with information 
it obtains through the collection of statistics pursuant to section 18 of the Bundesbank Act 
(Gesetz ueber die Deutsche Bundesbank). Before ordering the collection of statistics, the 
Bundesbank is required to consult with the FFSA (section 18 sentence 5 of the Bundesbank 
Act) where necessary. 
The FFSA and the Bundesbank may also permit each other access to their respective 
database in order to carry out their duties under the German Banking Act ( section 7 ( 4 ). 
Where the FFSA obtains personal data from the Deutsche Bundesbank's database, every 
tenth time, the Bundesbank is required to log the time and details which allow the obtained 
data to be identified and the identity of the person obtaining the data. 
The FFSA and the Bundesbank may also set up joint data files. When supervising 
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institutions which carry out banking business or provide financial services in another state of 
the European Economic Area, and when supervising institutions pursuant to the Banking 
Directive, the FFSA and so far as it is acting under the German Banking Act, the 
Bundesbank are required to cooperate with respective authorities of the state involved ( 
Division 2, Section 8 ( 3 ) KWG). 
Institutions are required to submit monthly returns to the Deutsche Bundesbank immediately 
after the end of every month. The Bundesbank also passes on monthly returns with its 
comments to the FFSA and the FFSA may waive its right to receiving certain monthly 
returns (section 25 KWG). 
Further evidence of close working relationship between the FFSA and the Deutsche Bundesbank 
can be seen under sections 26, 28, 29, 44, 44c of the German Banking Act. 
Under section 2 ( 10 ),  change in a financial services institution's circumstances should be reported 
to the FFSA without delay. The FFSA then forwards these reports to the Bundesbank. Other 
circumstances exist whereby an institution is required to report certain activities to the FFSA and 
the Bundesbank. These include: i) The acquisition of qualified participating interests in an institute 
(section 2b ( 1 ) KWG.; ( ii ) Where the holder of a qualified participating interest intends to 
increase the amount of the qualified participating interest in such a way that the thresholds of 20%, 
33% or 50% of the voting rights or capital are reached or exceeded, or that the institution comes 
under his control.  
7.3.9 Confidentiality 
 
Employees of the FFSA and anyone commissioned under section 4 ( 2 ) of the Act on integrated 
financial services ( Gesetz zur Errichtung der Bundesanstalt fuer Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht ), 
supervisors appointed under section 46 ( 1 ) sentence 2 number 4,  liquidators appointed under 
section 37 sentence 2 and section 38 ( 2 ) sentences 2 and 4 and employees of the Deutsche 
Bundesbank, insofar as they are involved in implementing the German Banking Act are under 
obligation not to disclose or use without authority, information and facts which have come to their 
observation during the course of their duties and which should be kept secret in the interests of the 
institution or a third party ( especially business and trade secrets ) - not even after they have left 
such employment or their activities have ended ( section 9 KWG ). The same applies to other 
persons who learn of such facts or information as a result of official reports.  
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Such facts are deemed not to be disclosed or of use without authorisation if they are passed: 
To public prosecutors' offices or courts having jurisdiction in criminal cases and 
administrative fine cases; 
To agencies which as a result of a parliamentary act or public mandate, are entrusted with 
supervision of institutions and other stated enterprises and to persons commissioned by such 
agencies; 
To agencies dealing with an institution's liquidation or the commencement of insolvency 
proceedings over its assets; 
To persons in charge of statutory audits of accounts of institutions or financial enterprises 
and to agencies supervising such persons; 
To a deposit guarantee scheme or an investor compensation scheme; 
To stock markets or financial futures exchanges or  
To central banks 
Insofar as these agencies require the information for the performance of their functions. In the case 
of a foreign agency, the agency is to be made aware that it may use information solely for the 
purpose for which it has been passed on to it. 
Submission of Annual Accounts, Management Report and Auditor’s Reports 
In addition to an institution being required to submit its approved annual accounts, approved 
management report to the FFSA and the Deutsche Bundesbank without delay, pursuant to Division 
5a, section 26 of the KWG, the auditor is also required to submit his report on the auditing of the 
annual accounts (auditor’s report), to the FFSA and the Bundesbank without delay upon completion 
of the audit. 
In relation to credit institutions belonging to a credit cooperative audit association or audited by the 
audit office of a savings bank and giro association, the auditor submits the audit report only upon 
request by the FFSA ( KWG 26 ( 1 ). Audit reports on supplementary audit carried out in 
association with a guarantee scheme and audits on group accounts are to be submitted by the 
auditor to the FFSA and the Bundesbank without delay upon completion of the audit ( Section 26 ( 
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2, 3) KWG). 
Auditors Appointed in Special Cases 
Institutions are to inform the FFSA and the Bundesbank of their appointed auditors immediately 
after the appointment has taken place. Within one month of receiving this information, the FFSA 
may order the appointment of another auditor if this is necessary in order to attain the aim of the 
audit (section 28(1)). The court of registration having jurisdiction of the institution shall then 
appoint an auditor upon request of the FFSA (section 28 (2)) subject to certain conditions under this 
section of the Act. 
Special Duties of the Auditor 
In addition to auditing the annual or interim accounts of a financial institution, the auditor is also 
required to examine its financial circumstances (section 29(1)). Compliance with reporting 
requirements, obligations under the Money Laundering Act, section 128 of the Companies Act on 
disclosure requirements and section 135 of the Companies Act are to be included in the auditor's 
report - with some items being reported separately in the report (section 29 ss1,2 KWG).  
If during the course of his audit the auditor discovers information which may lead to the audit being 
qualified or lead to the certificate of audit being withheld, jeopardise the existence of the institution 
or seriously disrupt its progress or which indicates that managers have seriously disregarded the law 
or the Articles of Association or the partnership agreement, he is to report this immediately to the 
FFSA and the Deutsche Bundesbank (section 29 (3 )). Upon request from the FFSA or the 
Bundesbank, he shall provide them the auditor's report and communicate any other facts obtained 
during the course of the audit which may suggest that the institution's business affairs have not been 
conducted properly. Provided he reported in good faith, the auditor would not be held accountable 
for accuracy of facts relating the information provided.  
7.3.10 The Deutsche Bundesbank's Responsibilities   
The Bundesbank's involvement in banking supervision arises not only from historical evolution but 
also from the nature of its duties.144 As a result of its business relationships with credit institutions, 
its local presence and its general proximity to the market, the Bundesbank has deep insights into the 
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financial sector and possesses knowledgeable, qualified staff who deal with issues relating to the 
financial market and its stability.145 It is therefore not surprising that the German Parliament 
approved the Bundesbank's involvement in banking supervision in section 7 of the Banking Act.146  
The Bundesbank is assigned most of the operational tasks in banking supervision and the functional 
effectiveness of the supervisory system is essentially backed, in particular, by the Bundesbank's 
many years and expertise in the field of financial markets and payment operations.147  The 
Bundesbank's responsibilities notably include evaluating the documents, reports, annual accounts 
and auditors' reports submitted by the institutions as well as regular audits of banking operations.148 
There is clear division of responsibilities between the Federal Financial Supervisory Office and the 
Bundesbank as regarding banking supervision.149 The Federal Financial Supervisory Authority,  
being successor to the Federal Banking Supervisory Office, is responsible for all sovereign 
measures.150 Sovereign functions include such functions as the issuing of administrative acts. Only 
in exceptional cases will the FFSA carry out audits of banking operations, either together with the 
Bundesbank or on its own.151  
Before issuing general regulations, the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority must consult with 
the Bundesbank.152 The extent of the Bundesbank's participation in the supervisory process is 
graded according to the level to which those regulations affect its functions.153 Through this 
involvement in supervising individual institutions, the Bundesbank also acquires knowledge about 
the solvency of its own borrowers which it needs for its central bank functions.154 This in turn 
contributes to the stability of the financial system - also in the framework of the European System 
of Central Banks (ESCB).155 In fact, a considerable shift in emphasis has been apparent during the 
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past few years towards strengthening the stability of the financial system.156 The Bundesbank plays 
an important role in virtually all areas of banking supervision as follows:157 
the issuing of general rules (such as principles and regulations); 
the process of ongoing supervision, with the exception of (sovereign) individual regulatory 
measures vis-à-vis institutions, which are reserved for the Federal Agency  
prudential audits and  
international cooperation/coordination in the prudential field.  
In addition, the Bundesbank plays an important role in crisis management.158 The Bundesbank's 
tasks are set out in the Bundesbank Act and in the EC Treaty. 
Article 3 of the Memorandum of Understanding explains159 the responsibilities of the main offices 
of Bundesbank in analysing banking business documents and notifying BaFin of the results of the 
analysis. The Deutsche Bundesbank also studies the auditor's report and  has more control over 
bank audits.160  
Audits of Credit Institutions 
The banking supervisory process relies substantially on the credit institutions' data – hence 
dependence on the use of auditors. Even though the Bundesbank has its own banking supervisory 
auditors ( approximately 70 as of September 2000), these also conduct trading activities on behalf 
of the Federal Financial Supervisory Office as well as audits to determine the adequacy of 
institutions' market risk models.161  As a result, the use of external auditors is of great importance. 
Credit institutions are audited by independent certified auditors whom they select themselves and 
who, in their audits, have to comply with detailed auditing guidelines laid by the Federal Banking 
Supervisory Office. Section 29 lists duties of the auditors. 
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7.4 Italy 
7.4.1 Banking Regulation and Supervision in Italy 
Financial regulation and supervision is undertaken by Italy’s six financial regulators namely: The 
Bank of Italy (Banca d’Italia) – the central bank; CONSOB ( Commissione Nazionale per le 
Societa e la Borsa ) – the Italian Securities and Exchange Commission; the UIC ( Ufficio Italiano 
dei Cambi) The Antitrust Authority; the CICR ( Comitato Interministeriale per il Credito ed il 
Risparmio,Isvap ( Istituto per la vigilanza sulle assicurazioni private e di interesse collettivo) and 
Covip (Commissione di vigilanza sui fondi pensione). Banking regulation and supervision in Italy 
has always been the function of the central bank. Even though the 1926 and 1936 Banking Laws 
actually created a separate banking inspectorate, this was headed by the Governor of the Bank of 
Italy and staffed by the personnel of the Bank.162 The supervisory function was transferred back to 
the Bank in 1947. The Italian Securities and Exchange Commission, Commissione Nazionale per le 
Societa e la Borsa (CONSOB) was established in 1974 through regulation L.216/1974. This is the 
very same law that led to the establishment of several decrees which set out the fundamental 
regulations of the capital market.163 CONSOB shares regulatory responsibilities with the Bank of 
Italy. Whilst the Bank focuses on financial stability, the prudential supervision of banks, financial 
companies and investment firms, CONSOB which is similar to the US SEC, is in charge of 
transparency and investor protection. As a result, it not only has regulatory powers over companies 
as issuers of securities but also over banks and investment firms as providers of investment services 
to the public.164 The Antitrust Authority, the most recently created of the financial bodies, aims to 
guarantee a free market165 and also to prevent malfunctions and bias of the capital market and the 
market in general. Separate supervisors such as Isvap and Covip regulate and supervise the 
insurance and pensions industries respectively. The financial regulators are distinguished from the 
credit authorities which comprise of the Interministerial Committee for Credit and Savings, the 
Minister of the Treasury and the Bank of Italy.166 
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7.4.2 Banking Objectives in Italy 
The objectives of supervision – sound and prudent management of intermediaries and the overall 
stability, efficiency and competitiveness of the financial system – were established expressly with 
the Bank of Italy being required to give prior public notice of the principles and criteria of its 
supervisory activity, and its regulatory powers were redefined with reference to banking risks.167 
Because the Bank of Italy's objectives involve the general interest, it is afforded great powers of 
institutional and operational independence and it can use these in its pursuit of monetary and 
financial stability.168 As the state has no share in the Bank's capital and is not represented in the 
Bank's governing organs, this facilitates the Bank's independence from political interference.169 The 
Bank of Italy is however subject to ministerial supervision by an Inspectorate General which audits 
the Bank's annual accounts.170 The Minister of Treasury also has powers of supervision and has to 
authorise changes affecting the Bank's branches after approval by the Board of Directors and 
approve guidelines for the investment of the Bank's reserves.171 
7.4.3 Historical Background of the Italian Banking System 
Banking in Italy dates back as far as the fourteenth century.172 In 1861, when Italy's new Parliament 
decreed the unification of Italy, there were just about six banks of issue and although unification 
embraced a wide range of activities, these did not include the issue of bank notes.173 The six banks 
of issue included Banca Nazionale nel Regno d'Italia, Banca Nazionale Toscana, Banca Toscana di 
Credito per le Industrie e il Commercio d'Italia, Banca Romana, Banco di Napoli and Banco di 
Sicilia.174Towards the end of the century, a serious bank crisis, in which Banca Romana was 
involved, led to a radical reorganisation of the banking system and in 1893, the Bank of Italy was 
created through a merger of three of the six existing banks of issue.175 Banca Romana was wound 
up whilst Banco di Napoli and Banco di Sicilia continued to issue notes until 1926 when the Bank 
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of Italy became the country's only bank of issue.176 As well as becoming the only bank of issue, the 
Bank of Italy was given powers of control over other banks and this was aimed at protecting 
savings.177 
The period between the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century 
saw very important banks such as the Credito Italiano, the Banco di Roma, the Banca Commerciale 
Italiana and the Banca Nazionale del Lavoro coming into existence.178 In addition to major banks 
holding shares within the state governed iron and steel industries, three of these banks, the Banca 
Commerciale Italiana, the Banco di Roma and the Credito Italiano, also held shares in ailing Italian 
firms and had to be taken over by the government.179 State control was intended to be permanent 
and shares taken from the affected banks were transferred to the Istituto per la Ricostruzione 
Industriale (IRI).180 In 1937, state ownership became permanent and as a result, the IRI having 
ownership over the three banks and their shares in the failed firms, became the largest state 
controlling holding company within the Westen economies.181 The three major banks, the Banca 
Commerciale Italiana, the Banco di Roma and the Credito Italiano, became the Banche di Interesse 
Nazionale. 
7.4.4 The 1936 Banking Law 
The 1936 Banking Law established a structure which classified Italian banks into two main classes 
namely Istituti di credito ordinario (dealing only with savings deposit and short term operations) 
and Istituti di credito speciale (dealing with medium to long term operations). Among the Istituti di 
credito ordinario, six groups were identified depending on their property structure and bylaws 
namely: Public law banks (Istituti di Diritto Pubblico), banks of national interest (Banche di 
Interesse Nazionale), ordinary credit banks (Banche di Credito Ordinario), co-operative people's 
banks (Banche Popolari), savings banks (Casse di Risparmio) and rural and artisan banks ( Casse 
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Rurali e Artigiane).182 
The Banking Law of 1926, revised and supplemented by that of 1936’s rigid regulatory regime, 
stemmed from the creation of IRI, Istituto per la Ricostruzione Industriale and IMI, Istituto per la 
Mobilizzazione Industriale.183 IMI's dealings concerned medium and long term finance and they 
placed bonds representing different industrial sectors on the market.184 During the period when the 
1936 Banking Law came into force, most European regulators had the opinion that restricting 
competition would maintain bank rates at a level which would favour bank profitability.185 The 
Bank of Italy's functional evolution did not end in 1936; whilst its institutional framework has not 
really changed, it has evolved as the custodian of a stable currency and economy and regulator of 
the country's financial sector development.186 
In 1946, the Banking Law was updated with the Bank of Italy intending to reflect the pre war 
economists' view that the role of banks was to promote economic development.187 The association 
between Italy's economic growth and the role played by banks was assessed by Raffaele Mattioli, 
chairman of the Banca Commerciale Italiana, who remarked that banks contributed to Italy's rapid 
economic growth in the 1950s and that this was as a result of the financial assistance given to 
mainly small firms.188 The existence of small banks was also considered important since they 
provided assistance to small and medium- sized firms who would have been overlooked by larger 
banks.189 Controls were in place to help preserve a system whereby small banks existing at regional 
or local levels could operate alongside the larger banks and as a result, bank competition was 
restricted to prevent a rise in industrial concentration.190 
The direction taken by the body whose duty was to create post-fascist Italian institutions the 
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Assemblea Costitutente, along with the recommendations of the Committee of Inquiry influenced 
the structure of Italy's financial system.191 One very important finding of the Committee through 
interviews conducted with representatives of the country's various financial institutions was that 
even though the distinction between banks and provision of medium and long term finance was to 
continue, the stock market was not regarded as an important optional source of capital.192   
Instead, it was considered that funds held by investors should be passed on to firms, that these 
would lend to firms and that they would also finance firms activities through the sale to public of 
industrial bonds.193  From this, a financial system whereby funds were directed through institutions 
was seen as easier to direct than a system left in the control of individual firms and investors.194 As 
a result, little was done to promote the development of the stock market.195 Guido Carli, who 
succeeded Menichella as the Governor of the Bank of Italy in 1960, realised the need to develop the 
stock market in order to prevent firms suffering the consequences of imbalance between debt and 
equity.196 The Bank of Italy also paid increased focus on the implications of its supervisory action 
for competition. Whilst priority was given to the objective of stability of the banking system in the 
fifties and sixties, during the 1970s, the objective of stability was coupled with that of higher 
efficiency which was to be achieved through promoting competition.197  
7.4.5 The Efficiency/Inefficiency of the Italian Banking System 
As stated earlier, the Banking Law of 1936 promoted a tightly regulated system which ensured that 
competition would not eliminate the smaller and more local banks. However as the country 
industrialised, the segmentation of the banking system and apparent absence of other financial 
systems (as the banking sector's prominence was evident), resulted in the efficiency of the Italian 
banking system being questioned – particularly from the mid 1970s onwards.198 
Even though the contribution made by small banks (namely providing small and medium sized 
firms with capital) has been recognised, their place in a modern international, financial environment 
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was contentious.199 Small banks were considered inefficient because of their inability to achieve 
economies of scale, provide modern services and use advanced technologies.200 The stifling of 
competition and rigid regulatory framework were other factors highlighted within the Italian 
banking system. 
The system of Italian banking regulation before the nineties was therefore characterised by a 
structure that was highly fragmented, a system whereby specialisation was the dominant 
characteristic of the banking system and one whereby the greater part of banking business was 
carried out by public sector banks.201 Strong structural controls, barriers to entry and restraints on 
assets and liabilities were also main features of bank regulation.202 
7.4.6 Changes in the Italian banking industry and legal framework  
Between 1990 and 1992, several Parliamentary Acts consolidated the Amato Law, resulting in a 
complete change of the legal framework for banking.203 The Amato Law (218/1990) formed the 
basis of the legal framework and paved way for the privatisation of the Italian public banking 
system.204 In 1993, the Legislative Decree 385 of 1st Sept 1993 (the 1993 Banking Law), replaced 
the 1936 Banking Law and consolidated all previous legislation in the banking industry. Under the 
1993 Banking Law, previous distinctions between deposit banks and long-term specialised credit 
institutions were abolished and a model asymmetric to universal banking established. This was the 
start of a new era of consolidated supervision in which banking groups were formally recognised 
and non-bank financial intermediaries were incorporated in the regulatory framework. 
Article 2 ( title 1) of the 1993 Banking Law deals with credit authorities and section 1 assigns the 
highest supervisory authority for credit and the protection of savings to the Inter-ministerial 
Committee for Credit and Savings. The Inter-ministerial Committee for Credit and Savings decides 
on matters assigned to it by the Legislative Decree 385 and is composed of the Minister of the 
Treasury (its chairman) and seven other ministers from other government sectors. The Governor of 
the Bank of Italy has to attend these meetings and the meeting may also be attended (on invitation 
by the Chairman), by other ministers. 
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Article 4 of the 1993 Banking Law states the duties assigned to the Bank of Italy during the course 
of performing its supervisory functions. These duties include: the formulation of proposals for 
resolutions within the scope of the authority of the Credit Committee, the issue of regulations in 
cases provided for by law, issue of instructions and adoption of specific measures within the scope 
of its authority. It is also required to establish and give prior public notice of principles and methods 
relating to its supervisory activity, to establish time limits for the adoption of measures and publish 
an annual report on its supervisory activity. Article 5 (1) states the objectives and scope of financial 
supervision and this includes: the sound and prudent management of those subject to supervision, 
the overall stability, efficiency and competitiveness of the financial system. 
Title 3, chapter 1 of the 1993 Banking Law deals with supervision of banks. Its provisions include 
reporting requirements,205 notification by boards of auditors and persons appointed to audit the 
accounts,206 regulatory powers of the Bank of Italy,207 and inspections208. Title 3, chapter 2 deals 
with supervision on a consolidated basis and contains provisions relating to reporting requirements, 
regulatory powers of the Bank of Italy and inspections in Articles 66, 67 and 68 respectively. 
Per capita GDP in Southern Italy is about 30% lower than national average with unemployment rate 
being around 18% - compared with 6% in the central parts and 3.8% in the north.209 By the early 
1990s, the South was a dependent economy structurally, with 36% of Italy’s population.210 During 
the recession of 1992-93, the reduction of domestic demand and interest rate adjustments required 
to face the crisis affected the profitability of firms. As a result of difficulties experienced by the 
southern banking system, supervisory action was required from the Bank of Italy and this was 
aimed at fundamental aims of protecting depositors and maintaining financial support for 
businesses in the south.211  Between 1990 and 1995, on site controls were undertaken in the 
southern banking system and around 60% negative evaluation received – in contrast to 15% 
received by banks in the central and northern parts of Italy. The process of rehabilitating southern 
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banks was aided through the Interbank Deposit Protection Fund and contribution from banking 
groups. One of such banking groups included Banco di Napoli. As the leading bank in South Italy, 
it had acted to support the southern banks and had been slow in adapting back – particularly in the 
face of an increasing competitive market. 
The need to prevent a serious impact on the South’s economy, avoid systemic risks required special 
legislation to be approved for the rescue of Banco di Napoli. As a result, Law 588 of 19 November 
1996 was enacted and it provided for the Treasury to supply funds for recapitalisation. This was a 
unique occurrence as it was the first time public intervention had been made to adopt a restructuring 
plan which was approved by the Bank of Italy. Banco di Napoli’s structures were renewed and 
factors which resulted in its crisis (factors such as bank loan portfolio, high costs and low efficiency 
of its operations) were corrected to align it with national average requirements. In addition to these 
developments within the legal framework, the 1998 Consolidated Law on Financial Intermediation 
has also enabled intermediaries to offer a wide range of asset management products. 
7.4.7 The Central Bank’s Role in Financial Regulation and Supervision: Post 
Parmalat Reforms 
The post Parmalat reforms do not consolidate Italy’s five financial regulators into one, unlike 
Britain’s FSA and Germany’s BaFin.212 The post Parmalat reforms according to many, have been 
disappointing as the central bank, Bank of Italy had still managed to retain many of its powers 
whilst CONSOB has not been afforded as much power as was previously expected. According to 
the draft law of February 2004, a new regulator, provisionally called the Authority for the 
Protection of Savings was to replace CONSOB, the securities market watch dog.213 This new 
CONSOB is to be more powerful than its predecessor and would take over the supervision of debt 
issuance from the Bank of Italy.214 
The Italian financial regulatory framework went through a major overhaul in 2005 through the Law 
262 of December 12th 2005 on Protection of Savings and Financial Markets Discipline.215 This 
overhaul was triggered by the financial scandals relating to Cirio and Parmalat, two major Italian 
food companies.216 The new legislation came into effect on the 10th January 2006 – however, due 
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to some provisions requiring secondary legislation, these provisions were not implemented 
straightaway. The legislation affects the Bank of Italy, CONSOB, the Competition Authority 
(Autorita Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato), the Pension Fund Supervisory Committee 
(Commissione Vigilanza Fondi Previdenza) Covip, and the Institute for Supervision of Private and 
Collective Interest Insurance (Istituto per la Vigilanza sulle Assicurazioni Private e di Interesse 
Collettivo) Isvap. 
A major impact of the new legislation on the Bank of Italy will be to increase the transparency of its 
operations and to transfer powers it holds in deciding upon the concentration (as opposed to the 
prudential implications) of mergers and acquisitions. These powers will be assigned to the 
Guarantee Authority for Competition and Markets (Autorita Garante della Concorrenza e del 
Mercato). Large crossborder bank mergers come under the jurisdiction of the European 
Commission. Transparency should be improved as a result of the following measures namely: 
Through requirements that board decisions having implications outside the central bank be taken by 
consensus, that written records be kept of board meetings and that the Bank of Italy report semi-
annually on its activities to both the parliament and the government. The Bank of Italy and 
CONSOB will share strengthened powers over conflicts of interest. 
Law 262 of December 12th 2005, resulted in distinct changes apart from those in the area of 
competition. Those that affect the Bank of Italy mainly involve requirements for greater 
transparency in its decision-making and more formal co-operation with insurance and financial-
market regulators. New rules on avoiding conflicts of interest in financial-market operations will be 
the joint responsibility of the Bank of Italy and CONSOB. Bank of Italy rules on banks’ exposure to 
associated groups acquired direct force of law, and the Bank of Italy has acquired the ability to 
impose administrative fines. A new system of arbitration of consumer disputes with banks is to be 
set up under Bank of Italy auspices to be funded by a levy on all banks. This had not yet been set up 
as of July 2006. 
Both Banca d’Italia, Italy’s central bank and the National Financial Markets Commission 
(Commissione Nazionale per le Societa e la Borsa, CONSOB) had been criticised for their inability 
to foresee the impending scandals.217 There have been a lot of suggestions that the Bank of Italy has 
been entrusted with too much power and that CONSOB’s powers need to be enforced and 
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increased.218  This resulted to suggestions for reforms which would leave the basic form of 
supervision in its original form but replace CONSOB with a Financial Markets Authority which had 
more powers.219 Even though it was later decided in the course of Parliament, not to replace 
CONSOB,220  CONSOB now has more investigative powers and more personnel. Powers which 
relate particularly to issuance of financial instruments and companies established where company 
law is not transparent have been increased.221 
Lack of close cooperative relationship between Banca d’Italia (Bank of Italy) and CONSOB was 
one of the reasons attributed to the Parmalat scandal. During the early months of 2002, financial 
analysts had voiced concerns about Parmalat’s management’s unwillingness to provide explanations 
of its financing strategy. 222 Apart from the failure of CONSOB to investigate Parmalat before it 
was apparent that market forces were discounting Parmalat’s stock in reaction to its practices,223 the 
Bank of Italy was criticised for failing to share with Consob vital information on distressed and 
defaulted debt apparent in the central bank records.224 
The Italian public opinion favoured an Italian “Sarbanes Oxley” and even though work commenced 
rapidly on the reforms, Parliamentary work was delayed as a result of several factors which 
included the resignation of Italy’s finance minister, Giulio Tremonti, who had campaigned tirelessly 
to reduce the central bank’s powers.225 In April 2005, Parliament through approval of the Legge 
Comunitaria 2004 permitted implementation of the EU Market Abuse Directive 2003/6/CE.226 
These rules aimed at safeguarding transparency and fairness on financial markets came into force 
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than Others!' Hill and Knowlton's Financial Services Newsletter  Number 5 May 2005 ; 'Italian Financial Regulation : 
Not So Super Consob’ The Economist Feb 5th 2004;  
226  See  M Moriconi,' Italy: Changes to the Legislative and Regulatory Framework post-Parmalat – Some Faster 
than Others!' Hill and Knowlton's Financial Services Newsletter  Number 5 May 2005 
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on 12 May 2005.227 The Italian financial regulatory framework went through a major overhaul in 
2005 through the Law 262 of December 12th 2005 on Protection of Savings and Financial Markets 
Discipline. CONSOB’s powers have been re-inforced in many ways including:228 Additional 
investigative powers; the capacity to directly apply sanctions; a new internal framework comprising 
150 new officers and a new framework for collaboration with the “Guardia di Finanzia” (financial 
police) in order to carry out their surveillance activities. National implementation of the EU Market 
Abuse Directive has therefore strengthened CONSOB’s powers. The Market Abuse Directive not 
only permits greater sanctions for abuse of privileged information and stock manipulation but also 
introduces new regulations on confidential communications, public communications and 
international cooperation between financial authorities.229 
However, the reform on savings has been put on hold by the Senate.230 However, reforms are not 
just sufficient on their own – better enforcement procedures need to be put in place. There is also 
need for better protection of smaller investors.231 Where possible, many investors decided to sue 
Parmalat's lending banks and external auditors in US courts – US courts being perceived as having 
more expertise in corporate financial issues, providing more certainty of outcome and being more 
likely to provide more recovery of damages.232 These are litigation facilities which are not available 
under Italian or many other European jurisdictions.233 
According to the president of the Association of Italian banks, Maurizio Sella,234 Italy would 
benefit from adopting an Act similar to that of Sarbanes Oxley. The need for external auditors to be 
more independent was also highlighted. As part of the post Parmalat reforms, Giulio Tremonti 
called for clearer demarcation between company and external auditors.235 
                                                
Differences between the US and Italian systems would still need to be taken into account when 
considering whether or not to adopt certain Sarbanes Oxley measures. Differences between Italy 
 
227 ibid 
228   See  M Moriconi, ' Italy: Changes to the Legislative and Regulatory Framework post-Parmalat – Some Faster 
than Others!' Hill and Knowlton's Financial Services Newsletter  Number 5 May 2005 
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231 M Tonello, 'Have Governance Reforms Spurred on by Parmalat's Collapse Given Investors a False Sense of 
Security?' Novemeber 14 2006 
232  ibid 
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234  S Delaney, 'Parmalat Spurs Call for Reform in Business: Italian Government Plans To Strengthen Oversight'  
The Washington Post January 20 2004 <http://www.washingtonpost.com> 
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and the US include the fact that no established procedures in civil law exist to help investors who 
lose money in such cases to regain their losses; there are also no class-action lawsuits in Italy, 
contingency fees to lawyers helping in case of investors who cannot afford lawyers are illegal, no 
common rules about what businesses are required to write in prospectuses or what recourse 
investors have if a prospectus turns out to be false exist.236 
7.4.8 Responsibilities of the Bank of Italy 
Supervision of banking and asset management sectors:  The Bank of Italy’s approval is 
required in order to start up or acquire a bank or securities trading company. Its approval is 
also required to increase holdings above pre-determined thresholds in either banks or asset 
managers. The Inter-ministerial Credit and Savings Committee (Imitators Ministerially per 
ail Creditor e ail Disparage) CICR, formulates banking and credit policies. It cannot 
intervene in the decisions of the Bank of Italy. The purpose of the committee is to advise on 
new legislation and interpret existing legislation. It comes under the Ministry of Economy 
and Finance (Minister dell Economic e dell Finance). Its powers to issue secondary 
legislation have passed to the Bank of Italy and Con sob under the new law on savings and 
financial markets discipline. 
Issue of coins: Having been a member of the European System of Central Banks (that is, the 
central banks of the European Union) and the Euro system (that is, the central banks of the 
Euro area) since June 1est 1998, coin issuance remains a national responsibility of the Bank 
of Italy even though the European Central Bank (ECB) is the issuing authority. Coin 
issuance by the Bank of Italy is however subject to ECB approval, since it affects the EMU’s 
money supply. The Bank of Italy collaborates with the ECB on banking supervision as well 
as authorisation and the payments system. It also works with the Committee of European 
Banking Supervisors, set up in late 2003, which has its secretariat in London. 
The Bank of Italy also operates the Centre for Financial Risks (Centrale dei Rischi), which 
keeps credit records on all national companies and business individuals. All credit 
operations, including factoring and leasing operations, and guarantees capitalised in excess 
of 75,000 are registered with this office. Credit institutions can check a loan applicant’s 
overall exposure with the centre and also information which is available to credit institutions 
in other EU states. 
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The Italian Foreign Exchange Office (“Ufficio Italiano dei Cambi” UIC) is an arm of the 
Bank of Italy but it enjoys considerable independence. Primary functions include gathering 
balance-of-payments statistics and monitoring payment transactions for fraud and money-
laundering. It is active in international financial markets on behalf of the public sector, as it 
hedges debt and invests in foreign paper, mainly sovereign issues. These form part of Italy’s 
reserves. The UIC’s role has diminished in recent years as part of Italy’s reserves have been 
transferred to the European Central Bank (ECB), and many transactions that were previously 
in foreign currency are now in euros. The UIC monitors implementation of legislation on 
money-laundering, usury and transactions in gold, and keeps the register of non-bank 
financial intermediaries. 
The Bank of Italy is also responsible for capital-adequacy oversight in the finance sector. 
The rules are incorporated in the Instructions for Banking Supervision (Istruzioni di 
Vigilanza per le Banche), which are updated regularly and of which the Bank of Italy issues 
a consolidated version at each update. They are based on EU Directives and the international 
Basle agreements on capital adequacy. 
 
7.4.9 The Competition Authority 
 
Powers relating to full responsibility for anti-competitive behaviour in the banking sector were 
granted to the Competition Authority on January 1st 2006. Previously, it had shared responsibilities 
with the Bank of Italy, and in some cases the latter had taken the lead. In January 2006, the 
Authority opened an investigation into retail banking service prices. In July 2006, it announced a 
2.5% of turnover fine on CO.GE.BAN (Convenzione per la Gestione del marchio Bancomat), an 
agreement between banks on the terms and conditions for transactions via point-of-sale terminals 
connected to banks. The fine was for failure to comply with a Bank of Italy decision in October 
2005 that maximum commission levels and restrictions on the ability to transact through the 
terminals of more than one bank were anti-competitive. The case was one that the Competition 
Authority had taken from the Bank of Italy under its new powers. 
7.4.10 CONSOB 
For listed financial institutions, takeover laws apply and the authority responsible for such cases is 
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the stock-exchange regulator, CONSOB. CONSOB must be notified as soon as a company holds a 
stake of 2% in a listed company. The stake is calculated on the basis of voting rights. CONSOB 
must also be notified when stakes reach 5%, 7.5%, 10% and increments of five thereafter. Anyone 
participating in a voting pact that has a stake of more than 5% in total must notify CONSOB. The 
Bank of Italy’s approval must be obtained for any investment of 5% or more in an Italian bank (or 
securities house (SIM), asset management company, financial company, including a consumer 
credit, leasing or factoring group), or in any company holding a stake of more than 5% in a bank, 
and of any subsequent increase to 10%, 15%, 20%, 33% and 50%. The 5% ceiling is calculated on 
the basis of voting rights but is not absolute. The criterion is the degree of control a company holds. 
If a company has control even over certain types of decisions, then it may require approval from the 
Bank of Italy. A stake of 10%, even without voting rights, is also subject to authorisation. A 
takeover bid is compulsory once the 30% threshold is reached in a listed company under Legislative 
Decree 58/98. New takeover legislation is likely to take effect in late 2006 when Italy implements 
EU Directive 2004/25 on takeovers. 
7.5 Banking Regulation and Supervision  in the United States 
7.5.1 Financial Regulation in the US 
7.5.1.1 Regulatory Structure in the US 
Financial regulation in the US is quite fragmented and is carried out by the following institutions: 
For securities, the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC); For futures, the Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission;For securities SROs (Self-Regulating Organisations), the New York 
Stock Exchange, the American Stock Exchange Incorporation, the National Association of 
Securities Dealers, the Municipal Securities Rule-making Board ;For futures SROs (Self-Regulating 
Organisations), the National Futures Association. 
Banking regulation is carried out by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Board (FRB), 
the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and the 
Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), the National Credit Union Administration and the Federal 
Financial Institutions Examination Council. Insurance regulation and supervision is almost entirely 
regulated at state level. This dates back to when the first major insurance scandal occurred in New 
York in the early 1900s. As a result of this, New York imposed a law prohibiting the insurance 
services sector from engaging in banking and securities activities. Other states decided to follow 
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this lead and the situation remains the same till today. 
7.5.2 History of US Financial Regulation 
Until 1863, US banks were regulated at state level. In that same year, a need arose for a means 
whereby the Federal Government could raise some source of funding. The Civil War had been 
going on for two years and the Federal Government was in need of cash. The National Banking Act 
came into existence two years later – with the formation of the OCC. A dual system of banking was 
introduced whereby some banks were chartered and regulated by the states and some banks were 
chartered and regulated by the OCC. 
The 1913 Federal Reserve Act led to the formation of the Federal Reserve System as a central bank 
and lender of last resort. Prior to 1933, US securities markets were regulated to a large extent. 
However events such as the 1929 US stock market crash and a “run” on the banks by depositors 
(who feared that banks would be unable to repay the money in their accounts)  led  to  the  
enactment  of  two  important  pieces of legislature  namely the  Securities  Act of 1933  and  the 
Securities Exchange Act  of 1934. Many banks had collapsed as a result of the stock market crash 
and as a result, the 1933 Banking Act was enacted. The 1933 Banking Act (also known as the Glass 
Steagall Act), distinguished between commercial and investment banks and led to the creation of 
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation which was to provide deposit  insurance to commercial 
banks. The 1934 Securities Exchange Act provided the framework for a partnership between the 
legislature and the judiciary which aimed to achieve the tasks of imposing minimum standards of 
information disclosed by companies who issue publicly-listed shares or bonds, controlling the 
quality of that information and policing the market place237. The Act also led to the establishment 
of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) as the primary regulator for US securities 
markets. 
                                                
The distinction made by the Glass Steagall Act of 1933, between commercial and investment banks 
had been getting blurred over the years – due to global developments which had not been foreseen 
when the 1933 Act was enacted. The original 1933 Act allowed banks to deal in exempt securities 
and over the years, authorisation was expanded to allow banks to deal with non-exempt securities 
(through their subsidiaries). Under the Glass Steagall Act, commercial banks could also participate 
 
237   N Veron, 'Strengthening  Europe's Capital Markets'  see  < http://www.ecif.info/CapitalMark> (last visited 15 
Dec 2005)  
 45 
  
in overseas securities business. Shortcomings of the Glass Steagall Act included failure to 
incorporate derivatives such as OTC derivatives markets, such derivatives not having been foreseen 
when the Act was enacted in 1933. Also currencies were not classed as securities even though they 
entailed similar market risks. The legal definition of “securities” under the 1933 Act also did not 
incorporate futures markets. Due to these shortcomings, commercial banks were able to take 
significant risks and a new legislation had to be introduced. This led to the Financial Services 
Modernisation Act (also known as the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act) being passed by Congress in 
1999. The Act removed the distinction between commercial banks and securities business. 
2000, replacing the 1974 
Commodity Exchange Act. OTC derivatives were to be left unregulated. 
30 rather than 45 days.240 Firms would also have to 
explain their reasons for certain accounting treatments.241 
                                                
There was still a lot of debate and concern as to how OTC derivatives were to be regulated. The 
Commodities Futures Modernisation Act was passed by Congress in 
As a result of the collapse of Enron, Congress passed the Sarbanes Oxley Act (also known as SOX) 
in 2002. The Sarbanes Oxley Act is an Act which aims ‘to protect investors by improving the 
accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures made pursuant to the securities laws, and for other 
purposes.’  On February 13th 2002, the SEC also called for changes to corporate-disclosure 
rules.238 Businesses would now have to disclose transactions in company shares by executives 
rather than waiting up to 45 days.239 Annual results now have to be posted within 60 days not 90 
days and quarterly results published within 
The US bank regulators are as follows:  The Federal Reserve Board, the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC), the National Credit Union Administration, the Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency (OCC) and the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS).242 The main focus of this research will 
be the Federal Reserve Board. Unlike federal regulators such as Britain’s FSA, Germany’s BaFin 
and the newly empowered Italian CONSOB, the US Federal Reserve Board is also the central bank 
and is therefore responsible for setting monetary policy. The Federal Reserve has regulatory and 
supervisory control over an extensive range of financial institutions and activities. Alongside other 
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federal and state supervisory authorities, it works to ensure the safety and soundness of financial 
institutions, stability within the financial markets and fair treatment of consumers in their business 
transactions.243 
are regulated by the FDIC. National banks, federally chartered 
branches are regulated by the OCC. 
n and the Office of Thrift Supervision 
regulate credit unions and thrift associations respectively.247 
ondition of banks and whether banks are complying 
with relevant banking laws and regulations.248 
apital, managerial and other conditions and 
must elect to become a “financial holding company”.250 
                                                
A dual system of banking exists and operates in the US. This dual system of banking refers to the 
parallel state and federal banking systems. The Federal Reserve Board regulates state member 
banks.244 State non member banks 
Foreign banks are regulated by the FDIC (insured branches of foreign banks)245, foreign state 
licensed branches and agencies are regulated by the Federal Reserve and the FDIC whilst foreign 
federally licensed branches and agencies are regulated by the OCC and the FDIC.246 Other 
regulators, namely the National Credit Union Administratio
7.5.3 Main Objective of the Supervisory Process 
This is the evaluation of the overall safety and soundness of the banking system which includes 
assessing risk-management systems, financial c
7.5.4 Collaboration with Other Regulators 
One of the main objectives of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act was to enable banks, securities broker-
dealers and insurance companies associate with each other through the structure of the bank holding 
company.249 In order to benefit from the extended associations allowed under the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act, a bank holding company must meet certain c
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7.5.5 Enforcement 
Where it is concluded that a state member bank or bank holding company has problems which 
could affect the institution’s viability and well-being or that it is not acting in compliance with laws 
and regulations, the Federal Reserve may resort to taking supervisory action to ensure that the 
institution amends its ways.251 Usually management and directors of  the banking organisation are 
informed of such findings in the form of a written report, asked to respond to all identified problems 
voluntarily and take necessary action to ensure that such problems do not recur.252 In other cases 
however, the Federal Reserve may be compelled to take informal supervisory actions or formal 
enforcement actions to ensure that management and directors of an affected banking organisation or 
anisation’s problems.253 
ition orders, orders assessing civil money penalties may be taken where those regulated 
act in violation of laws, rules, carry out unsafe practices, breach fiduciary duties and violate final 
                                                
persons associated with it address the org
7.5.6 The Federal Reserve Board 
The Federal Reserve Board not only regulates state member banks, branches and agencies of 
foreign banking organisations operating in the US and their parent banks, but also bank holding 
companies, non bank subsidiaries of bank holding companies, edge and agreement corporations.254 
As well as performing dual functions of regulator and setting monetary policy, the Federal Reserve 
is also empowered with statutory authority to take formal enforcement actions against banks, 
companies and organisations it regulates.255 It can also take formal enforcement actions against 
officers, directors, employees and certain other classes of individuals associated with the banks, 
companies and organisations it regulates.256 These individuals are known as “institution-affiliated 
parties.” Formal enforcement actions such as cease and desist orders, written agreements, removal 
and prohib
orders.257 
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7.5.7 Historical Background 
The Federal Reserve was established by Congress in 1913 and given the power to coin money and 
regulate its value.258 This responsibility had originally been granted to the Congress by the US 
Constitution.259The Federal Reserve Act of 1913 empowered the Federal Reserve in giving it 
responsibility for setting monetary policy.260 The mission of the Federal Reserve Board as set out 
by the Congress is as follows:261 To maintain price stability; to foster maximum sustainable growth 
tate a stable and efficient financial system. 
r making use of external auditors. On-site work is usually 
done by the examination staff of the bank supervisory agency or commissioned by supervisors but 
have responded to resource constraints in recent years by making greater use of off-site surveillance 
in output and employment and to facili
7.5.8 The Supervisory Process 
The supervisory process consists of both on-site examinations and inspections and off-site 
surveillance and monitoring. State member banks must usually have an on-site examination at least 
once every twelve months whilst banks with assets of less than $250 million which meet certain 
management, capital and other criteria are likely to be examined once every 18 months.262 
According to the Basel Core Principles for effective Banking Supervision 1997, an effective 
banking supervisory system should consist of a mix of both “on-site” and “off-site” supervision.263 
Off-site supervision involves the regulato
may be undertaken by external auditors. 
In the US, periodic on-site examinations are carried out and justified on the basis of the large 
number of small banks and on unit banking within particular states.264 Unlike jurisdictions where 
authorities place reliance on outside experts, bank supervisors in the US must possess skills in order 
to evaluate asset quality and other areas governing a bank’s activities.265 The disadvantage in this is 
that it can be labour intensive and restricted by budgetary constraints.266 US supervisory authorities 
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systems.267 However the use of off-site surveillance systems can also be disadvantageous as 
computers cannot observe certain aspects of examinations namely the scrutiny of management 
practices.268 For this reason, the use of external auditors is also encouraged. 
ent and municipal securities 
dealing, securities credit lending and information technology. 
rder to make predictions on adverse trends which may be 
imminent in the banking industry.272 
r, the Financial Services Authority inspects banks (on-site) and utilises external auditors 
(off-site). 
                                                
Results from US on-site examinations or inspections are communicated to the board of directors 
and management of the bank or holding company.269 The confidential rating, based on a 
supervisory rating system is a supervisory tool used by all of the federal and state banking agencies 
to communicate assessments to bank organisations.270 It is also used to identify potentially 
problematic institutions which require special attention.271 The Federal Reserve also performs on-
site examinations to ensure banks’ compliance with consumer protection laws, compliance with 
fiduciary activities, transfer agency, securities clearing agency, governm
7.5.9 Off-site Monitoring 
The Federal Reserve utilises automated screening systems to detect organisations with poor or 
deteriorating financial profiles in o
The system of bank supervision in jurisdictions such as Germany is based on one which delegates 
on-site examination and inspection of banks and the verification of their records to external 
auditors.273 In Germany, general auditors perform bank examinations and must inform the 
authorities should they discover facts warranting an audit qualification.274 In comparison to this, the 
UK’s system involves a reduced use of external auditors and mixed system of supervision whereby 
its regulato
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7.5.10 Structure of the Federal Reserve System 
The Federal Reserve System is made up of the Board of Governors, the Federal Open Market 
Committee, reserve banks and the Board of Directors.275 The Federal Open Market Committee 
performs the vital role of making monetary policy decisions. The Federal Reserve utilises three 
tools of monetary policy namely: open market operations, the discount rate and reserve 
requirements.276 Responsibility for the discount rate and reserve requirements lies with the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System whilst the Federal Open Market Committee controls open 
7.6 Second Investigative Aim: Risk Based Supervision and its 
fficiently cross 
sector services' risks, implementation would be a daunting task for which it is not yet prepared. In 
iques has meant that regulators can no 
longer focus on traditional risks linked to the business they authorised and the need to acquire an 
but also external risks. In this respect, it differs from meta regulation (of which the Basel II Capital 
                                                
market operations.277 
Growing Importance 
The main focus of jurisdictional comparison here will be between the UK and the US. The US 
places great importance on the Basel II Accord as it realises the importance of adopting a system 
which can efficiently manage risks in the face of increasing conglomeration and globalisation. Due 
to historical factors and the complex structure of financial regulation which currently exists in the 
US, a move towards the adoption of a single regulator would call for considerable change. Although 
the US realises the importance of having a single regulator which can manage more e
the light of this, there is great interest in implementing the Basel Capital II Accord.  
Financial markets all over the world have witnessed considerable changes as more complex 
methods of dealing with assets, liabilities and improved risk management techniques have been 
developed to enhance the profitability of financial intermediaries.278 The combination of 
deregulation and developments in risk management techn
understanding of other forms of risks has been realised.279 
Risk based supervision incorporates not only internal risks inherent within the regulated institutions, 
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Accord is an example) which draws firms into regulatory processes and attempts to both influence 
and make use of firms internal risk management and control strategies.280 Since external risks are 
more subjective and not as easy to measure, it could be argued that meta regulation presents a more 
accurate means of measuring risks. The difficulties in measuring such external related risks has 
been acknowledged in Basel II through the establishment, by the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, of a specific treatment for operational risk281. It is evident however that firms do 
indeed face external risks so it can also be said that risk based supervision by focussing more on 
external risks quantitatively, adopts a more realistic approach to external risks. Whichever way the 
argument goes, the underlying issue remains the same – both forms of regulation focus on risks. 
Whilst one form of regulation may seem more advantageous than the other, both still have inherent 
disadvantages.282 
ncies in the information provided to 
them will better facilitate the use of the risk based approach.  
                                                
To a large extent, risk based regulation does not rely on past performance indicators.283 The 
importance of future performance indicators has become increasingly evident in today's world. 
Whilst it has been argued that risk based supervision ultimately relies on past performance,284 the 
availability of experienced staff who can identify inconsiste
The risk based approach structures regulatory decision-making in a more coherent way and also 
highlights the complex nature of decision making and the judgement required to be exercised.285 
 
280 J Gray and J Hamilton,  Implementing Financial Regulation: Theory and Practice  (2006) 36; Operational risks 
however also incorporate risks resulting from external events 
281  The new framework of Pillar 1 of Basel II establishes that capital calculation be founded on a combination of 
qualitative and quantitative elements including internal data, relevant external data, scenario analysis and bank specific 
business environment and internal control factors. See M Moscadelli, 'The Modelling of Operational Risk : Experience 
with the Analysis of Data collected by the Basel Committee' Banca D'Italia Temi di Discussione del Servizio Studi 
Bank of Italy, Banking Supervision Department Number 517, July 2004.  
282  One major advantage of meta-risk regulation is that it should enable the FSA exploit the expertise of the 
industry in an age when the complexity and volatility of modern risk calls into question the ability of financial 
regulators to stay one step ahead. A disadvantage lies with its use of  mathematical models; ibid p 38. Other dangers 
with meta-risk regulation involve meta-risk management seeking to leverage off firms' own systems and expertise in aid 
of reducing risks to the FSA's objectives rather than directly imposing detailed requirements on firms as to the design of 
their internal risk assessment and management strategies. 
 In relation to risk based supervision, it has been argued that it may not be an accurate indicator of future 
performance; see D Singh, 'Legal Aspects of Prudential Supervision' 2007 p 95 Hence the importance of having  
experienced staff who are able to spot inconsistencies in the information provided. The risk based approach also 
presents concern in that regulatory resources are focussed mainly on areas that pose the greatest risk at the expense of 
those parts of the business considered to have lower risk; ibid p 132 
283  Risk ratios enable the prediction, well in advance and before a bank collapses, of which banks are more likely 
to fail. See 'Off-site Surveillance Systems' < http://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/history/vol2/panel2.pdf> 
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Timely, accurate and complete information is particularly important to regulators – especially in 
situations where the central bank is not really involved in supervision.286 
external environment; consumer and industry-wide 
risks and the regulated institutions themselves.  
ow well 
constructed, would not always provide sufficient information for analysts and investors.290 
on's ability to manage risks as part of a proper business 
organisation is taken into account292. 
 The UK's financial regulator, the FSA, operates on a risk-based approach whereby it differentiates 
between regulated institutions and allocates resources to areas of greater perceived risk.287  It 
identifies three sources of risk namely:288 The 
7.6.1 Risk-Based Regulation and Supervision in Germany 
The importance of risk-related information as a vital component of companies' annual reports when 
performing operating and financial reviews (OFRs) of listed companies was highlighted in a report 
aimed at inquiring into the arrangements for financial regulation of public limited companies in the 
UK.289 This ensued from the realisation that traditional financial statements, no matter h
As part of the implementation of the Financial Conglomerates Directive, section 25 a (1) was 
amended in the last quarter of 2004.291 The implementation of the European Financial 
Conglomerates Directive into German Law took effect on the 1st Jan 2005 and it requires clearly 
for a strategy whereby the instituti
The adoption of a risk based approach to financial regulation and supervision in Germany has been 
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prompted by the significance of financial conglomerates.293 Financial conglomerates have 
significant influence on financial stability particularly when they have a notable level of market 
share in several financial sectors and gain increasing significance in the market as a result of their 
size.294 The objectives of the Financial Conglomerates Directive interalia includes ensuring the 
sound supervision of additional risks associated with financial groups who are involved in cross-
sector financial activities.295 It also encourages member states to develop their standards for limits 
on risk concentrations or permit their national supervisors to do so until there is further 
t involvement in financial conglomerates' reporting enhances its ability 
to assess risks to enterprises within a conglomerate and the risks to financial stability attributed to 
 a form of monitoring that informs them about risk concentrations and intra-
group transactions but does not yet set integrated supervisory upper limits across all sectors - which 
                                                
coordination.296 
The implementation of the EU Financial Conglomerates Directive in Germany considers the 
growing economic importance of financial conglomerates and for the first time, supervisors now 
have a weapon in overcoming risks to the financial system attributed to financial conglomerates.297 
The Bundesbank's significan
financial conglomerates.298  
 Despite the Bundesbank's involvement, supervisors are still challenged by the fact that sectoral 
supervisory requirements address the relevant risks differently and that there is still no integrated 
approach to cross-sector supervision of equivalent risks.299 Supervisors are therefore still largely 
confining themselves to
appears reasonable300. 
It is therefore important, prior to creating more extensive supervisory standards, to compile 
information and gather experience based on incoming reports. Arrangements to resolve or at least 
disclose conflicts of interest resulting from business activity in different financial sectors have also 
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not been reached.301 The focus of the supervision of companies belonging to a financial 
conglomerate remains on individual supervision that is supplemented, but not overrided, by rules 
f External Auditors in Germany?  
The Deutsche Bundesbank and German Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin): Statistics ongoing 
Ongo nking supervision operations, Number of operations conducted 
2002 2003 2004 
206 153 186 
Single borrowers included in the summary reports submitted pursuant to 2 314 
 
1 832 
 
2 126 
 
Reports pursuant to sections 24 and 24a of the Banking Act 
47 
 
44 
 
47 
 
42 40 38 
Reports on the volume of foreign lending (country risk) pursuant to section 
                                                
governing group-wide supervision (solo-plus approach).302 
7.6.2 Has the Approach to Risk-based Regulation influenced the Degree of 
involvement o
banking supervision303 
ing ba
Item 
¹ Revised from the previous year. Source: Deutsche Bundesbank 
Individual reports pursuant to sections 13 to 14 of the Banking Act 
971 035 754 
sections 13 to 14 of the Banking Act 292 038 336
585 561 002
Monthly returns pursuant to section 25 and 25a of the Banking Act 
992 918 558 
25 (3) of the Banking Act 
270 370 912 
Auditors' reports on annual accounts 3 378 3 263 3 253
 
301  ibid 
302  ibid 
303  Source : <http://www.bundesbank.de/bankenaufsicht/bankenaufsicht_bafin_fenster.en.php> 
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Item 
 7 5 
panies 
panies on their activities 5 1 6
Reports under Principle I 
32 
 
29 
 
28 
 
31 
7 
28 
0 
27 
9 
Reports under the Capital Accord of the Basel Committee on Banking 
t companies have increased. Particularly notable is the significant increase in sections 44 
and 44c audits pursuant to the Banking Act. Between 2002 and 2004, these audits have more than 
represents a significant component of standard disclosure requirements and credit institutions must 
2002 2003 2004 
Reports on the auditing of safe custody accounts 614 483 644 
Routine, special and deposit guarantee fund auditors' reports 1 88 1 75 1 678
Audits pursuant to sections 44 and 44c of the Banking Act 69 79 155 
Auditors' reports on the special funds of investment com 1 431 1 309 1 459
Reports from investment com 6 63 6 89 6 60
846 923 907
Reports under Principle II 
61 99 78
Audits of internal risk models 8 9 6 
Supervision 
76 76 81 
From the statistics on ongoing banking supervision, it can be seen that although auditors' reports on 
annual accounts, routine special and deposit guarantee fund auditors' reports have decreased, audits 
pursuant to sections 44 and 44c of the Banking Act, auditors' reports on the special funds of 
investmen
doubled. 
From this, it can be inferred that the adoption of risk based regulation in financial supervision in 
Germany has overall, not resulted to a reduction in its use of external auditors. The growing 
importance of risk-based regulation is also highlighted through risk-oriented reporting as it now 
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not only explain their assets and other elements but also outline their own risk situation and their 
ability to manage these risks.304 The growing importance of using external auditors is also 
demonstrated through the Basel Committee's recommendations305 and certain post Enron 
reforms.306   
 foundation for this is a new circular 
called MaRisk (minimum requirements for risk management).311   
encourages banks to develop and implement better risk management techniques in monitoring and 
                                                
7.6.3 The Impact of Basel II on German Banking Supervision 
It was expected that the new Basel Capital Accord would result to a shift as on-site prudential audits 
assume greater importance within the supervisory review process and came to supplement the 
evaluation of reports and returns from institutions.307  This seems to be reflected in the above table 
of statistics on ongoing supervision. Basel II has three pillars namely: Minimum capital 
requirements, supervisory review process and market discipline. Even though the past years have 
concentrated on pillar 1, pillar 2 presents a great challenge for banks and supervisory agencies.308  
In October 1995, following the collapse of Barings Bank, which was attributed to inadequate 
control mechanisms, organisation and risk management, BaFin's predecessor, the 
Bundesaufsichtsamt fuer das Kreditwesen circulated the statement on “minimum requirements for 
the trading activities of credit institutions”.309 BaFin gave an official statement regarding the 
implementation of Pillar 2 on the 15th April 2004.310 The
Pillars 1 and 3 are to be covered by the new solvency directive Solvenzverordnung. Section 10 (1b) 
of the German Banking Act will be amended with regards to pillar 2.312 Pillar 2 not only seeks to 
ensure that banks have adequate capital to support all the risks related to their activities, but also 
 
304  See Deutsche Bundesbank, 'New Transparency Rules for Credit Institutions' Deutsche Bundesbank Monthly 
Report (October 2005) p 69 
305 Basel Committee's Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision and the Relationship between Banking 
Supervisors and Banks' External Auditors , International Auditing Practices Committee 
306  See Deutsche Bundesbank,  'The Evolution of Accounting Standards for Credit Institutions, Deutsche 
Bundesbank Monthly Report (June 2002) p 39 
307 Deutsche Bundesbank, Deutsche Bundesbank's Involvement in Banking Supervision  Monthly Report 
(September 2000) p 37  
308 NO Angermueller, M Eichhorn and T Ramke, 'New Standards of Banking Supervision – A Look at the 
German Implementation Approach for the Second Pillar of Basel II' (2005) 2 Journal of International Banking Law and 
Regulation  45 
309 Ibid p 47 
310 ibid 
311 ibid 
312 Ibid p 52 
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managing their risks.313 
Basel II goes beyond the current German bank regulations – as a result there are not only 
inconsistencies, but also gaps between the regulations.314 When comparing the minimum 
requirements for the credit business of credit institutions (MaK) with Basel II Internal Risk Based 
approaches, in detail, it is evident that requirements for IRB approaches are beyond those of the 
MaK.315 As a result of its higher sophistication, those ratings which fulfil IRB requirements will 
also fulfill MaK requirements but the reverse is not the same.316  
The minimum requirements for risk management (MaRisk) combines the minimum requirements 
for the credit business of credit institutions (MaK), MaH and MaIR.317 As well as paving way for 
more holistic regulation, this merger should prevent further risk classes specified in the New Basel 
Capital Accord.318  
7.7 Risk Based Approach to Bank Supervision in Italy 
Supervisory activities aimed at increasing the capitalisation of banks – particularly major ones and 
to manage their risks of large exposures became more of a regular practice in 2001.319 Methods for 
certifying banks’ internal models for market risk calculation and related capital charges were also 
established.320 
The Bank of Italy is taking measures to implement the new Basle Capital Accord.321 In accordance 
with the EU’s Capital Adequacy Directives 2006/48 and 2006/49 on the taking up and pursuit of the 
business of credit institutions and the capital adequacy of investment firms and credit institutions 
respectively, the so-called Basle II capital-adequacy principles will take effect as from January 1st 
2007. The exception will be for financial institutions adopting more sophisticated methods of risk 
calculation, who will be allowed to adopt the principles on January 1st 2008. Although the EU will 
apply Basle rules to all banks and investment firms, and not just to those that are internationally 
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active as required by the Basle Accord, a number of adjustments have been made to incorporate EU 
specifications and to make life easier for smaller firms. There are areas where national discretion 
may be exercised. There will be lower capital requirements in the EU rules for banks venture-
capital business in order not to put excessive dampers on finance for start-ups, given that these are 
regarded as crucial for the future growth and competitiveness of the EU. This directive will 
introduce a common regulatory approach to securitisation across the EU for the first time. The Bank 
of Italy was still consulting with Italian financial institutions as of end-July 2006 on details relating 
to the Italian legislation for the purposes of transposing EU directives into national legislation. 
In the area of credit risk, low- and medium-risk investment firms will be able to continue using the 
existing expenditure-based rules for credit risk, though they will have to divide their exposures into 
a larger number of classes. This will be known as the standardised approach. The more 
sophisticated approach for other financial institutions uses the internal ratings-based (IRB) 
method based on the Basel agreement, but will comprise foundation and advanced approaches. 
Less complex institutions will be able to mix the less and more sophisticated methodologies. 
There will be similar flexibility in addressing operational risk, consisting of three levels: the 
basic indicator approach, the standardised approach, and the advanced measurement 
approach (AMA)322. These levels reflect the increasing levels of risk sensitivity. The standard 
definition of operational risk as agreed to by the Risk Management Group of the Basel Committee 
and industry representatives is “the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal 
processes, people and systems or from external events.”323 This definition includes legal risk and 
excludes strategic and reputational risk and depends on the classification of operational risks 
according to the underlying causes324. Other important operational risk issues currently encountered 
by banks include business-continuity planning, the role of internal and external audits, the 
outsourcing of business functions and electronic banking.325 Since 2001, the Basel Committee's 
Risk Management Group has been carrying out surveys of banks' operational loss data with the aim 
                                                 
322   The basic approach is founded on a fixed percentage of gross income, the standardised approach extends the 
basic approach by breaking down banks' activities into components' and the advanced measurement approach is based 
on the adoption of banks' internal models. See M Moscadelli, 'The Modelling of Operational Risk: Experience with the 
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of obtaining information on the sector's operational risk experience and also with a view to refining 
the capital framework.326 The Bank of Italy checked the state of preparedness of Italy’s eight largest 
banking groups in 2005 and concluded that management was well aware of the imminence of the 
changes and that statistical systems were adequate. However, it identified a need for improvements 
in the quality of data and in IT systems for modelling. 
There will be a single consolidating supervisor through which cross border groups will channel 
applications to use the IRB and AMA methodologies. Decisions will be made within six months by 
the different supervisors acting together. 
7.8 Risk Based Supervision in the US 
The Federal Reserve also operates according to a risk-focussed method of supervision which was 
adopted not only as a result of the ever growing size and complexity of banks, but also because of 
the continuity inherent in its nature – as opposed to a point-in-time examination.327 The risk based 
approach was also introduced following the 'savings and loans' debacle of the late 1980s and 
1990s.328 The risk-based supervision process aims to ascertain the greatest risks to a banking 
organisation and evaluate the ability of the organisation’s management to identify, measure, 
monitor and control those risks.329 Businesses which have the potential to produce the greatest risks 
form the main focus of examination carried out by Federal Reserve examiners.330 The risk 
management component consists of four sub components which indicate the effectiveness of the 
banking organisation’s risk management and controls namely: Board and senior management 
oversight; Policies, procedures and limits; Risk monitoring management information systems and  
Internal controls.331 According to Alan Greenspan, a combination of improved risk management 
and the utilisation of financial derivatives to manage the risk portfolio has enabled banks to 
calculate risks more efficiently in business, which in turn has resulted to a reduction of the burden 
of the banking system on its regulators.332 
                                                 
326  See M Moscadelli, 'The Modelling of Operational Risk: Experience with the Analysis of Data collected by the 
Basel Committee' (July 2004)  Banca D'Italia Temi di Discussione del Servizio Studi Bank of Italy, Banking 
Supervision Department Number 517/2004  p 10 
327  The Federal Reserve System Purposes and Functions p 63 
328  D Singh 'Legal Aspects of Prudential Supervision' 2007 p 127 
329  The Federal Reserve System Purposes and Functions p 63 
330 ibid 
331  ibid 
332  A Greenspan,  ‘Banking’, Federal Reserve Bulletin, 7 October (2002) 
 60 
  
The move towards a risk-based approach is an attempt to realign bank regulation and supervision 
with the commercial realities faced by banks and this involved institutions managing their risks in a 
more efficient way to reflect the increase in modes of obtaining finance for business and also to 
hedge risks.333 The risk based approach in the USA concentrates on both small 'community banks' 
and 'large banks' and the mode of supervision has developed in distinct ways as a result of the 
existence of more than one bank regulator at the federal level.334 
The risk based approach consolidates on the extent to which a risk could adversely affect the safety 
and soundness of a bank.335 Benefits of the OCC's risk based approach include:336 Core assessment 
criteria which assist the OCC in its application of a common methodology to evaluate the risk 
profile of individual group entities to ensure that risks can be measured consistently and ; the 
forward looking and proactive nature of the OCC's approach which enables it to gauge how risks 
will change over the next 12 months. 
7.8.1 Impact of Basel II on US Financial Regulation and Supervision 
Basel II is important not only because it is a common standard for measuring capital adequacy but 
also because it is based on the risks of an institution’s investments.337 It therefore allows for greater 
facilitation of harmonisation and easier comparisons between different countries, particularly at a 
time when globalisation and the increase of multinational firms has made this necessary. The risk 
based capital standards not only mandate institutions that assume greater risk to have higher levels 
of capital but also take into consideration risks associated with operations that are not included on a 
bank’s balance sheet, such as those risks resulting from obligations to make loans.338 Basel II has 
been pursued by the Federal Reserve due to the increasing inadequacies of Basel I regulatory capital 
rules particularly in the context of the growing complexity of products and services provided by 
large internationally active banks.339 A more risk-capital framework has been called for and it is 
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believed that Basel II would provide such framework for such internationally active banks.340 As 
banking involves the acceptance and management of risks, it is of great importance that bank 
supervisors ensure that an adequate level of capital is maintained to insulate itself against potential 
losses. Minimum regulatory capital requirements are vital to ensuring that such protection is 
facilitated.341 
On the 25th of September, 2006, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Treasury (OCC); 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Board); Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(FDIC); and Office of Thrift Supervision, Treasury (OTS), which are collectively known as the 
Agencies, issued a notice of proposed rule making ( NPR or proposed rule).342 This notice 
welcomes comments on the New Advanced Capital Adequacy Framework that will replace the 
present general risk-based capital standards which have been applied to large, internationally active 
US banks.343 The proposed framework would also implement the “International Convergence of 
Capital Measurement and Capital Standards: A Revised Framework,” which was published in June 
2004 by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (Basel II) in the US.344  Basel II consists of 
three pillars namely: capital adequacy requirements, centralized supervision and market discipline. 
In relation to Pillar 1, the proposed framework as described in the NPR, would require some 
qualifying banks and permit others to calculate their regulatory risk-based capital requirements 
using an internal ratings-based (IRB) approach for credit risk and the advanced measurement 
approaches (AMA) for operational risk.345 As well as giving guidelines for the supervisory review 
process and requiring a process for the supervisory review of capital adequacy under Pillar 2, the 
NPR also highlights requirements for improved public disclosures under Pillar 3.346 
Three documents lay out the proposed supervisory guidance for implementing proposed revisions to 
the risk-based capital standards in the US and this new capital framework would be compulsory for 
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Implementation. <http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/press/bcreg/2007/20070215/attachment.pdf> last visited 
20th February 2007 
343 ibid 
344 Ibid; Even though Basel II lists various possible approaches for calculating regulatory risk-based capital 
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large internationally active US banking organisations and optional for other institutions.347 Two of 
these documents relate to the Basel II advanced approaches for calculating risk-based capital 
requirements namely, the advanced internal ratings-based (IRB) approach for credit risk and the 
advanced measurement approaches (AMA) for operational risk.348 Under the IRB framework, 
internal estimates of certain risk components would be used as key inputs by banks in determining 
their regulatory risk-based capital requirement for credit risk.349 As well as updating and 
consolidating previously proposed supervisory guidance on corporate and retail exposures, the IRB 
Guidance also provides new guidance on systems which a bank may require in order to distinguish 
risks posed by other types of credit exposure.350 
The second guidance document provides supervisory guidance on the AMA for operational risk and 
updates the proposed AMA Guidance published in 2003.351 The third document, issued for the first 
time, sets out proposals for guidance on the Basel II supervisory review process for assessing 
capital adequacy.352  
7.9 Third Investigative Aim: The Role of the External Auditor in 
Banking Regulation and Supervision 
The degree of external auditors' involvement in bank regulation and supervision varies across 
different jurisdictions. In the US, periodic on-site examinations are carried out and justified on the 
basis of the large number of small banks and on unit banking within particular states.353 Unlike 
jurisdictions where authorities place reliance on outside experts, bank supervisors in the US must 
possess skills in order to evaluate asset quality and other areas governing a bank's activities.354 
There is no formal statutory based relationship between the supervisors and external auditors in 
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countries such as the USA and Italy.355 Supervisors in these countries depend on direct inspections 
which they themselves carry out and commercial law governs the appointment of bank auditors.356 
In the UK and Germany, the banking supervisor has statutory powers over the appointment of 
external auditors, such as the right of approval or removal, and the right to commission an 
independent audit.357 
The benefits of using the external auditor in the bank regulatory and supervisory process include the 
ability of the external auditor to provide a wide range of resources and knowledge and acting as an 
intermediary for the regulator, thereby helping to protect the regulator's reputation and avoiding 
regulatory capture. The risks involved in using the external auditor include conflict of interests358, 
loss of information during the transfer of information to the regulator and higher costs.359  This 
investigative aim, in addition to providing a descriptive analysis of the audit professions of selected 
jurisdictions, considers the safeguards in place to mitigate those risks emanating from the use of 
external auditors in the supervisory process. 
7.9.1 The German Audit Profession 
Individual financial statements and annual reports for German stock corporations are required to be 
prepared in accordance with the German Commercial Code.360 Section 264 paragraph 1 sentence 1 
of the German Commercial Code requires the executive board to prepare individual financial 
statements.361 In addition, stock corporations must also prepare annual reports unless it is a small 
corporation under the definition of section 267 of the Commercial Code.362 Audits are carried out 
on two levels. Whilst the audit of financial statements and the annual report is performed by the 
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statutory auditor363, the individual and consolidated financial statements, as well as the annual 
report of a stock corporation are subject to examination by the supervisory board of the company.364 
The statutory audit results in two documents being issued namely:365 The audit report which is 
published along with the financial statements and the confidential audit report known as the long-
form audit report. Whilst the audit report which is addressed to the public contains a summary of 
the overall conclusion reached in the audit by the auditor, the long form audit report provides 
detailed conclusions and is addressed to the supervisory and executive board.366 The audit carried 
out by the supervisory board is more comprehensive than that of the statutory audit.367 Upon the 
supervisory board's consent of the financial statements, the individual financial statements are 
usually approved and rarely require an approval by the general meeting.368 The audit of the 
individual financial statements by the statutory auditor is however, subject to approval.369 
The audit objective in Germany is the identification and public disclosure of irregularities and 
omissions and arriving at an opinion on the firm as a going concern.370 Whilst the first paragraph of 
the published audit report states that the audit was conducted accordingly with section 317 of the 
German Commercial Code and that the audit abides by the professional standards of the Institut der 
Wirtschaftspruefer, the last paragraph states that the financial statements present fairly the financial 
position, operating activities and cash flows of the firm accordingly with generally accepted 
accounting principles.371 
7.9.2 Growing Perception of Auditor Independence in Germany?  
Since 1931, when the audit profession started being regulated, outsiders, in particular credit 
institutions, have been giving up their stakes in firms of partnerships (Wirtschaftspruefer, WP).372 
Apart from the growing realisation that outside ownership was not popular internationally, there 
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was also growing doubt as to whether firms which were partly owned by outsiders promoted auditor 
independence.373 However, there is now a growing trend of audit services being provided by non 
audit owners in Germany. Medium sized partnership firms (Wirtschaftspruefer) are being founded 
by non auditors – in particular members of the consultancy profession wishing to offer their clients 
the additional service of an audit.374 Even though the 8th Directive has achieved some degree of 
harmonisation in that both Germany and the UK now permit incorporation, the legislation regarding 
ownership of audit firms presents a reversal of the original situation.375 As a result of changes 
arising from the implementation of the 8th Directive, there have been questions raised in relation to 
changing perceptions of auditors and audit in both countries – whether there is growing focus on 
commercialism in the UK and whether there is growing focus on independence and professionalism 
in Germany.376 A higher perception of audit independence in Germany is probably long overdue 
following criticisms of auditors’ independence.  
7.9.3 Auditor Rotation 
Auditor rotation has been a topic of considerable debate – particularly in jurisdictions such as 
Germany. The debate usually centres around the alleged costs of implementing and carrying out 
mandatory audit rotation and also the claim that quality of audits will fall.377 An issue for 
consideration in Germany is whether the audit liability level is high enough to make up for the lack 
of mandatory audit rotation. However, there may be dangers in using only liability levels to ensure 
independence – especially where liability levels become too high.378 It is also important to note that 
just as mandatory rotation can reduce legal liability in thin markets, it will also tend to increase 
legal liabilities in developed markets.379 
In audit markets with relatively few large clients (thin markets), it has been proved that the resulting 
improved incentives for independence (benefits from mandatory rotation) outweighs the cost of 
carrying out mandatory rotation.380 This is because mandatory rotation can reduce legal liability in 
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such markets. In addition, there is greater concern for reappointment in thin markets and hence 
there would be greater likelihood that an auditor would be more willing in such markets, to 
compromise his independence. If audit markets are thin, independence can still be attained with 
lower level of legal liability under mandatory rotation than in a case where rotation is not 
mandatory.381 
Gietzmann and Sen also argue that in contrast, auditors’ potential gains from establishing and 
sustaining a reputation for independence supersedes the gains of reappointment with a particular 
client where a more developed audit market with many potential new clients exists.382 These results 
occur because in a sufficiently thin market, the auditor’s reputation is not a strong incentive as there 
relatively few new clients and in addition, opportunities to replace the existing client base are 
limited, no matter how good that auditor’s reputation is.383 As a result, it is concluded that if audit 
markets are thin, rotation is desirable.384 
Germany has been classed as having a relatively thin market as relatively few companies are public 
limited companies (AGs).385 Private limited companies (GmbH) are more dominant with only a 
section of these companies requiring statutory audits.386 The German legislature has considered an 
active reform on the regulation of auditors and possible introduction of auditor rotation.387  
7.10 Safeguarding the Auditor’s Independence in Italy 
In Italy, the Board of Directors are required to prepare annual financial statements according to 
Article 2423 of the Italian Civil Code.388 
Focus on internal audits: enough focus on external audits? 
The concept of the external audit, is not as developed in Italy when compared to Germany and 
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Britain.389 Presidential Decree No 136 of 1975, whose source is the Law 216/1974, brought into 
force for the first time the requirement for the external audit of listed company financial statements 
in Italy.390 External audit is differentiated from the traditional Collegio Sindicale or simply sindaci 
(internal) audit through legislative restrictions.391 In contrast to the present European trend whereby 
there seems to be a relaxing approach on standards of auditor independence, Italy has adopted a 
more stringent approach to provisions on auditor independence.392 CONSOB plays a significant 
role in regulating external audit of listed companies and its involvement appears to have resulted in 
stricter provisions for ensuring that auditors carry out their responsibilities in an objective manner 
and that they are seen as doing so.393 
In 2001, the quality of internal control systems formed a focal point during prudential analysis and 
particular importance was given to verifying the effectiveness of internal audits.394 Internal auditing 
is considered to be in a phase whereby it assumes an approach to inspection that is not well 
positioned to assessing the effectiveness of the internal control system.395 The process involves 
mainly checking operations of branches and verifying compliance with internal rules – audit 
controls on central structures and process analysis are considered to be inadequate.396 
Apart from certifying compliance with prudential requirements, the supervisory process has also 
involved greater focus on the effective control of risks.397 The growth of foreign connections of 
large banks has resulted to special supervisory action aimed at dealing with risks of subsidiaries 
overseas.398 In addition, increasing utilisation of credit derivatives for hedging and trading activities 
has warranted a check on measures whereby risks are calculated and managed.399 
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7.10.1 The Audit Profession in Italy 
There are two types of statutory auditors in Italy namely:400 The Collegio Sindicale – this type of 
statutory auditors (a board of three or five members chaired usually by their senior), has more of a 
management supervisory role than an auditing role and as such, does not carry out a full audit but 
monitors proper administration of the entity and its compliance with rules.401 Audits by the 
Collegio Sindicale must be carried out on all limited liability companies who appoint the Collegio 
Sindicale and whose share capital exceeds around 103,000 Euros.402 Full auditors are empowered to 
carry out full audits and according to the law, companies subject to mandatory full audits have to 
employ the services of both Collegio Sindicale and a full auditor. 
                                                
7.10.2 Audit of Financial Statements In Italy  
The Italian 1942 Civil Code mandated capital-based companies requiring a statutory audit to 
appoint a board, “Statutory Board of Auditors” (un Collegio Sindacale) of between 3 and 5 
individual auditors (Revisori Contabili) to carry out an ‘institutional internal audit’.403 The Civil 
Code, Article 2488 states that the Collegio Sindacale must be appointed if certain conditions 
relating to size of the company404, share capital are met.  
For the first time in Italy, through the Presidential Decree No 136 of 1975, the requirement for the 
external audit of listed companies was introduced under the Il Commissione Nazionale per le 
Societa e la Borsa (CONSOB) – the stock exchange regulatory authority.405 This compulsory 
external audit requirement has since been extended to a wide range of entities such as state-owned 
companies.406 The  L’Ordine dei Dottori Commercialisti ( graduates in Economics and Commerce) 
and L’Ordine dei Ragionieri e Periti Commerciali (College of Accountants and Commercial 
Experts – high school diploma) supported the continued existence of the traditional audit board ( 
sindaci) in the interests of most of its members.407 As a result, Decree no 127 in 1991 whilst 
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imposing a statutory external audit requirement on some classes of businesses, allowed for 
continued operation of the sindaci.408 
Whilst the Collegio Sindacale is mandatory for all companies where an audit of the accounts is 
required, the use of external auditors is compulsory only in companies which are required to get an 
audit opinion.409 The audit company must be authorised by the Security and Exchange Commission, 
CONSOB.410 In outlining the responsibilities of the Board of Statutory Auditors, the Italian Civil 
Code did not distinguish between listed and non listed companies.411  
The Collegio Sindicale performs audits restricted to particular account balances and fiscal/social 
security areas and as a result, duties of the Collegio Sindicale and those of full auditors 
overlapped.412 The Draghi law (Decreto Legislativo 24 febbraio 1998 no 58 – Decreto Draghi) 
attempted to clarify the apparent overlap of audit duties between the sindaci and the societa di 
revisione 413 in listed companies by making inapplicable almost half of the Civil Code provisions 
for sindaci in these companies.414 It addresses the overlap of audit duties for some companies (more 
importantly for the listed companies), in that the Collegio Sindicale of some of the companies 
subject to the Draghi law have no audit responsibilities – these responsibilities having been 
transferred to external accountancy firms.415 
In relation to non listed companies, the Italian Civil Code416 states that the Board of Statutory 
Auditors must perform operations to verify the correctness of accounting, cash accounts, existence 
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of investments and other assets of the company every three months.417 As well as other proposals 
and provisions, the final report on the draft of financial statements should summarise activities and 
the results of such activities.418 
Legislative Decree no 58 of the 24 February 1998 effective from the 1st July 1998 exempted some 
provisions included in the Italian Civil Code for listed companies and describes the roles and 
responsibilities of the Board of Statutory Auditors for listed companies.419 These roles include the 
oversight of the company's compliance with the Italian Civil Code and Articles of Incorporation, the 
appropriateness of the administration which includes the internal system of controls and 
administrative functions.420 The Board of Statutory Auditors are also required to report to 
CONSOB if they are aware of any irregularities during the performance of their control 
functions.421 Irregularities relating to the directors' operations within the company can also be 
reported to any competent court.422 All other areas required by the Italian Civil Code to be verified 
by the Board of Statutory Auditors became the exclusive responsibilities of the external auditors for 
the company.423 
                                                
However, this law did not result in change for most companies operating in Italy.424 It gave the 
societa di revisione sole responsibility for the control of client accounting – including verification 
of underlying accounting records, however the sindaci are still required to express and report an 
opinion on the financial statements.425 Further change occurred through the reform of the Italian 
commercial law in 2001 whereby the possibility to appoint a full auditor (individual or audit firm) 
instead of a Collegio Sindicale was given in some cases.426 This reform came into effect on 1 
January 2004 and provided an option to the company to choose whether or not to employ an 
individual auditor or an audit firm instead of the Collegio Sindicale – thereby changing the 
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obligation under prior legislation of limited liability companies to appoint a  Collegio Sindicale (or 
according to the new law, a full auditor).427 
mission (Commissione per 
la Statuizione dei Principi di Revisione) to issue auditing statements.430 
ionals now in Italy, it has the second largest number of 
accounting professionals in Europe after the UK. 
sionale which came into force in 1987 and whose revised January 2001 version 
has been used and 
                                                
The EC Eight Directive was implemented in Italian law in 1992 and as a result, the statutory auditor 
(Revisore Contabile) is required to be enrolled on a register held by the Ministry of Justice and hold 
one of two recognised professional qualifications.428 One of the two professional qualifications 
must be from either L’Ordine dei Dottori Commercialisti (graduates in Economics and Commerce) 
or L’Ordine dei Ragionieri e Periti Commerciali (College of Accountants and Commercial 
Experts).429 This objective was only partially achieved as whoever was sindaco for at least three 
years before the law was enforced, regardless of his school/academic qualifications, was 
automatically enrolled on the new register. These bodies appoint a com
In addition to statutory audit – that is, the external audit of listed companies and other bodies and 
the quasi-internal audit by sindaci, there is growing preference for voluntary audit in Italy due to 
many reasons and there are now more companies undertaking voluntary audits than there are 
companies for whom a statutory audit is required.431 Individual auditors are allowed to perform 
voluntary audits.432 The Civil Code433 details provisions regarding accounting and auditing and 
with over 70,000 accounting profess
7.10.3 Safeguards in Operation to Reduce Threats to Independence  
Two ethical guidelines are available to auditors in Italy depending on which professional body they 
belong to:434   The Consiglio Nazionale dei Dottori Commercialisti’s (CNDC) Norme di 
Deontologia Profes
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the Consiglio Nazionale dei Ragionieri Commercialisti’s (CNRC) Codice Deontologico which was 
approved in October 1999 
are covered first 
under general principles before integrity and confidentiality but are not defined.435 
e and on an independent frame of mind rather than the appearance of 
independence.436 
required to submit detailed 
documentation to CONSOB as part of its quality review process.442 
                                                
The CNDC document is composed of 40 articles which cover three sections namely general 
principles, external relations and internal relations. Independence and objectivity 
The CNRC’s Codice Deontologico is more comprehensive than the previously issued 1983 version 
and it has been influenced by the IFAC and FEE codes insofar as they are compatible with Italian 
legislation. As is the case in the UK, emphasis in the CNRC’s code is placed on objectivity rather 
than independenc
Since 1995, auditors (revisori) have to be qualified members of either the CNDC or CNRC and are 
automatically bound by their codes.437 In addition, external auditors of listed companies are bound 
by CONSOB’s comprehensive regulations.438 CONSOB performs quality reviews of the societa di 
revisione regularly439 in order to monitor independence and technical fitness.440 As a result of this 
process, CONSOB consults with the councils of the two professional bodies with the aim of 
providing recommending changes to their practice and therefore plays an important role in external 
auditing in Italy.441 Not only does it have the authority to remove any firm contradicting its 
regulations from the register, but also, registered firms are 
7.10.4 Auditor Rotation 
According to the data obtained for Italy, Italy is classified as having a relatively thin market for 
external auditors.443 As a result, mandatory rotation would and should be desirable in Italy where 
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external auditors are concerned. Interestingly enough, mandatory rotation in Italy applies only to 
external auditors.444 Italy is the only EU Member State to require rotation of audit firms for listed 
clients as well as for other bodies such as insurance companies.445 
ce on the one 
hand, and tightening up the monitoring of audit quality within the EU on the other.449 
 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants) set up the 
                       
7.10.5 EC Consultative Paper 
The EC Paper has evolved from an examination of the FEE Common Core Principles (FEE 1998) 
and has maintained not only the framework developed by FEE but that also common to the UK 
guidance whereby five threats to independence are recognised and a range of safeguards are offered 
to reduce these threats.446 The EC document however, addresses issues on auditor independence 
more deeply than either the UK or FEE codes.447 It also adopts the use of the principles based 
approach over a rules based approach as this promotes greater flexibility in dealing with issues 
related to auditor independence.448 The European Commission has developed a two way approach 
by advancing a common set of principles governing the issue of auditor independen
7.11 Auditor Independence in the US 
In the US, developments relating to the issue of auditor independence have led to the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) carrying out investigations in situations where conflicts of interests 
are apparent among major audit-consultancy firms.450 The preservation of the independence of 
external auditors is considered vital to investor protection – as a result, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission and AICPAC (American 
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Independence Standards Board (ISB).451 
In the aftermath of Enron, the Co-ordinating Group on Audit and Accounting Issues (CGAA) 
comprising regulators and ministers was formed by the UK government.452 The chairman and the 
director of the Accountancy Foundation Review Board (Review Board), were both members of the 
CGAA – the Board being responsible then for the independent oversight of the UK accountancy 
professional bodies.453 The Review Board in ensuring that policy discussions on the topic of auditor 
independence were well informed commissioned a research programme in collaboration with 
leading academics and market research bodies.454 Of great concern to the CGAA was the adequacy 
of the UK framework for auditor independence particularly given the circumstances which led to 
criticism of Andersen.455 These criticisms are as follows: The fact that the income generated by 
Andersen from non-audit services ($27 million) was greater than that from audit services ($25m); 
that Enron had been the partner’s only client for some years and was the main client of the firm’s 
Houston office – hence making the office and partner economically dependent on keeping Enron as 
 by auditing firms where the same firm performs both the internal and 
external audits for the client firm and when the auditing firm also provides lucrative consulting 
a client; and a number of former staff of Andersen worked for Enron. 456 
Enron’s accounting practices had overstated revenue from long term contracts and Andersen’s 
errors of judgment in the audit of Enron were admitted by Joseph Berardino, Andersen’s CEO 
before Congress in December 2001. 457  As well as highlighting the importance of financial 
transparency in the adequate functioning of capital markets, the Enron case also demonstrates the 
conflict of interest faced
services to the client.458 
As regards non-audit services, the Review Board makes two recommendations:459 Firstly, for a 
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prohibition to be introduced which would disallow auditors from providing advice to management 
where this had adverse effects for investors and secondly, that those permissible non-audit services 
presently in operation be reviewed and where threats to independence were significant, 
discontinuation of such services should be considered .460 Four further recommendations by the 
Review Board include the vesting of responsibility for the UK auditor independence framework in 
the Auditing Practices Board, that the level of economic dependence for one audit client be reduced 
to 5% of total practice fees, a suggestion for wide review to be undertaken on the change of 
s scope to cover 
.461
financial information are mainly bankers, 
governments or founding families, where there are relatively few listed companies ( when compared 
Based on the uniformity of accounting rules, strong enforcement procedures which exist in the 
Based on users of financial information however, countries such as Italy and Germany comprise 
                               
appointment procedures and fourthly that the monitoring regime should extend it
the management of economically significant clients  
7.12 Fourth Investigative Aim: The Audit Expectations Gap 
In countries like Italy and Germany where users of 
to the US and the UK),462 the expectations gap in these jurisdictions can be ascertained through the 
characteristics of the users of financial information. 
US,463 this would tend to reduce the expectations gap which exists in the US when compared to the 
EU and jurisdictions within the EU. 
mainly of core, insider shareholders464 hence the expectations gap is more likely to be reduced than 
the case of the UK and the US where there are many outside shareholders. 
In addition, the type of legal system (be it common law based or codified) is likely to have an 
impact on the expectations gap as the law can be said to be more well defined in codified systems in 
comparison to common law systems. These differences between credit/insiders (Germany and Italy) 
and equity/outsiders ( the UK and the US) shareholders and the legal systems may be determining 
factors in the expectations gap within these jurisdiction. The situation however, is not so clear cut. 
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Institutional and private investors now have an increasing importance in Germany465 and as 
mentioned in the second chapter, the Italian and German governments have realised the growing 
 two contexts since it requires 
audits of public companies not only to include procedures that will ensure the detection of fraud 
                                                
importance of audits and requiring public or listed companies to publish detailed, audited financial 
statements. 
Litigation and legal exposure risks created by the expectations gap has led to great concerns for the 
international auditing community.466 Such are those concerns that the implementation of 
“expectations gap” auditing standards has taken place in the US.467 In addition, legislation relating 
to proportionate legal liability for auditors, the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, was passed 
by the US Congress in 1995.468 Management fraud and bankruptcy are two important audit contexts 
which not only present considerable legal exposure to the audit profession but have also been 
directly addressed in both international and US auditing standards.469  The Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act470 does not emphasise the significance of these
having a direct and material effect on the financial statements, but also an assessment of an entity’s 
ability to continue as a going concern, hence avoiding bankruptcy.471 
Litigation concerns have increased following the demise of Arthur Andersen, as a result of the 
Enron scandal. According to a European Commission policy paper due for publication in January 
2007, the big four audit firms needed legal protection against potentially damaging legal actions.472 
Four ways whereby Brussels could enhance protection for auditors as suggested by the Commission 
paper are as follows:473 Firstly, through the imposition of a fixed monetary cap for auditor liability 
at European level via EU legislation; secondly, by introducing a cap based on the market 
capitalisation of the audited company; thirdly, the proposal of a cap based on a multiple of the audit 
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fees charged by the auditor to his client; and fourthly, through the principle of “proportionate 
liability” which can only be implemented by national governments. Under the principle of 
proportionate liability, auditors would only be liable for damages resulting from their own mistakes 
Expectations gap contribute to litigation risk because differences in perceptions between the judicial 
he audit profession 
attaches great importance to materiality issues in addressing audit responsibility in a fraud case, 
parties.479 Unique factors which exist in Germany include the close relationship of all professional 
                     
and not their clients’. At present, a liability cap exists in just five EU member states namely 
Germany, Austria, Belgium, Greece and Slovenia.474 Britain, in the meantime, is implementing the 
concept of “proportionate liability”.475 
and audit profession, particularly with regards to the issue of materiality, are likely to result to a 
higher level of litigation risk – since judges’ lack of consideration of materiality levels are likely to 
subject less culpable auditors to less favourable judicial decision making. 
As well as evidence shows that certain external factors from the audit environment, held to be 
highly important by auditors are considered by the judiciary in deciding responsibility assessments 
and mitigate the effects of judges’ unfavourable attitudes towards the auditing profession, it has also 
been shown that whilst reliability and materiality greatly influenced auditors’ attributions, they did 
not play a part in the attributions of the judges.476 Findings show that whilst t
judges do not appear to take into consideration whether a fraud is above or below the auditor’s 
materiality level.477 If factors such as materiality play such a role in the audit standards, then judges 
should also consider these factors during responsibility assessments of auditors. 
In Germany, auditor legal liability is capped at a maximum amount and whilst there are pressures in 
other jurisdictions (such as the UK)478 to pass limited liability legislation, German auditors sought 
to increase the cap on audit liability in order to avoid broader unlimited responsibilities to third 
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groups within the state, the strong influence of banks and conservative accounting.480 These factors 
are said to have accounted for the acceptance of capped audit liability arrangement over the past 60 
years and for the initiative by auditors in seeking to increase the cap in order to avoid broader, 
unlimited responsibilities to third parties.481 In April 1998, through amendments made to the 
German Commercial Code, audit reforms made effective for fiscal years ending after December 31 
1998, became law.482 As well as changing the objective of the audit, the audit reforms refined audit 
reporting requirements, and increased the legal liability of auditors.483 The legislation resulting 
ility limits of audit failures from 250,000 Euros to 4 million 
7.13 Comparative Analysis 
7.13.1 Comparative Analysis between Germany and the UK 
                                                
from the reforms increased the legal liab
Euros. 
7.13.1.1 First Investigative Aim 
The Central Bank's Involvement in Supervision in the UK and Germany  
BaFin and the Deutsche Bundesbank share responsibilities for banking supervision and this division 
of responsibilities is aided through a Memorandum of Understanding. The FSA, HM Treasury and 
the Bank of England also co-operate through a Memorandum of Understanding484. Reasons for HM 
Treasury's involvement are probably historical – the Bank of England's relationship with the 
Treasury dating as far as 1946 through the Bank of  England Act 1946. A more direct involvement 
between the Bank of England and the FSA (rather than the existing tripartite one) would have been 
preferable – especially through the Bank of England's greater participation in the supervisory 
process. The Memorandum of Understanding aids accountability in the supervisory process – even 
 
480  M Gietzmann and R Quick, 'Capping Auditor Liability: The German Experience' 1996. See 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2580>  (last visited 17th February 2007) 
nal of Auditing 1998 p 229 
 Audits? Evidence from the 
ly add an additional paragraph to the published audit report in order to inform the public about a specific 
roblem or limitation of the audit, but the structure or the content of the optional additional paragraph was not codified 
481  Also see   B Anderson, M Maletta and A Wright, 'Perceptions of Auditor Responsibility: Views of the 
Judiciary and the Profession' International Jour
482  HA Skaife and J Gassen, 'Can Audit Reforms Change the Monitoring Role of
German Audit Market.' August 2006 see also 
<http://www.papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=933010#PaperDownload> 
483  Ibid ; Before the audit reforms, the audit objective focused on the verification of the composition and 
existence of assets-in-place. The published audit report was a one paragraph opinion that consisted of a mandatory 
phrase that annual financial statements were in compliance with German law and German generally accepted 
accounting principles, and that the financial statements presented a true and fair view of the enterprise. The auditor 
could voluntari
p
by law; ibid 
 
484  Refer to chapter two  for this 
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though more work is required in regards to clearer allocation of responsibilities, particularly in 
relation to when the Treasury should be involved.485  The quality of the supervisory process would 
ec
y process. Effective and regular communication is therefore required in order to ensure 
that the Bank provides timely, accurate and complete information when required and requested for. 
ced staff who can recognise when such information is 
 as 
regards which regulatory objective should take priority. This presents a problem for the German 
ines to determine which objective should take 
ne regulator, BaFin. As a 
result, there is still no integrated supervisory approach in Germany yet488 and as highlighted with 
be greatly enhanced through the Bank of England's immense knowledge being eff tively 
contributed to the supervisory process. 
The exchange of information between the Bank of England and the FSA is a vital principle486 since 
the Bank of England stands in a position whereby it can provide necessary information required for 
the FSA to function effectively. There should be more focus on exchange of information between 
the Bank of England and the FSA in order to involve the Bank of England on a greater level in the 
supervisor
The FSA also requires qualified and experien
required. 
7.13.1.2 Regulatory Objectives 
In comparison to the UK, where the Financial Services Authority's statutory objectives govern the 
financial services industry, be it banking, insurance or investment activities, the regulatory 
objectives within the banking, insurance and securities sector in Germany have been retained. As 
these three regulatory objectives rank equally487, a situation could occur whereby conflicts arise
system as there are no governing principles or guidel
priority – unlike the case which exists in the UK whereby section 2(3) of the FSMA 2000 exists. 
7.13.1.3 The Structure of Single Regulators 
In contrast to the UK where amalgamation of all previously existing financial services regulators, 
processes and objectives have taken place, Germany's structure of financial regulation consists of 
previously existing regulators still operating independently albeit under o
conflicting objectives, this situation would also present opportunities for lack of coherence and 
                                                 
485  See the Memorandum of Understanding between HM Treasury, the Bank of England and the Financial 
Services Authority (2006) paragraph 5 
486  For more on these principles see he Memorandum of Understanding between HM Treasury, the Bank of 
England and the Financial Services Authority (2006) paragraph 1 
487 See BaFin's Annual Report for 2004 
488  See Deutsche Bundesbank Monthly Report  (April 2005) p 55 
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inconsistencies when compared to the coherent system of the UK's FSA. 
This exchange of information would follow two objectives namely:490 To help improve the 
on with enterprises from the other financial sector in the case of sectoral 
a German bank are submitted to the German Bundesbank 
for evaluation who then reports its findings to the BaFin. Safeguards inherent in the German system 
In this respect, and from this level of enforcement Germany's supervisory process introduces more 
e case in the UK – as the regulator and the central bank 
both review the work performed by external auditors. The UK like also Germany imposes statutory 
red during 
                     
In order to resolve the inconsistencies arising from the fact that Germany has not adopted an 
integrated supervisory approach yet, it has been suggested that focus should be on close cooperation 
and an extensive exchange of information among the supervisory institutions in the various 
sectors.489 
evaluation of cooperati
individual supervision of an enterprise and secondly, to facilitate coordination between competent 
national supervisors in the deployment and evolution of the surveillance toolkit in connection with 
such one-stop finance strategies. 
Enforcement Process 
The audit reports produced by auditors of 
include: Firstly, the statutory obligations imposed on auditors to report to the regulator (BaFin) and 
the Bundebank any irregularities or causes for serious concern discovered during the course of their 
audits and secondly, that  both BaFin and the Deutsche Bundesbank rely not only on direct on site 
review but also on off site review.491 
checks in its enforcement process than is th
obligations on auditors to report any irregularities or causes for serious concern discove
the course of their audits.492 
                            
g Act , KWG section 28 
489  ibid p 56 
490  ibid 
491  E Huepkes p 11 
492  See FSMA section 166 and the German Bankin
 81 
  
7.14 Second Investigative Aim 
7.14.1 Treatment of Risk Concentration in the UK and Germany – Separate 
ncentration to separate supervision.496 Since there 
is still no integrated supervisory approach in Germany, there should be focus on close cooperation 
interrelationships between these two sectors to ensure accurate assessment of their scope and 
system.499  
ple 
 that the risks posed by individual sectors can be 
Supervision or Consolidated Supervision? 
In contrast to the UK, where consolidated supervision exists, there is still no integrated approach to 
cross sector supervision of equivalent risks in Germany. The one stop financial services strategy on 
which the establishment of BaFin is based is reflected strongly in the “Risk Analysis and Finance 
Market Studies Department'.493 In Germany, financial conglomerates play a greater role in the 
insurance sector where they account for a total of 52% of the gross premiums written.494 In contrast, 
they play a less significant role in the banking sector.495 
The focus of the supervisory regime in Germany concerns setting specific capital requirements at a 
financial conglomerate level and treating risk co
and extensive exchange of information between the supervisory institutions in the various 
sectors.497 The provisions of section 7 of the Banking Act and section 84(4) No 2a of the Insurance 
Supervision Act on the exchange of information will facilitate such close cross-sector cooperation 
between BaFin's insurance and banking supervisory sections.498 It is also vital to monitor 
relevance to the stability of the financial 
The main efficiency gain from using a single risk-based approach rather than having multi
systems operating in various parts of the industry is
compared against one set of criteria.500 A single approach does not necessarily indicate that all 
sectors of the industry present the same kind of risks or that they will give rise to the same degree of 
risk to the individual objectives or principles of regulation.501 
                                                 
493 See 'Responsibilities and Objectives : Cross Sectoral Departments' 
://w e/bafin/aufgabenundziele_en.htm<http ww.bafin.d >  
on of Financial Conglomerates in Germany' Monthly Report April 2005 p 39 
p 39,40 
Supervision' 2007 p 133  
494   'Supervisi
495  Ibid p
496  Ibid p 40 
497  Ibid p 56 
498  Ibid  
499 ibid 
500  D Singh, 'The Legal Aspects of Prudential 
501  ibid 
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7.15 Third Investigative Aim 
7.15.1 Differences between the Audit and Accounting Profession in Germany and 
the UK 
In addition to representing opposing accounting traditions, Germany and the UK have different 
legal y s stems.502 Whilst the UK operates according to a common-law based legal system, Germany 
is based on codified Roman Law. This legal difference plays an important role inter alia on each 
lenders) whilst in the UK, finance has been provided by external shareholders.505 Understandably, 
ever questions differences which particularly relate to the distinction between statutory 
control in Germany and a strong profession in the UK – especially because of EU harmonisation.510 
intervention in Britain has resulted to a 
their audit objectives.512 Whilst the audit objective under German law is to test for accordance with 
                           
country’s interpretation of the ‘true and fair view’ principle.503 In addition, there are differences in 
the sources of finance for enterprises and as a result, differences in the importance of capital 
markets.504 German finance has traditionally been provided by banks (both as equity owners and as 
this difference has led to greater importance and focus on audit and publication requirements in the 
UK.506 
In Germany, there is a lower number of listed companies than in the UK.507 In addition, share 
capital is less distributed and small investors are not as important.508 As a result of these 
differences, there is more tendency for the German system to place greater emphasis on creditor 
protection whilst the UK system emphasizes shareholder protection.509 
Vieten how
He points out that the increased scope for government 
situation which is increasingly resembling that of the German system.511 Apart from this however, 
he notes that there are still more differences than similarities between the two systems – particularly 
                      
nd C Nobes, 'Harmonisation of the Structure of Audit Firms: Incorporation in the UK and Germany' 
98) 7 unting Review at p 126 
diting in Britain and  Germany Compared: Professions, Knowledge and the State' (1995) 4(3) 
opea
 des Experts Comptables Europeens  'Enforcement Mechanisms in Europe: A 
limin on of Oversight Systems'  April 2001 p 33 : the purpose of the German audit is to provide a 
502   L Evans a
(19  (1)European Acco
503  Ibid  
504  ibid 
505 Ibid p 127 
506  ibid 
507  Ibid p 141 
508  ibid 
509  ibid 
510  Ibid p 127 
511  H Vieten, 'Au
Eur n Accounting Review  495 
512  ibid p 500; also see  Federation
Pre ary Investigati
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the relevant legislation, that of the UK is to give an opinion on the true and fair view.513  
 
7.15.2Concepts of  “Auditing” and “Accounting” 
One significant difference between the auditing professions in Germany and Britain is the existence 
of auditing as a distinct profession in Germany.514 The Wirtschaftspruefer is a qualified auditor and 
515
onflicts of interest better 
avoided). 
in  Caparo v Dickman to the 
519 Under company law, the auditor can also 
                                                                                                                                                                 
in contrast to Britain, an accounting profession does not exist in Germany.  In Britain, auditors 
grew more dependent on the expertise of accountants over the years until the audit function became 
dominated by the accounting profession.516 The concepts of “auditing” and “accounting” are often 
used interchangeably in Britain.517 (One of the reasons why the dual role of external auditor/ 
reporting accountant) does not exist in Germany – roles are distinct, c
Other differences between the accounting and auditing professions in Germany and the United 
Kingdom are as follows:518 In Germany, the tax profession is separate although it overlaps, and it is 
larger than the accountancy body. In contrast the UK system includes those practising tax in its 
accountants' figure. A second tier auditing body for auditors permitted only to audit private 
companies (of vereidigte Buchpruefer) came into being in the late 1980s. 
7.15.3Communication between Audit/Accounting Profession and Third Parties 
In the UK, the auditor owes a duty to the company and follow g
shareholders as a body – not an individual person.
make written representation to shareholders and can be heard at the general meeting if the directors 
try to remove him.520 The Wirtschaftspruefer does not have such rights except in court proceedings 
– however, his right to make statements is limited by the duty of confidentiality he owes the 
 
statement as to whether or not the financial statements and the annual report are in accordance with authoritative 
accounting principles. 
513   L Evans and C Nobes, 'Harmonisation of the Structure of Audit Firms: Incorporation in the UK and Germany' 
unting Review  127 
6 
nd R Parker, Comparative International Accounting  p 27  
3 
The European Acco
514 Vieten p 14
515 ibid 
516 ibid  
517 ibid 
518  C Nobes a
519 Vieten p 15
520 ibid 
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company.521 This is not to say that the auditor, under German law, cannot report irregularities. He 
has to do so by reporting to the management and supervisory board.522 
7.15.4Exercise of Professional Judgements 
It is debatable as regards whether the Wirtschaftspruefer does exercise as much professional 
judgement as his UK counterpart as a system of common law exists in the UK as contrasted to 
codification which exists in Germany. However, since German law does not cover all cases, some 
measure of professional judgement would still be required from the Wirtschaftspruefer.  
 Regulators are now inco
g lators in the US however, British and 
auditors are also required to provide them with a more detailed report on the audit.  Confidential 
                  
Some similarities however persist between the German and UK systems of regulation of 
auditors/accountants. As is the case in the UK523, a dual system of state and self regulation operates 
in Germany.524 The Wirtschaftsprueferkammer (chamber of auditors) was established in 1961 and 
assumes the form of a self-governing body but is supervised by the Federal Minister of Economics, 
whose approval is essential for amendments to its constitution.525 The other important body in 
Germany is the Institut der Wirtschaftspruefer, the members’ trade organisation.526 Membership of 
this organisation is not only voluntary but also restricted to practising auditors only.527 
Initially, there were no provisions for on-site inspection in Britain.528 Subsequently, the auditor’s 
role in facilitating monitoring was realised.529 rporating audit technology 
into their enforcement procedures.530 Unlike financial re u
German banking supervisors do not have large teams of inspectors investigating bank operations 
on-site. Instead, the external auditor contributes by monitoring.531 Auditing is also considered as 
being less intrusive than inspection. Bank auditing goes beyond company law requirements.532 As 
well as providing German regulators with attested annual financial statements, German bank 
533
                               
r four 
7 
4 
G 
521 ibid 
522 ibid 
523 See chapte
524 Vieten p 14
525 ibid 
526 ibid 
527 ibid 
528 Vieten p 17
529 ibid 
530 Vieten at p 166 
531 ibid 
532 ibid 
533 Section 26 (1) KW
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reports to regulatory authorities, as well as auditors’ reports which focus on capital ratios and other 
items have become important focal points.534 Auditing provides a vital connection between 
prudential authorities and regulated financial institutions.535 
Under the Bank of England’s regime, British banking law featured just a few reporting 
requirements.536 The audit report still follows company law by stating whether or not the financial 
orting accountants commissioned under section 39 Banking 
Act 1987 which frequently exceeded 600 reports annually.538 
eport any matters of prudential concern to the Bank of 
England. Usually auditors are under a duty not to communicate with third parties. However, as long 
statements provide a true and fair view and are properly in accordance with the Companies Act 
1985. The regime of its successor, the Financial Services Authority, has led to a more reduced level 
of frequency in number of reports produced. From 1 April 2003 to 31 March 2004, the FSA 
exercised its power under section 166 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 to require 
firms to produce a skilled person’s report in 28 situations.537 This is a considerable reduction in 
investigations from the number of rep
Under Statement of Auditing Standards (SAS) 620 Revised: The Auditor’s Right and Duty To 
Report To Regulators in the Financial Sector, auditors have routine reporting responsibilities and 
also responsibilities to provide a special report required by the regulator. In addition, auditors are 
required by law to report, subject to compliance with legislation relating to “tipping-off”, direct to a 
regulator when they conclude that there is reasonable cause to believe that a matter is or may be of 
material significance to the regulator. 
In the UK, prior to 1994, there was only a right to report under section 47 of the Banking Act 
1987.539 This gave the auditor the right to r
as the auditor had communicated to the regulator in good faith, he could not be considered to have 
breached any duty of confidentiality. SAS 620 gave rise to an extension of the right to the duty to 
communicate.540 In Germany, however, there has always been strict rules upon the auditor in that he 
had a duty to communicate.541 There is still no statutory duty to communicate in the UK even 
                                                 
534 Vieten at p 166 
535 ibid 
nd P O Russell  at p  107 
 p 168 
536 See Vieten p 167 
537 P Dewing a
538 ibid 
539 See Vieten
540 ibid 
541 ibid 
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though the duty to report has gone beyond just using a professional standard (SAS 620) to using a 
statutory instrument.542 Apart from the duty to report to regulators in the financial sector, the auditor 
can also provide reports as a skilled person. 
In the UK, section 166 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 deals with the powers of the 
FSA to obtain a report by a skilled person (reporting accountant) to assist the FSA in performing its 
functions under FSMA 2000. Under sections 167 and 168 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 
2000, the FSA also has the powers to appoint competent persons to carry out investigations. The 
differences between the roles of reporting accountants (now known as skilled persons) and 
competent persons are demonstrated by the bearer of the costs for work carried out by these 
persons. For work undertaken by skilled persons, the bank bears the cost directly whilst for work 
undertaken by competent persons, the FSA bears the cost.543 The role of the reporting accountant 
has become so important that it will be incorporated into the entire regulated sector.544 Even though 
skilled persons are usually approved by the FSA, the role is usually performed by auditors of the 
d limited circumstances in which a firm can 
use skilled persons.547 
but also makes use of external firms of certified accountants or could ask the Bundesbank for help. 
e Bu it 
regulated firm.545 This raises the question of independence since both roles of auditor and reporting 
accountant are distinct roles which still overlap occasionally.546 Measures have however been 
adopted by the FSA to safeguard against possibilities of a conflict of interest. Chapter 5 of the FSA 
Supervision Manual provides examples of circumstances where the FSA may use skilled persons. 
The FSA may nominate or approve the appointment of the auditor of a bank as a skilled person if it 
is cost effective to do so but also takes into account any conflicts the auditor may have in relation to 
the matter to be reported on. There are also defined an
The Federal Financial Supervisory Authority has the powers to carry out special audits at any time 
Th ndesbank audits minimum reserves and foreign currency transactions and parts of the aud
                                                 
D Mallett,  Banking: A Regulatory Accounting and Auditing Guide (Institute of 
ts 2001)  295 
 'The Role of Third Parties in Banking Regulation and Supervision' (2003) 4 (3) Journal of 
rnati
or specific purposes; not to use them as a matter of routine; to use skilled persons only after having considered 
because of the added value to be gained due to their expertise or knowledge and not 
 restraints; to take into account cost implications and to use the tool in a focused and proportionate 
542 See paragraph 3 of the Accountants ( Banking Act 1987) Regulations 1994, SI 1994/524 
543  See J Hitchins, MHogg and 
Chartered Accountan
544   D Singh, 
Inte onal Banking Regulation   9 
545  ibid 
546 ibid 
547  According to chapter 5 of the Supervision Manual, the FSA stated that firms are to appoint skilled persons 
only f
alternatives; to use skilled persons 
because of resource
way. 
 87 
  
are performed for the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority.548 The Bundesbank does not charge 
any fees and there is a limit to the number of audits it can undertake for the Federal Financial 
r will most likely have worked at the bank before and therefore be familiar with the 
environment. This will save costs as he is not learning new things about the bank and is more 
 improvement on the approach previously taken by 
its predecessor. 
increased use should be made of such auditors. 
Supervisory Authority.549 For all other audits carried out by external auditors, which are section 44 
reports, the external auditors are paid by the banks.550 
Whilst the Bank of England usually used a financial institution’s chosen auditor (even though it had 
the power to appoint its chosen auditors), the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority might select 
a different firm of accountants.551 
The FSA may nominate or approve the appointment of the auditor of a bank as a skilled person if it 
is cost effective to do so but also takes into account any conflicts the auditor may have in relation to 
the matter to be reported on. There are also defined and limited circumstances in which a firm can 
use skilled persons.552 There are certain advantages in using a financial institution’s chosen auditor 
in that the audito
familiar with vital information and procedures required for the audit. However, audit firms need to 
be rotated and if the same audit firm had been used by the bank for quite some time, this may affect 
the judgment of the audit firm as to much familiarity with the client ( bank) could compromise the 
objectivity and independence of the audit firm. As a result of potential conflicts of interests, it may 
be said that the FSA’s approach is definitely an
Whilst the FSA’s use of external auditors has declined, when compared to the use of external 
auditors by the Bank of England, it may be justified based on its reduction in use of external 
auditors also acting in the dual capacity of skilled persons. Where the external auditor acts solely 
and exclusively as an external auditor, and not under the dual role of skilled person/auditor, then 
                                                 
548 See Vieten p 169 
549 ibid 
550 ibid 
551 Ibid at p 170 
for specific purposes; not to use them as a matter of routine;to use skilled persons only after having considered 
rtionate 
552  According to chapter 5 of the Supervision Manual, the FSA stated that firms are to appoint skilled persons 
only 
alternatives; to use skilled persons because of the added value to be gained due to their expertise or knowledge and not 
because of resource restraints; to take into account cost implications and to use the tool in a focused and propo
way. 
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The Impact of the Eighth EU Council Directive on German and UK Auditing Professions All UK 
registered companies are subject to an annual external audit as part of the requirement of the 
Companies Act of 1985.553  As from July 2000, companies meeting two tests of the Audit 
Exemption Amendment 2000 SI 2000/1430 and also requirements of the EC Fourth Directive were 
exempted from the audit requirement.554 Through the Companies Act 1989, regulatory authority for 
auditing was given to the Secretary of State but the accountancy profession still maintained its self-
regulatory status through the major professional bodies assuming the title of Recognised 
Supervisory Bodies whereby the Secretary of State could still delegate power through them.555 The 
implementation of the Eighth Directive through the Companies Act of 1989, addressed auditor 
As a result of their historical development, large German audit firms were often owned by banks or 
e
 effect from 1 
October 1991.562 KPMG expressed their views on incorporation – their objection having been based 
independence in two ways namely:556 Firstly by stating the ineligibility of a person to be appointed 
as auditor where he is an officer or employee of that company or a partner/employee of a company 
officer or employee557 and secondly, by requiring Recognised Supervisory Bodies to have rules on 
eligibility as a further measure558. 
the State.559 Article 2 of the 8th Directive allows an exemption with respect to voting rights and if 
this exemption had not been implemented in Article 2, these owners ( banks and the State) would 
have been barred with the resulting violation of the German constitution and legal proceedings 
against the Stat .560 
The UK implementation the 8th Directive through the Companies Act 1989 resulted in more rules 
being laid down in legislation instead of being delegated to the accounting profession.561 More 
importantly, there was the removal of the prohibition for auditors to incorporate with
                                                 
553  See JE Stevenson, 'Auditor Independence : A Comparative Descriptive Study of the UK, France and Italy p 
161 
554  Ibid; the tests under the Audit Exemption being turnover up to £1 million and/or balance sheet total up to £1.4 
mum of 50 employees. The Secretary of  State for Trade and Industry raised the turnover 
irem aximum of £4.8 permitted under the Fourth Directive.  
obes,  'Harmonisation of the Structure of Audit Firms : Incorporation in the UK and 
many ean Accounting Review131 
0,131 
million and/or maxi
requ ent to the m
555 ibid 
556  Ibid p 162 
557  Section 27(1) 
558  Schedule 11 
559   L Evans and C N
Ger ' The Europ
560  Ibid pp 13
561  Ibid p 135 
562 ibid 
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rather on concerns related to auditor independence and confidentiality with the most apparent 
problem being the audit client holding shares in the audit firm.563 KPMG did not object in principle 
to the idea of incorporation but rather to the idea of outside shareholders as they felt that the same 
person should not be allowed to hold a directorship with the auditor and his client.564 
7.15.5.Safeguards to Independence in Germany 
Germany on the other hand in 1985, introduced a law requiring all new corporate auditors to be 
wholly owned by persons working in the business of the corporate auditor and with a majority of 
voting shares being held by qualifying interests.565 In so doing, Germany was taking measures to 
strengthen independence.566 German audit reforms which became law in April 1998 have made it 
compulsory for auditors to modify audit reports and disclose through a middle paragraph, a going 
concern limitation, a disclosure omission or non compliance with generally accepted accounting 
principles.567 According to the German Stock Corporation Act, it is compulsory for all German 
stock corporations to have a supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat) and a management board 
(Vorstand).568 Before the 1998 audit reforms, no guidelines were in place as regards who was 
responsible for hiring the auditor.569 Management was usually responsible for the hiring of auditors 
whilst the supervisory board approved the appointment and since the auditor was hired to check up 
th laws and safe-guarding of assets, there were apparent conflicts 
                     
on management’s compliance wi
of interest in the auditor’s appointment before the 1998 audit reforms.570 As well as making the 
supervisory board responsible for hiring the auditor, the audit reforms made it mandatory for the 
auditor to report exclusively to the supervisory board.571 The reforms brought about an increase in 
the legal liability limits for auditors which resulted in additional incentives for auditors to act 
independently by detecting and reporting accounting omissions, irregularities and uncertainties.572 
                            
 and J Gassen, 'Can Audit Reforms Change the Monitoring Role of Audits? August 2006 
eport and a set of financial statements to every 
ember, attend meetings of the supervisory board. The reforms brought into force legislation which 
ulate
aintaining its confidentiality. 
563  Ibid p 134 
564  ibid 
565  ibid 
566  ibid 
567  HA Skaife
568  ibid 
569  ibid 
570 ibid 
571  Ibid; The auditor now also has to submit the long-form audit r
supervisory board m
stip d that the long-form audit report had to be written in a precise and understandable manner – such as would be 
clear to a lay man or non-expert whilst m
572  ibid 
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7.15.6Safeguards in the UK 
UK legislation implements only the minimum requirement of Article 2 which requires a firm of 
 by qualified persons (where this is defined mainly with respect to voting 
s with harmonisation. The 
 tak
lled upon to draft a common set of 
principles as a starting point.580 Given the problems of harmonisation with the Eighth Directive, the 
auditors to be controlled
rights).573 The Institutes (ICAEW, ICAS and ICAI) considered this as insufficient to safeguard 
auditor independence if control meant that only a mere majority of voting rights.574 Using their 
position as Recognised Supervisory Bodies, they put in place a requirement that at least 75% of 
voting rights should be held by qualified auditors – which also applies to voting rights on the 
management body.575 
7.15.7 Convergence 
As mentioned previously, the UK is moving towards the German system in terms of relying more 
on state regulation.576  In other areas however, there have been problem
Green Paper highlighted the weaknesses of the Eighth Directive in failing to produce a common 
definition of independence – thereby resulting not only in an incomplete regulatory framework but 
also one which was not helping to fulfil EC objectives.577 
European harmonisation would help place the European Community in a strong position to e on 
an international role with bodies such as the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) 
and the International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO).578 
Following the Green Paper proposals, a new Committee on Auditing was established by the 
European Commission which consisted not only of representatives from auditing regulators in the 
15 Member States and 3 countries of the European Economic Area (EEA), but also of 
representatives from the audit profession, internal auditors and large European firms.579 This 
signified a new approach to regulation by the European Commission in that unlike the previous use 
of directives to harmonise, the European profession was ca
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nting Review  137 
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Green Paper had to avoid regulating at EU level and the draft of a set of common principles by the 
European profession (FEE) made this possible.581 The FEE’s efforts resulted to the 1998 publication 
of “Statutory Audit – Independence and Objectivity, Common Core Principles for the Guidance of 
the European Profession” ( Initial Recommendations) and this publication has provided the 
framework for the European Commission Consultative Paper “Statutory Auditors’ Independence in 
the EU : A Set of Fundamental Principles” issued in 2000.582 
The Recommendation issued by the European Commission Statutory Auditor’s Independence in the 
EU: A Set of Fundamental Principles on 16 May 2002, does not require mandatory rotation of firms 
but does require mandatory partner rotation on listed clients after seven years.583 This differs in 
some aspects from the UK requirements as: 584 (i) It allows a return after two years ( not five years 
as in the UK); (ii) It applies to ‘public interest clients’ not just listed clients and (iii) In a group 
context, it extends to key audit partners other than the audit engagement partner. No country within 
the EU, with the exception of Italy presently undertake a system of mandatory audit firm rotation.585 
If this recommendation fails to achieve desired harmonisation, the European Commission intends to 
resort to the use of legislation.586 The process of European Union auditing harmonization has so far, 
A survey carried out by the FEE shows that the principles-based approach to auditor independence 
                                                
been successful and is likely to continue to be so in the future.587 Convergence with International 
Accounting Standards requires constant and thorough enforcement procedures across Europe and 
around the world.588 The UK’s Financial Reporting Review Panel (FRRP) is considered by the 
FEE as a potential model for other EU jurisdictions even though some have commented that the 
effectiveness of the FRRP could be further strengthened by introducing some form of pro-active 
monitoring.589 It  was  however added that any changes to the FRRP should be co-ordinated with 
developments in Europe.590 
 
, 'Mandatory Rotation of Audit Firms'  p 9 ; see <http:// www.icaew.co.uk/publicass> 
nce and Italy' 
l of Auditing   161 
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which is set out in the EU Recommendation on Independence is now extensively used throughout 
Europe.591 The importance of a regulatory pause has been highlighted to allow time for this 
to users of audit reports.592 Both the EC 
of IFAC (International Federation of Accountants) adopt a 
tral bank's involvement in the 
supervisory process is of immense importance, its powers should not be so great that this results to 
ons from Parmalat and the failure of the Bank of 
regulator. Whilst the central bank's 
, a balance should be struck between those powers 
approach to auditor independence prove its worth 
Recommendation and the Code of Ethics 
conceptual framework approach to independence . The Recommendation makes it necessary for 
auditors to identify, consider and document potential threats to their independence and to detail 
safeguards which have been put in place to eliminate those threats.593 
7.15.8Comparisons between the UK and Italy 
7.15.8.1 First Investigative Aim:  
Even though Italy is still in the process of adopting its single regulator for financial services, the 
importance of the central bank's role in the supervisory process is emphasised. Indeed, the Bank of 
Italy's powers are so immense that efforts are being made to curtail it – in contrast to the position of 
the Bank of England. This goes to show that even though the cen
lack of accountability in the financial process. Less
Italy to intervene when it should led to rapid reforms being made to curtail the Bank of Italy's 
powers and catapulted the process of the adoption of a single 
role in supervision is of immense importance
assigned to it and those powers assigned to the supervisory agency. 
7.15.8.2 Second Investigative Aim:  
There is more focus on meta-risk regulation (the adoption of the Basel II Accord) by the Bank of 
Italy than on risk based supervision when compared to the UK. 
7.15.8.3 Third Investigative Aim 
The concept of the external audit has not been in operation in Italy for a considerably long period – 
however, it has been distinguished from the traditional sindaci (internal) audit through legislative 
restraints on the role of the societa di revisione and equipping the stock exchange authority with 
                                                 
591  See <http://www.fee.be/publications/default.asp?library_ref=4&content_ref=552>  (last visited 17  Feb 2007) 
leupload/upload/PR46.Implementing%20EC%20Recomm%20on%20Independ.Final182200553125
th
592  ibid 
593  See < 
http://www.fee.be/fi
th Feb 2007) 2.pdf> last visited 17
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primary control over external listed audits.594 The Italian guidance is surely not as developed as that 
in the UK – due to it being more recent, however most of the safeguards in Italy are laid down in 
legislation or under stock exchange control.595 As a result, not only is there stronger statutory 
r measures for ensuring that auditors 
597 
nies are of small/medium size, do not depend on the 
ven though it realises the need to 
do so. Historical factors and the complex structure of regulation which exists in the US would 
sent system of regulation. Such is the complexity 
retation of risk which connects risk and risk taking to objectives and principles.598 
The UK and US however have adopted similar approaches as they both try to manage regulatory 
control and uniformity in Italy than the UK, there is also stronger power distance and uncertainty 
avoidance in comparison to the weak power distance and uncertainty avoidance which exists in the 
UK.596  The role of CONSOB in regulating external audit of listed companies and its participation- 
being a stock market regulator, appears to be provide tighte
perform their duties in an objective manner and are seen to do so.
The issue is that in Italy, 98% of the compa
stock market, and as a result, rely on banks or government and/or EU grants for financial resources. 
Financial institutions are more dependent on other resources and sources of financial information 
than a set of fiscally biased financial statements information. 
7.15.9Comparisons between the UK and the US  
7.15.9.1 First Investigative Aim 
In contrast to the UK, the US has not adopted a single regulator e
undoubtedly make it difficult to overhaul the pre
of the present system of regulation that issues relating to responsibilities of various regulators in the 
event of an adoption of a single regulator, need to be carefully considered. If jurisdictions with just 
one supervisory authority still experience problems in allocating supervisory responsibilities, the 
task for the US system of supervision would not be less difficult.  
7.15.9.2 Second Investigative Aim 
The significance of the US risk based approach to supervision is that it focusses on the firm's risk 
management techniques and the safety and soundness of the bank whilst the UK seeks to focus on a 
specific interp
                                                 
594    J Stevenson, 'Auditor Independence: A Comparative Descriptive Study of the UK, France and Italy' 
International Journal of Auditing  176 
id 
7  Ibid p 177 
h, 'Legal Aspects of Prudential Supervision' 2007 p 134 
595  ibid 
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resources according to the risks posed by the respective institutions. Both systems are also similar 
in that they both emphasise the importance of being able to oversee the business undertaken by a 
group and an individual bank to assess whether such group activities present risks to objectives.599 
ents are also similar even though they are labelled 
effort to improve accounting practices of UK listed companies – 
particularly at international level.602  In response to a move aimed at facilitating integrated financial 
 operating and financial reviews of 
listed companies.605 Since the late 1980s, continual efforts have been made in the UK to reduce the 
could affect the overall standing of companies.606 The development of US standards has not attained 
                               
Categories used in UK and US risk assessm
differently.600 
Work undertaken by the OCC, in comparison to the UK's FSA, does not show provision for cross 
comparisons with other banks in a sector and the different risk based systems in the US banking 
sector would make cross sector comparisons difficult.601 
7.15.9.3 Third Investigative Aim 
Following the Enron debacle, concerns were raised about the UK’s financial reporting system and 
as a result of greater awareness to continuously develop the financial reporting system and 
standards, there has been greater 
services market in the EU, a draft regulation was published in February 2001 in the aftermath of an 
announcement by the European Commission in June 2000 that it would be mandatory for EU listed 
companies to use International Accounting Standards (IAS) in their consolidated accounts from 
2005.603 In March 2002, the European Parliament gave approval for adoption of standards issued by 
the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) which governs listed companies when 
preparing financial statements.604 
Problems within the UK corporate reporting sector include limited statutory requirements and non 
mandatory Accounting Standards Board (ASB) guidance on the
potential for exclusion of assets and liabilities from the balance sheet – particularly those which 
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ouse of Commons Treasury Minutes of Evidence pp  4  and 5 of 23  
://www.law.uni lsr/policy_new/news/ukparliament.pdf> 
599   ibid 
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this level although the FASB is considering moves in such direction.607 Although the Enron affair 
has not revealed any significant issues which present great concern for UK financial reporting 
standards, there is constantly a need to develop standards to incorporate new business practices, 
reasonable shareholder expectations and other developments.608 
Differences in audit regulation between the UK and the US comprise the following:609 There exists 
rnment.; 
the UK Accountancy Foundation supervises the profession’s regulatory and disciplinary 
arrange
Examples of safeguards adopted in the UK to protect the independence of auditors include:610 The 
ibility of overseeing the relationship 
with the auditor, checking that the nature and scope of non-audit services in operation and 
                                                
a principles-based approach system in the UK as opposed to a rules-based system which exists in 
the US; in the UK, the inspection regime is controlled by full-time professionally qualified 
inspectors employed by the professional bodies and whose work is approved by the gove
ments to ensure they are in accord with public interest. 
ability of staff on audit assignments to communicate concerns to a separate partner Provision for an 
independent partner to be reviewer or reviser of the work Regular rotation of audit partners 
Effective interchange between the audit committee and auditor 
Segregation of responsibilities and knowledge within the audit firm. 
Existing provisions to protect the auditor’s independence in the event of providing non-audit 
services include:611 The prohibition by the Institute of non-audit services to audit clients where that 
would present a threat to independence for which no safeguards are available; secondly, the audit 
committee, as representative of the shareholders has the respons
satisfying itself that the auditor’s independence and objectivity are not compromised; thirdly, the 
ethical code states that an audit appointment to a listed company should not be accepted where the 
client provides as much as 10% of a firm’s gross income; and fourthly, an improved environment 
facilitating transparency has been created over the years whereby shareholders themselves are able 
to gauge the extent of non-audit services provided by auditors. 
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Arguments in favour of the provision of non-audit services include the need for auditors to be able 
to acquire knowledge and experience from colleagues who are experts in key risk areas.612 In 
addition, rigid separation of audit and non-audit services within such a firm would lead to a 
 of mandatory rotation of audit firms require the consideration of two issues 
namely whether there is a link between the length of association and reduction of audit quality, and 
rinciple, would result to increased audit quality.615 In the United 
ermany’s system of supervision is advantageous in that its central bank, the 
Bundesbank, has principal functions within the regulatory and supervisory process, it has not 
wev lso been argued the FSA is not sufficiently accountable to Parliament and to those 
tly 
decrease in the level of audit quality, an increase in cost or some combination of both.613 In 
addition, the chairman of the SEC expressed his view that creating an “audit only” firm would not 
necessarily guarantee an “audit failure free” future.614 This is true, however any reduction in audits 
failures (be it not 100%), may range from little to a highly significant reduction – significant 
enough to avoid a major corporate crisis. 
Arguments in favour
whether mandatory rotation in p
Kingdom, legislation requires shareholders to appoint auditors annually and the Combined Code 
requires audit committees to keep under constant review the independence of the auditor616. 
According to opponents of mandatory rotation, these provide a better safeguard than fixed-period 
mandatory rotation. 
7.16 ASSESSMENTS  
Even though G
amended its substantive law and cannot be said to be exploiting maximum possible benefits of 
implementing a single financial services regulator. This is in contrast to the UK, whose legislation 
was amended following the adoption of a single financial services regulator. The Financial Services 
and Markets Act 2000 has gone a long way in improving accountability within the financial 
services sector. 
Ho er it has a
financial customers on behalf of whom it regulates the financial services sector and who indirec
                                                 
612  Ibid p 16 
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615  Ibid p 17 
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pay for its costs through charges imposed.617 Apart from recommending that the composition of the 
FSA Board be changed, that members of the FSA’s Consumer Panel should not all be appointed by 
the FSA and that the Financial Ombudsman Service618 be made into an entirely separate statutory 
organisation from the FSA, it has also been noted that the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 
protects the FSA and its staff from being held liable to policyholders for losses arising from its 
negligence.619  This is in contrast to the situation which exists in Germany , Italy where the supreme 
ould 
then be carried out within the different sectors. For example, within the banking sector, priority 
courts of these jurisdictions have held that banking regulators can be held liable for loss caused to 
depositors as a result of their negligence.620 
Even though the introduction of new UK legislation (and its approach to integrated supervision as a 
result), has its benefits, the UK's system of supervision since the adoption of a single regulator also 
has its disadvantages. The UK’s adoption of a risk based approach to supervision by its regulator, 
the FSA, has led to the reduction of the use of external auditors by the FSA. The risk based 
approach to supervision is to be commended and if it were carried out on a sectoral level, that is, 
within the different sectors (insurance, banking sectors) as opposed to an integrated level, more 
resources could be allocated to the banking sector than is the case at present. This could be achieved 
by allocating a stipulated amount of resources to each sector rather than the present system whereby 
more resources are dedicated to the insurance sector. A risk based approach to supervision c
would be given to external auditors, such that the number of external auditors used for on-site 
inspections in particular, would be increased to a level above that which had ever operated. 
This is important, not only because the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision recommends the 
                                                 
617   Summary of  Submission to the House of Lords Select Committee on the Accountability of the Financial 
Services Authority in general, and of the Accountability of the Government and of the Parliamentary Ombudsman 
Regarding the Equitable Debacle. 
responsible for appointing members of the Financial Ombudsman Service Board, for establishing the scheme's scope 
ts. For more information on this, 
://w
618 The Financial Ombudsman Services was established under the FSMA 2000 in order to facilitate quick 
resolution of disputes between consumers and financial service firms. It is a company limited by guarantee, without 
share capital, deals with approximately 108,000 cases annually and has an estimated budget of about £53.1 million. 
Whilst the Financial Ombudsman Service is an independent  arbitration service, and whilst the  Financial Ombudsman 
Service Board is responsible for appointing the Chief Ombudsman and ensuring his independence, the FSA is 
and areas of functions, and for establishing principles for handling customer complain
see 'Sir Christopher Kelly appointed chairman of the Financial Ombudsman Service ' 
<http ww.fsa.gov.uk/Pages/Library/Communication/PR/2005/008.shtml (last visited 12th February 2007) 
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use of external auditors, but because the reduced involvement of the Bank of England in the bank 
supervisory process warrants greater use of the expertise which could be provided by external 
auditors. In addition, a more pro active approach (increased use of on-site inspections) to bank 
supervision was suggested following the collapse of Barings Bank. External auditors can help bank 
In determining whether a particular jurisdiction’s accounting system and auditing practices are 
 expensive 
to operate and such costs may not be justifiable for a country like Germany where there are limited 
ial to active stock market users, it may not 
an financiers.624 
 C
notable and key threats to auditor independence include: 
                     
examination staff perform on-site inspections. 
Risk based regulation has also impacted the UK's financial enforcement procedures as demonstrated 
by the Legal and General Assurance Society (L & G) v FSA case621. This case has also brought to 
light the need for a more proactive approach to bank supervision. Self-enforcement, monitoring by 
regulators, the approval of financial statements and the statutory audit are enforcement mechanisms 
used by the UK, Germany and Italy. There are large differences in legal environments and these 
contribute in part to the differences in the enforcement procedures. 
better than the other, factors such as jurisdictional differences, objectives and main purposes of each 
individual jurisdiction’s financial reporting systems need to be taken into account. For example, in 
comparing US and German accounting/auditing, one may assume right from the outset that US 
accounting is better because there is more disclosure.622 However, US accounting is very
capital markets.623 US financial reporting also produces more volatile series of earning figures than 
German accounting and even though this may be benefic
be so for a longer term view – a position which is usually favoured by Germ
The different mix of users in the various countries also need to be considered. In Germany for 
instance, the importance of banks has been given as a possible reason for greater conservatism in 
reporting than in the UK.625 onservatism is however becoming a thing of the past in Germany and 
many European jurisdictions like Italy as many listed companies adopt IAS or US rules. 
In addition, to the categories of threat mentioned under the introductory section of this chapter, 
                            
, the FSA relied on too small a representative sample 
nd R Parker, Comparative International Accounting  569 
621  In this case
622  C Nobes  a
623  ibid 
624  ibid 
625  Ibid p 36 
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7.16.1 The Provision of Other Services to Audit Clients 
Out of all the issues revolving round independence of auditors, this is the most debatable. The UK’s 
position on this issue shows no objection to a firm providing advisory services to a company which 
are additional to the audit.626 The UK 1989 Companies Act required disclosure of audit and non-
audit fees paid to audit firms to be disclosed separately in financial statements – the aim of this 
being to provide information to investors which would help judge the relationship between the 
cept for book-
m
7.16.2 Acting For the Same Audit Client for a Prolonged Period of Time 
 appointment of statutory auditors.631 Italy 
n  year.633 Auditors in Italy could be said to be in a 
company and its auditors.627 In Germany, non audit services are also allowed, ex
keeping.628 In Italy, the legal and professional bodies regard the provision of additional services by 
statutory auditors as a significant threat to their independence.629 In Italy, Presidential Decree 
31.3.75 no 136 addresses the issue of me bers who are external auditors and forbids them from 
having other contractual relationships with the audit and from offering additional paid services to 
the client.630  
The UK Companies Act section 385(2) requires annual
appoints its statutory auditors for more than one year and since these are statutory requirements, 
there is no ethical guidance on this matter.632  Germany on the other hand, has no fixed term and like 
the UK, the length of mandate is usually for o e
stronger position relative to their counterparts in the UK and Germany when faced with client 
pressure.634 
7.16.3 Rotation of the Engagement Partnership 
The position in the UK can be differentiated from that in Italy since UK firms are allowed to keep 
their clients as rotation applies only to engagement partners.635 In Germany, rotation of the 
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engagement partner takes place every 6 years.636 
The safeguards implemented in such jurisdictions such as Italy (prohibition of provision of non 
vices. 
nsideration of reasons for changes arising from the major corporate 
collapses which occurred in the late 1980s and early 1990s in the UK (and which resulted to many 
K and US systems of audit regulation), but also require consideration of 
existing safeguards currently in place in the UK to protect the auditor’s independence. 
rly 1980s when the EU’s 
harmonisation efforts began.638 
their financial regulatory structure is being considered namely: Whether some model of unified 
unified financial services supervision were to be 
                           
audit services by audit firms), Germany (prohibition of provision of book keeping services by audit 
firms), could be considered in the UK. The benefits of allowing the provision of non audit services 
by audit firms, namely the need for auditors to gain knowledge and experience from other 
colleagues, increase in level of audit quality, should be weighed against the risks to be encountered 
if an audit firm’s independence is compromised as a result of provision of non audit ser
Given the present operating UK safeguards, to protect the auditor’s independence in the event of 
providing non audit services, this does not seem to be an area which warrants great cause for 
concern. 
Questions regarding change to the UK’s system of audit regulation especially following the collapse 
of Enron necessitate not only co
differences between the U
Accounting standards are more detailed and powerful in the US than in the EU – as a result, there is 
greater uniformity of practice than in any other country.637 It would be easier to implement 
enforcement procedures and provide more effective monitoring where there was greater uniformity. 
As mentioned previously, the harmonisation process in the EU has encountered various difficulties 
but it can be said that more uniformity has been achieved since the ea
7.17 Conclusion 
7.17.1 First Investigative Aim 
It is of vital importance that countries address two fundamental questions where reorganisation of 
financial services supervision be followed; and if 
                      
ker  p 46 
 
636   C Piot, 'Auditor Reputation and Model of Governance' (2005) 9 (1) International Journal of Auditing   26  
637 Nobes and Par
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adopted, how it should be done.639 These questions should be addressed having regards to the 
countries' historical, economic, institutional and political frameworks.640  
In considering particularly, the Bundesbank’s approach to supervision and its use of external 
auditors, this chapter has not only shown how the FSA can use external auditors in the supervision 
process, but also how other regulators in the investigated jurisdictions can benefit from the 
involvement of external auditors in the supervision process. Benefits of the central bank's 
involvement in banking supervision in jurisdictions such as Germany, Italy and the US have also 
been considered. The degree of the central bank's involvement in the supervisory process is also an 
important factor which is worth consideration. Whilst it is concluded that countries such as the UK 
would benefit from greater involvement of the central bank, the dangers of the central bank having 
too much powers is demonstrated in the case of the Bank of Italy. Following the collapse of 
vement in the banking supervisory process. Auditors have valuable and 
vital third party knowledge of firms and the FSA would benefit immensely by exploiting such 
                                                
Parmalat, the Bank of Italy's powers have been curtailed. The Italian financial regulatory framework 
went through a major overhaul in 2005 through the Law 262 of December 12th 2005 on Protection 
of Savings and Financial Markets Discipline. CONSOB, the securities market watch dog was to 
have additional powers resulting in the new CONSOB being more powerful than its predecessor 
and taking over the supervision of debt issuance from the Bank of Italy.641 CONSOB’s powers have 
been re-inforced in many ways including:642 Additional investigative powers; the capacity to 
directly apply sanctions; a new internal framework.   
In the UK, external auditors could help provide some solutions to the gap left as a result of the Bank 
of England's reduced invol
priceless expertise and knowledge. The FSA places great reliance on the cooperation of regulated 
firms to provide information which is timely, accurate and complete in order to be able to gauge 
whether a firm is complying with its requirements. Auditors can help facilitate smooth functioning 
of the supervisory process as they are also required under the FSMA to inform the FSA of certain 
matters of concern and have to provide annual reports to the FSA. The FSA in its proximity to the 
market and consumers would also need to be mindful of not getting 'captured' by those it is 
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supposed to be regulating. 
There is no formal statutory based relationship between the supervisors and external auditors in 
countries such as the USA and Italy.643 Supervisors in these countries depend on direct inspections 
which they themselves carry out and commercial law governs the appointment of bank auditors.644 
In the UK and Germany, the banking supervisor has statutory powers over the appointment of 
external auditors, such as the right of approval or removal, and the right to commission an 
independent audit.645 These powers help banks in ensuring that external auditors with the required 
experience, resources and skills are appointed to perform their duties.646 The bank supervisor's 
 situation which occurred in Legal and General in that it 
e US is 
encouraged and not just a proactive approach, but one which involves greater use of external 
der Pillar 3 of the Basel II Accord648.  
statutory powers also help avoid the
encourages the use supervisor to engage more in pro active supervision. In contrast to the Bank of 
England which commissioned reporting accountants' reports on annual and routine basis, the FSA 
predominantly uses its own front line supervisors in carrying out risk assessments. As a result, a 
more proactive approach to supervision, such as that which exists in Italy647 and th
auditors. 
7.17.2 Second Investigative Aim 
The immense contribution made by external auditors to the supervisory process is demonstrated in 
association with the implementation of Basel II. They can contribute towards the process of 
certifying more advanced model-based approaches to measuring credit, market and operational risks 
and verifying information required for disclosure un
As seen from the analysis on the US, there is great interest in the implementation of Basel II. The 
US realises that it needs a regulatory framework which corresponds to changes in global events. In 
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647  In order to ensure proper compliance with the Bank of Italy's regulations, inspections are performed by the 
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irregularities are highlighted at a bank. Periodic inspections usually occur at the head offices of the banks and/or at the
main branches and are classified as general where each aspect of bank activity is examined. The bank's manageme
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the face of globalisation and conglomeration, the risks posed by financial institutions call for better 
management techniques. As it has retained its regulatory structure, the US realises that other 
measures need to be adopted to manage cross sector service risks which can be managed more 
s is probably the reason for the great interest shown by the US 
 also help 
the regulator in the process of obtaining information which the regulator needs to assess whether a 
is way should not also be protected by the immunity that 
shields regulators from tort of negligence actions. In comparison with various European 
the UK should be afforded limited audit liability is however another issue – given that no statutory 
efficiently by a single regulator. Thi
in a meta-risk based model such as that of Basel II. 
External auditors can therefore play an important role not only in risk based regulation, but also in 
the Basel II process. They can assist in the validation process of the advanced techniques used for 
measurements under the Basel II Accord.649 In addition to this role, external auditors can
regulated institution is complying with required standards. 
7.17.3 Third Investigative Aim 
Other benefits of using the external auditor in the bank regulation and supervisory process include 
the ability of the external auditor to provide a wide range of resources and knowledge and acting as 
an intermediary for the regulator, thereby helping to protect the regulator's reputation and avoiding 
regulatory capture. The risks involved in using the external auditor include conflict of interests650, 
loss of information during the transfer of information to the regulator and higher costs.651 
It is appropriate to use external auditors as 'indirect supervisors' in the supervisory process even 
where such risks of conflict may exist - provided there are safeguards to protect against such risks. 
However external auditors used in th
jurisdictions, the US legal system is said to be unique as a result of the ease with which large class 
lawsuits can be instigated at relatively low cost.652 This results from a public view of protection for 
individuals who have been harmed.653 There are however similarities between the US and the UK 
in that legal responsibilities to third parties in these jurisdictions are similar.654 Whether auditors in 
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duty is owed by an auditor to an individual third party. Whilst protection measures exist for 
aggrieved individuals in the US in that large class lawsuits can be instigated at relatively low cost, 
such ease of initiation does not exist in the UK. 
Factors such as culture and historical development have played defining roles in shaping the audit 
pproaches adopted in Germany, Italy, the US and the UK. These jurisdictions represent a 
 
 accepted accounting principles.”660 
ubstance over 
 for change are some German 
                                                
a
reasonably diverse selection with Gray655 classifying Italy as a country whose accounting system in 
terms of authority and enforcement, exhibited strong uniformity and weaker professionalism. The 
UK’s accounting system was considered to show strong flexibility and professionalism.656 In terms 
of measurement and disclosure of accounting systems, the Italian system (like the French), is 
considered strongly conservative than the more transparent UK system.657 
7.17.4 Harmonisation Efforts and Difficulties 
The requirement of the EU’s Fourth Directive that “true and fair” should take precedence over 
detailed rules in all member states conceals unchanged old differences.658 In Italy for example, the 
Italian accounting system has altered slightly even though the requirement from 1 Jan 1993 that 
Italian financial statements should give a representation which is veritiero e corretto led to changes 
in the law and audit reports.659 There’s a transatlantic distinction regarding the concept of fairness: 
In the EU Directives, fairness is an overriding concept whilst in the US, practice is to “present fairly 
in conformity with generally
In Germany however, there is still no legal preference for fairness over rules or for s
form.661 The main actors exerting an influence in their desire
multinationals who wish for greater access to international capital markets.662 Such access can be 
achieved through the preparation of consolidated statements which are not in accordance with 
normal German rules and practices.663  Since 2001, large listed companies in Germany have 
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increasingly used US or International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs) accounting for their 
consolidated statements.664 
7.17.5 Compliance with Basel Capital Accord: How Does the UK Rank in 
Comparison to Other Investigated Jurisdictions? 
In the same manner as Italy, prudential regulations in Germany are based to a great extent on 
665
u ces of regulation, be it domestic or international, not only present 
667
Committee of European Banking Supervisors, the Committee of European Insurance and 
Occupational Pensions Supervisors, the Financial Stability Forum, the Joint Forum668, the 
ational Association of 
l 
 
e 
international standards and on the Basel Capital Accord and the EC Directives in particular.  The 
Deutsche Bundesbank has been a member of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision since its 
inception and also works with other international banking supervisory bodies such as the Banking 
Supervision Committee of the ESCB ( European System of Central Banks), the Banking Advisory 
Committee, Groupe de Contact, the International Organisation of Securities Commissions, the 
Financial Stability Forum and the Committee on the Global Financial System.666 As stated in the 
concluding section of chapter two, an effective global regulatory regime appears to be a task which 
can only realistically be achieved through co-operation between national regulators.  
The FSA recognises that all so r
cost issues, but are also capable of distorting markets.  There is also an acknowledgement that 
global committees contribute immensely to the domestic, EU and international rule making 
processes. In addition to the collaboration forged with the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, the FSA also collaborates with the Committee of European Securities Regulators, the 
International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) and Intern
Insurance Supervisors (IAIS).669 
The adoption of the Basel II Accord appears to be the most feasible way of achieving globa
regulatory harmonisation. In June 2006, the implementation of Basel II at European level was
initiated through the Banking Directive (2006/48/EC) and the Capital Adequacy Directiv
                                                 
664  C Nobes and R Parker, Comparative International Accounting  p 569 
665 Deutsche Bundesbank's Invo
666
lvement in Banking Supervision p 39 
 Ibid p 40 
7   See FSA Report, ‘International Regulatory Outlook’ December 2006 p 33 66
668 Which consists of national regulators, Basel, IOSCO (the International Organization of Securities Commissions) and 
IAIS (International Association of Insurance Supervisors) 
669   See FSA Report, ‘International Regulatory Outlook’ December 2006 pages 45-52 
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(2006/49/EC).670 Whilst Germany671, Italy672 and the UK673 have implemented Basel II, there has 
been a delay in the US in implementing Basel II.674 Delay in implementing Basel II in the US may 
be attributable to the US’ complex system of regulation. The positive thing to observe is that even 
though implementation is not as speedy as one might wish, it is still taking place. 
7.17.6 ow After Enron (and the 2007/08 Financial Crisis)? 
Reform 
           
Future Outlook: What N
Proposals For 
First Proposal: 
 
As is the case with bank regulation and supervision in Germany, there should be a greater 
role for and greater involvement of the Bank of England in the bank supervisory process 
than is the case at present. The Northern Rock crisis highlighted the following problems 
inherent in the tripartite arrangement between the Treasury, the Financial Services Authority 
and the Bank of England for dealing with financial stability:675As soon as Northern Rock 
encountered problems, it was virtually impossible for the Bank of England to perform its 
traditional role as lender of last resort as such role was required to be made public – even 
though the risk of destroying confidence in the mortgage lender existed.676The Treasury has 
proposed to restore to the central bank its ability to lend to a troubled bank for a limited 
period whereby the public would not be aware of such – hence avoiding a situation of panic 
                                      
 See <670  http://www.bundesbank.de/bankenaufsicht/bankenaufsicht_basel.en.php> (last visited 30 April 
 Basel II’s incorporation in Germany, into national law was not only facilitated through changes to the 
 Act, but also by means of additional regulations, particularly the 
2008) 
671  
Banking Solvency Regulation 
(Solvabilitätsverordnung) which was published in mid-December 2006 and the Regulation governing large exposures 
of €1.5 million or more (Groß- u Millionenkreditverordnung);ibid 
 In accordance with the EU’s Capital Adequacy Directives 2006/48 and 2006/49 on the taking up and 
f the business of credit institutions and the capital adequacy of investment firms and credit institutions 
ely, the so-called Basle II capital-adequacy principles will take effect as from January 1st 2007. The exception 
or financial institutions adopting more sophisticated methods of risk calculation, who will be allowed to adopt 
iples on January 1st 2008. 
and loans nd 
672  
pursuit o
respectiv
will be f
the princ
 
e new risk based capital regime ( as introduced by the Capital Requirements Directive, 
RD), were formally finalised in October 2006. 2007 however, is intended to be a transitional year with firms having 
n to continue with Basel based rules for all or part of 2007. All firms subject to the CRD must have adopted the 
 
673 In the UK, rules relating to th
C
the optio
regime by the 1st of January 2008: (see http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/iro/iro_2006.pdf), International Regulatory Outlook, 
lso ‘Avoiding the Next Northern Rock: The Treasury has Learned Some Expensive Lessons’ The Economist  
31st 2008 
December 2006, FSA, page 12) 
 
674 ibid 
675 See W Buiter ‘The Lessons from Northern Rock’ The Financial Times  Nov 13 2007 
676 See a
January 
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and a “run” on the bank.677 The second problem comprised of an ineffective scheme of 
deposit insurance.678 A run might still have been avoided (after it had been revealed that the 
Bank of England had provided emergency loan to Northern Rock) if an effective deposit 
insurance scheme had been in place.679 The Treasury proposes an element of pre-funding 
which should provide some relief to a banking industry concerned about having to provide 
an entirely funded scheme.680 Perhaps the most important of the proposed reforms relates to 
the problem whereby during the Northern Rock crisis, the government lacked powers to 
withdraw control from Northern Rock’s board and shareholders even though the bank was 
being funded with tax payer’s money. As a response to this problem, the establishment of a 
 The special resolution regime constitutes the focal point of the Banking Act 
2009 in respect of measures aimed at dealing with failing banks. It is the new statutory and 
permanent regime which consolidates temporary measures introduced by the Banking 
                                     
“special resolution regime” which should enable the seizure of a failing bank and facilitate 
all or part of its business to be transferred to a “bridge bank” which would manage services 
for customers, has been proposed.681 The FSA is most likely to be in charge of the oversight 
of these new powers.682 The Bank’s role in ensuring financial stability is also to be 
strengthened. The tenure of the present Governor of the Bank, Mervyn King, has been 
extended to provide some degree of certainty at a time when the markets are unsteady. In 
addition to strengthening the Bank’s role in ensuring financial stability, plans are being made 
over the next months to grant to the FSA, the US style of plea bargaining powers.683 This is 
aimed at encouraging wrong doers to admitting their faults in return for leniency. 
(Following the original publication of this thesis in September 2008, the Banking Act 2009 
was introduced.
(Special Provisions) Act 2008 (BSPA) which was implemented as a means of exercising 
control and bringing Northern Rock into temporary public ownership in February 2008. 
According to Part 1, section 1 (1) of the Act, the purpose of the special resolution regime for 
banks is to address the situation where all or part of the business of a bank has encountered, 
            
es 675 and 676 
0 bonuses for the FSA watchdogs who watched Northern Rock collapse’ Daily Mail  March  
677 Supra not
678 See W Buiter ‘The Lessons from Northern Rock’ The Financial Times  Nov 13 2007 
679 ibid 
680 ibid 
681 ibid 
682 ibid 
683 See B Barrow ‚£300,00
28 2008 
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or is likely to encounter financial difficulties. The special resolution regime consists of 684 
three stabilisation options,685 the bank insolvency procedures686 and the bank administration 
procedures).687 
(The Banking Act 2009 not only consolidates the tripartite arrangement as established under 
the 2006 Memorandum of Understanding, but is also evidential of the extension of the Bank 
of England’s role in the supervisory process. This is reflected in sections such as those of 7 
and 8 of the Act, which clarify responsibilities in relation to the exercise of powers. In 
respect of bank insolvency procedures, an insolvency order may be made only on the 
application of the FSA with th
 
e consent of the Bank of England, or on the application of the 
           
Bank of England (See section 117(2) of the Act). Further, before exercising insolvency 
powers in respect of a residual bank, the FSA is required to give notice to the Bank of 
England. In Germany, the perception that the allocation of responsibilities between the 
Bundesbank and BaFin had lacked clarity and transparency and had the potential to result in 
inconsistency and duplication of work, lead to the issue of a new Memorandum of 
Understanding in February 2008.688 This followed a series of government bailouts of state 
owned banks in 2008 – which in part, was attributed to the systemic importance assumed by 
such banks and the potential disastrous consequences which could occur if they had been 
allowed to fail).689 
As well as assuming a greater role within the supervisory process and collaborating with the 
FSA, the Bank of England would greatly contribute to the supervisory process as a result of 
its use of external auditors - in a way similar to that employed by the Bundesbank. In 
addition to the employment of auditors to conduct trading activities on behalf of the Federal 
Financial Supervisory Office and audits to determine the adequacy of institutions' market 
                                      
n 2 of the Act 684 Sectio
685 See section 1 (3a-c) : These are a) transfer to a private sector purchaser b) transfer to a bridge bank, and c) transfer to 
ee W isis’ IMF Working 
ttp:/ el.de/international/business/0,1518,536635,00.html 
temporary public ownership  
686 As stated under Part 2 
687 As provided under Part 3 
688 S  Nier, ‘Financial Stability Frameworks and the Role of Central Banks: Lessons from the Cr
Paper WP/09/70 April 2009 at pages 21 and 22  
689 h /www.spieg
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risk models,690 the Bundesbank has its own banking supervisory auditors (approximately 70 
as of September 2000). As a result, the system of bank regulation and supervision in 
ermany could be said to involve a degree of on-site supervision and pro active monitoring. 
As illustrated by the Legal & General case, regulators in employing the expertise of external 
lear division between 
e conduct of the investigation on the one hand and the need to maintain the supervisory 
the firm on the other.692 At the same time this division of responsibility 
 focus more on investor protection, in comparison to 
aly, there is greater need for the use of external auditors. This is not to say 
that Germany and Italy are not encouraged to make greater use of auditors. The Basel 
                                                
G
auditors, should also be more pro-actively involved in the supervisory process. As regards 
the involvement of supervisors during the investigation phase, supervisors of a firm are not 
as a general rule, directly involved in an investigation which is being pursued by 
Enforcement.691 This approach has its advantages in maintaining a c
th
relationship with 
may mean that the investigation does not benefit as much as it might otherwise do from the 
knowledge of the firm or individuals that the supervisor will have built up, nor from the 
general understanding of the firm’s business or sector that the supervisor may be able to 
contribute.693 
 
Financial crises such as those of Northern Rock, IKB and Hypo Real Estates in Europe, have 
lead to a review of arrangements involving the central banks in the jurisdictions concerned. 
The occurrence of these crises also highlighted the need for a special resolution regime and a 
“bridge bank” whose aims are to address the needs of failing banks.  
 
Second Proposal 
Greater use of external auditors should be encouraged not only in the UK but also in the US. 
As these jurisdictions' audit objectives
Germany and It
Committee also recommends greater use of external auditors within these jurisdictions. The 
reason for the UK FSA's reduced use of external auditors may be attributed to the dual role 
 
690  Bundesbank's Involvement in Banking Supervision Monthly Report September 2000 p 37 
691  <http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/enf_process_review_report.pdf>   p 30 
692  ibid p 30 
693 ibid 
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of the reporting accountant and skilled person which  may result in a conflict of interests 
where the external auditor performs both roles – hence, compromising his independence. To 
avoid such conflicts of interest, separate persons should perform these roles and greater use 
of external auditors should be encouraged in the process. The adoption of a risk-based 
rvision is one which should be applauded – however it should not provide 
an excuse for the reduced use of external auditors. Globalisation and conglomeration call for 
r
Third Proposal 
 
omponents of the expectations gap makes it difficult to eliminate695. 
Perceived performance of auditors is an element which is difficult to measure and changes 
 by popular consensus – as realised through the opinions received from 
                                                
approach to supe
a risk based approach to supervision. A consolidated supervisor is also able to manage mo e 
efficiently cross-sector services' risks. 
Since Article 57(2) of the Treaty of Rome requires unanimity for the adoption of community 
measures concerning the protection of savings, what applies to banking depositors in 
Germany, Italy and France should also apply to policy holders in these countries and the 
UK.694 In addition, the FSA should have some form of responsibility for loss caused to 
depositors as a result of its negligence – as is the case in Germany and Italy.  
Fourth Proposal 
The nature of the c
constantly. It is possible to substantially reduce but not totally eliminate. 
Periodical surveys should be carried out in the general public to ascertain what many 
perceive to be the role of an auditor. These surveys should be carried out only after the 
public has been sufficiently educated about the role of the audit. After this, draft proposals 
should be made whereby the public is involved and is invited to submit their ideas or 
challenge any proposals.  The draft proposals on the definition of an audit should be a more 
acceptable definition
 
694  See Summary of  Submission to the House of Lords Select Committee on the Accountability of the Financial 
Services Authority in general, and of the Accountability of the Government and of the Parliamentary Ombudsman 
Regarding the Equitable Debacle. 
695 See  P Sikka A Puxty H Willmott and C Cooper  ' The Impossibility of Eliminating the Expectations Gap: 
Some Theory and Evidence”  December 2003. Sikka et al argue that due to social conflict the meaning of social 
practices  continually face challenges  and the gap between competing meanings of audit cannot be eliminated. 
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surveys carried out on the public. There should be an objective component within the 
definition of an audit which would be the public's reasonable expectations. These 
expectations could be deemed reasonable as public would already have been educated about 
component would also be 
revised from time to time based on periodical surveys. In the absence of a duty to third 
rd Performance Component could be reduced by restoring the fraud and 
oses of educating users of financial information. It would be more feasible to 
educate users of financial information as opposed to members of the general public – 
ot all members of the public use financial information. 
The more stringent regulations which exist in Italy such as not allowing external auditors to 
nger periods of tenure, rotation 
the role of auditors, nature of audits before a survey is carried out to find out what the public 
want from an audit. 
The subjective component definition of an audit would be revised from time to time – 
depending on social, environmental changes. The objective 
parties, the fraud and error detection role of an auditor seems to be a role which should 
become a primary audit objective – as this would help bring about some form of 
accountability. Of course, the auditor cannot be expected to sniff out every form of fraud – 
only material ones. 
In sum, various ways through which the individual components of the expectations gap 
could be reduced are as follows: 
The Sub Standa
detection role as the main audit objective. 
The Deficient Standards Component could be reduced through unambiguous wordings 
within Statements of Auditing Standards. These should be avoided and clearer definitions 
provided to give the auditor a better understanding of his duties. 
In relation to the Unreasonable Expectations component, reasonable expectations of the 
public could be ascertained through education of the public about the role of the auditor and 
the auditing standards relating to his role. Public education about the auditor's role could be 
facilitated through annual shareholders' meetings and other events which are organised for 
the purp
especially since n
Fifth Proposal 
offer additional (non-audit services), appointing firms for lo
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of audit firms, restrictions on staff movement between firms and clients and monitoring 
audit fees/hours are factors which would facilitate a better environment for auditor 
independence. It would therefore be worthwhile considering the adoption of these measures 
 
 
t is needed in the form of a degree of liability which discourages the 
auditor from acting negligently or intentionally taking risks. However, there is need to 
 caps as discussed in the next section should help achieve this balance. 
t and third options697 could also serve as an option. The four 
options presented for reforming auditors’ liability are as follows:698 
The introduction by Member States of the principle of proportionate liability, which means that 
in the UK. As stated previously, corporate governance structures, “thinness”696 of the audit 
market and other relevant factors and jurisdictional differences would need to be considered 
when deciding whether or not to adopt certain measures. 
 
Sixth Proposal 
In relation to audit liability, auditors should be held liable for the negative consequences of 
their actions. A deterren
ensure that such liability is not so high that it leads to defensive auditing. The introduction of 
liability
The issue of audit liability in the UK could be addressed by the relatively newly introduced 
Companies Act 2006. However on a European level, a combination of variants of the 
European Commission’s firs
The introduction of a fixed monetary cap at European level, which in the Commission’s 
opinion, might be difficult to achieve. 
The introduction of a cap based on the size of the audited company, as measured by its 
market capitalisation. 
The introduction of a cap based on a multiple of the audit fees charged by the auditor to its 
client. 
                                                 
696 Audit markets wi
697 The European Commission in its consultations relating to whether there is need for a reform of the auditor liability 
regime, not only presented four options, but also invit
th relatively few large clients are referred to as thin markets. 
ed stakeholders to submit their opinions by 15 March 2007. For 
&guiLangu
more on this, see < 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/07/60&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN
age=en>; also refer to the first chapter of this thesis. 
698 ibid; also see < http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/auditing/liability/index_en.htm > (last visited 2 May 2008) 
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each party (auditor and audited company) is liable only for the portion of loss that corresponds to 
the party’s degree of responsibility. 
 In relation to the European Commission’s options, I would propose a model based on a 
combination which are variants of the first and third options, namely a combination of a single 
monetary cap at a European level and a cap based on audit fees699. Whilst a cap based on market 
capitalisation would be rather subjective, adopting a principle of proportionate liability, also 
involves subjective elements. According to the European Commission, the option relating to 
proportionate liability would not only consist in courts awarding damages which are in proportion 
to the auditor’s fault, but also in contractual arrangements being negotiated between the company 
and its auditors and approved by shareholders.700 In relation to the subjective nature of 
disproportionate liability, where does one draw a distinction between negligent acts and those acts 
committed intentionally? Whilst some negligent acts may result in greater losses, is this to imply 
that such unintentional acts should attract more severe punitive sanctions than intentional ones 
between the company and its auditors and approved by shareholders. These variants are introduced 
 
re not 
whose acts incurred fewer losses? Furthermore, how is one to distinguish between grossly negligent 
and mere negligent (simple negligent) acts, and how is one to apportion liability for those acts 
which are merely negligent but which have resulted to greater losses than grossly negligent acts? 
Do we apportion according to the losses incurred by the company or on the basis of the nature of 
the act? It seems that a response to these questions would necessitate a consideration and balance of 
those factors surrounding both the nature of the act, the extent and consequences of the losses 
incurred. For example, the impact of the loss on third parties and other affected stakeholders. These 
are issues which would have to be considered in the contractual arrangements being negotiated 
as follows:  
In relation to the first option, I support a monetary cap at a European level. However, such cap 
would have to be defined since a fixed figure does not take into consideration the differences which
exist in the audit environments of various EU member states. For example, whilst 5 million Euros 
may be deterrent for audit companies in Italy and Germany (as the market for audit services a
                                                 
699 In considering a variant based on audit fees, the audit revenue generated by the audit firm is considered. 
700 See ‘The European Federation of Accountants_ Federation des Experts Comptables Europeens’ Paper 
<http://www.iwp.or.at/veranstaltungen/documents/unterlagen_2007-05-07.pdf> 
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as great as in the UK and the US)701, it might not produce such a deterrent effect in the US or the 
UK. In defining what the cap should be, an appropriate determinant would be the revenue702 
generated by the audit firm. Revenue should not relate only to the audit fees generated by these 
firms, but also to fees generated from non audit services. However, a benchmark needs to be set in 
relation to the cap. This is so because if a cap were solely determined by the audit firm’s revenue, 
those firms generating low revenues would be inclined to take greater risks. If a minimum figure 
were set depending on whether the firm was a medium sized or large audit firm (small sized audit 
firms should be exempted from liability in the same way as small companies are not mandated by 
law to carry out audits)703, say x million Euros minimum for medium sized audit firms and y 
                                                 
701 Audit markets with relatively few large clients are referred to as thin markets. Germany has been classed as having a 
  The revenue generated by the audit firm constitutes the variant of the audit fees (third option as proposed by the 
European Commission). Reasons for a preference of revenue, instead of operating profit include the fact that operating 
profit is more subjective as costs are deducted (administration and distribution costs) in order to arrive at a profit figure. 
These deductions can provide a leeway for creative accounting, that is, the manipulation of accounts to achieve a 
 fo
ion, to which different fines are imposed, in the event of audit liability, should also take into account 
ulate their accounts in order to be classified or 
des ference 
bet  
des
bal
inc g practices.  
e Explanatory  Memorandum to the Companies Act 1985 (Small Companies’ Accounts and Audit) 
are annual accounts and to have those 
ents originate from EU directives. 
accounting and reporting 
requirements. Under section 246 of the 1985 Act they can prepare and file at Companies House 
s do not have to have their accounts audited 
.  
ection 4.2 states:  
s turnover in a financial year is not more than £5.6m,  
t more than 50 employees.  
Whilst section 4.3 states : Section 249 of the 1985 Act sets out similar criteria for qualifying as a small 
group. U der section 248 the parent company of a small group does not have to  
repare group accounts. 
relatively thin market as relatively few companies are public limited companies (AGs). See MB Gietzmann and PK Sen, 
'Improving Auditor Independence Through  Selective Mandatory Rotation’ (2002) 6 International Journal of Auditing  
201 
702
desired figure ( r taxation or penalty purposes). Ranges of audit revenues chosen by national regulators or the 
European Commiss
the fact that some audit firms may generate the same revenue but not the same profit. The selected ranges could also 
determine the extent to which some firms would be tempted to manip
ignated within a certain range. This is so, particularly if such range would attract lower fines. Whilst the dif
ween different ranges should not be so narrow as to make it easier for audit firm to “manipulate” its way into a more
irable range, it should also not be so wide as to compel certain firms to take greater risks. A means of achieving this 
ance would be to apportion fines in such a way, between the different ranges of audit revenues, that there are less 
entives to resort to creative accountin
703   Se
Regulations 2006. 
companies are required by the 1985 Act to prep Section 4.1 reads as follows: All 
counts audited. These requiremac
However, small companies can take advantage of less onerous 
less detailed accounts and reports. Small companie
(sections 249A and 249AA)
S
To qualify as small, a company must meet two of the following criteria (set out  
in section 247 of the 1985 Act):  
• 
it
• 
its balance sheet total for that year is not more than £2.8m, and  
• 
it has no
 
n
p
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million Euros minimum for large audit firms ( y million Euros naturally being greater than x million 
Euros), then cases whereby caps are higher, would have to be justified according to the revenue 
generated by the medium or large sized audit firm. For example whilst the benchmark liability 
would apply to firms earning relatively low audit income within their class704, higher penalty fees 
would apply to those earning higher revenues (within different specified ranges). 
The minimal caps of x million Euros (medium sized audit firms) and y million Euros (large sized 
audit firms) should be deterrent enough to discourage such audit firms from taking undue risks. 
Whilst I support the Commission’s Working Paper proposal for a single monetary cap at European 
level, the designation as a medium or large sized audit firm would have to be determined by the 
revenues generated by these firms. The use of revenue generated by these firms should provide an 
objective basis even though the audit markets in various jurisdictions differ.705 Thus, whilst 
numerous large sized audit firms may exist in the UK, this would not be the case in Germany706 or 
 it has been argued that a single monetary cap is not appropriate,707 I would only 
agree with the criticism that certain issues need to be clarified. Such issues as whether the liability 
cap applies separately to claims or once to the sum of claims, differences in laws of member states 
as regards direct claims by the company or third parties need to be addressed708. However these 
issues do not imply that the implementation of a single monetary cap at EU level is unworkable. 
Moreover in my opinion, it is preferable to the desired choice of Doralt and others709 for the 
purpose of promoting harmonisation and facilitating greater cooperation between regulators on an 
international basis. 
                                                                                                                                                                 
Italy. Even though
 
Also see Fourth Council Directive of 25 July 1978 (78/660/EEC) based on Article 54(3)(g) of the Treaty on the annual  
accounts of certain types of companies, OJ L222/11 of 14 August 1978. Seventh Council Directive of 13 June  
1983 (83/349/EEC) based on Article 54(3)(g) of the Treaty on consolidated accounts, OJ L193/1 of 18 July 
1983.  
 
 
 
lass ication
  e referred to as thin markets. Germany has been 
lassed as having a relatively thin market as relatively few  
alt and others, ‘Auditors’ Liability and Its Impact On The European Financial Markets’  
’ Liability 
nd Its Impact On inancial Markets’ (2008) 
 
704 C if  as medium sized or large audit firm 
705   ibid 
670  Audit markets with relatively few large clients ar
c
  companies are public limited companies (AGs). 
 
707   See W Dor
  (2008) 67 Cambridge Law Journal  64 
708   ibid at 63 
709   See W Doralt , A Hellgardt, K J Hopt, P C Leyens, M Roth and R Zimmermann  ‘Auditors
a  The European F
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Source of table710 
 
General Response of Audit firms to Recommendation on Limiting Audit Firms’ Liability 
Whilst limited liability was favoured by most respondents in their response to the European 
Commission's proposals,711 it has been argued that proportional auditor liability is unlikely to 
address audit market failure.712 Furthermore, it is contended that the distortion of market incentives 
in audit markets can be traced to government intervention and that a solution can be found by 
ith competition.713 
he responses were in favour of a 
limitation on auditors’ liability - with the audit profession accounting for slightly over half of 
                                                
replacing government intervention w
Opinions of major audit firms 714 
A total of 85 responses which consisted of opinions from the audit profession, companies, banks, 
regulators and other stakeholders were obtained.715 66% of t
 
 argument against unlimited liability consists in the fact that it cannot be insured sufficiently/at all. 
 Economic Affairs, Vol 26 (3) at 67- 69 
d at: 
://c
d&s
t_en.pdf (page 6 of 79) 
710   See http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/auditing/docs/liability/impact_assessment_en.pdf 
  (page 61 of 79) 
711  Vital
712  See B Köhler, ‘Audit Market Failure’ (2009)
713  ibid 
714  Responses of respondents can be foun
<http irca.europa.eu/Public/irc/markt/markt_consultations/library?l=/abschlussprfung/abschlussprfern&vm=de 
taile b=Title> (last visited 27 April 2009) 
715  See http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/auditing/docs/liability/impact_assessmen
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respondents who supported a limitation on auditors’ liability.716 
6 of these responses will be considered. Even though the sample may at first appear to be non 
representative, given its size, it is considered to be sufficient for the purposes at hand, namely, an 
estimation of the general opinion of audit firms. This is so, since the Big Four, which account for 
the ‘lion’s share’ in the provision of audit services are included in the sample. Furthermore, all the 
audit firms being investigated are major audit firms. The audit firms whose responses will be 
investigated are as follows: Deloitte, Ernst and Young, Institut der Wirtschaftsprüfer, Institute of 
ther member states, auditors owe a duty of care not only to the company and its 
shareholders, but to other third parties.718 Harmonisation could be achieved through statutory 
- The limitation of liability should not apply in the case of intentional misconduct on the part of the 
third parties 
Damaged parties have the right to be fairly compensated 
                                                
Chartered Accountants in England and Wales, KPMG, and PricewaterhouseCoopers. 
The table below for auditors’liability illustrates that tort law accounts for the basis of auditors’ 
liability, in respect of third parties, in most of the EU member states featured. As a result, 
harmonisation at European level, on the basis of contractually arranged caps, would not be 
feasible.717 Furthermore, contractual limitation as is the case with the UK, is not favoured since in 
many o
means. 
Key Principles to be followed when Limitation Method is selected by Member States 
auditor 
- A limitation would be inefficient if it does not also cover 
- 
 
The Recommendation appears to permit a wide scope in prescribing how Member States should 
implement a limitation of audit firms’ liability. Even though this could be aimed at ensuring greater 
 
716  ibid; Of the 66%, 35% consisted of the audit profession and 31%, the non audit profession. The figure 
attributed to those who were not in favour of a limitation on auditors’ liability was 29%. 
717  See page 32 of 79 <http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/auditing/docs/liability/impact_assessment_en.pdf> 
718  Third parties such as banks, creditors, individual shareholders or groups of minority shareholders and even 
potential shareholders. Auditors would not be able to contractually limit their liability with these third parties. 
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flexibility due to differences in audit liability regimes operating in various states, the degree of 
guidance provided by the European Commission is also vital for purposes of compliance and 
enforcement of the Recommendation. This contrasts with the 2006 Directive on Statutory Audit719 
which sets out more detailed guidelines to be followed by Member States. Furthermore, the 2006 
Directive appears to have as one of its objectives, the goal of harmonisation. Section 32 of its 
reamble reads: 
e and effects of this Directive, be better achieved at Community 
level, the Community may adopt measures, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set 
s, 
the methods to be applied by such states in limiting liability could have been stipulated by the 
p
 
- “Since the objectives of this Directive — namely requiring the application of a single set of 
international auditing standards, the updating of the educational requirements, the definition of 
professional ethics and the technical implementation of the cooperation between competent 
authorities of Member States and between those authorities and the authorities of third countries, in 
order further to enhance and harmonise the quality of statutory audit in the Community and to 
facilitate cooperation between Member States and with third countries so as to strengthen 
confidence in the statutory audit — cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can 
therefore, by reason of the scal
out in Article 5 of the Treaty.”- 
Closer examination of the three methods put forward by the Commission in limiting liability reveals 
that the goal of harmonisation still constitutes a focal point. However, harmonisation would be 
made the more difficult given the degree of flexibility allowed by the European Commission in 
permitting Member States to decide on the appropriate method for limiting liability. Even though 
the above mentioned key principles would still serve to provide some guidance to Member State
Commission according to the prevailing legal basis for auditors’ liability in those member states. 
In addition to stipulating methods which would apply, and which are based on the prevailing legal 
basis for auditors’ liability, consideration should also be given to those countries where liability 
caps presently exist. This would have been considered by the European Commission based on the 
                                                 
719  DIRECTIVE 2006/43/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 17 May 2006 
ounts, amending Council Directives 78/660/EEC and 
49/E
on statutory audits of annual accounts and consolidated acc
83/3 EC and repealing Council Directive 84/253/EEC 
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response from these jurisdictions. The response720 obtained from the countries (see below) 
indicated that 74.1% of respondents from outside the audit profession and from countries where 
audit limitation caps are in place (including the UK, Germany and Austria) favoured reform on 
European basis – provided significant amendments would not be required to their national laws. As 
a result of the Commission’s Recommendation, would (and should) substantial amendments to the 
national legislation in such countries be required? 
                                                 
720  See page 61 of 79 of the Impact Assessment Document 
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Source: <http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/auditing/docs/liability/impact_assessment_en.pdf> page 75 of 79 
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 Evaluating the European Commission’s Recommendation 
 
Having considered the responses of all six firms721, a recurring response was the opinion that 
proportionate liability should not operate in isolation as this could place mid tier audit firms at a 
disadvantage. This is due to the fact that they may not have the financial resources required to 
respond to claims of excessive amounts. Whilst a combination with some form of absolute 
protection such as limitation by contractual agreement has been considered, difficulty in 
implementing such a proposal is foreseen since in many other member states, unlike the UK, the 
auditor's duty of care is much wider.722 
In such a situation, it would be difficult to limit their liability contractually with such third parties. 
Difficulties are also anticipated in implementing the proposal that proportionate liability be 
combined with absolute protection and enshrined in EU legislation. In this respect, the fact that 
liability caps already exist in some member states like Austria, Belgium, Germany, Greece and 
Slovenia needs to be considered. Proportionate liability by law as from 1st Jan 2008, was 
introduced in Hungary whilst contractual limitations of liability applied in the UK as from June 
2008. 
However, the reforms in these jurisdictions only apply within local boundaries. Reform is required 
in order to introduce a law which can apply at European level. Based on the results obtained from 
the consultation, 74.1% of respondents from outside the audit profession and from countries where 
audit limitation caps are in place (including the UK, Germany and Austria) favoured reform on 
European basis - provided significant amendments would not be required to their national laws. On 
the other hand, 76.5% of the respondents from outside the audit profession and in those countries 
where liability caps do not presently operate, do not favour liability caps.723 
Given the high percentage of respondents in those countries where liability caps do not presently 
                                                 
721  For a more detailed analysis of these responses, please see M Ojo, 'Limiting Auditors' Liability: A Step in the 
Right Direction ?" (Proposals for a New Audit Liability in Europe Revisted)<http://mpra.ub.uni-
muenchen.de/14878/>Even though the sample may at first appear to be non representative, it is considered to be 
sufficient for the purposes at hand, namely an estimation of the general opinion of audit firms. 
722  In these jurisdictions, the auditor owes a duty of care not only to the company and its shareholders, but also to 
other third parties such as banks, creditors, individual shareholders and in some cases, potential shareholders. 
723  See page 61 of 79 of the Impact Assessment Document 
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operate and who do not favour liability caps, and considering the fact that significant amendments 
to national laws would not be welcomed in those countries where liability caps presently exist, the 
flexibility afforded by the European Commission in its Recommendation on Limiting Auditors' 
Liability, is justified. However, a price will be required in allowing for such a degree of flexibility. 
The success of harmonisation and enforcement at European level despite prevailing differences in 
national regimes, will require that resulting immense challenges, be overcome by supranational 
authorities. 
A variant of a fixed monetary cap at European level and the introduction of a cap based on a 
multiple of the audit fees charged by the auditor to its client, would have presented a better 
opportunity for harmonisation and that - without the need for (as many) significant changes to the 
national legislation of several EU member states. 
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UITF    Urgent Issues Task Force 
 
UK    United Kingdom 
 
UKLA   Listing Authority 
 
US    United States 
 L 
  
 GLOSSARY OF TERMS 
Aktiengesellschaft (AG) Company limited by shares which may be traded on the stock market. 
In the UK, this is referred to as PLC (Public Limited Company) 
 
Audit Committees Audit committees are composed of independent non executive directors, one of 
which is usually a financial expert. 
 
Audit Concentration Audit concentration can be said to exist in a market where as few as four firms, 
account for such a substantial share of the audit work undertaken in the markets. 
 
Auditor Independence   The ability to resist client pressure.1  
 
Big Bang Process whereby City markets (London Stock Exchange) opened to outside markets 
– this mainly occurring through restructuring of the London Stock Exchange. The 
abolishment of exchange controls took place. 
 
Capital Adequacy Term used to describe the adequacy of a bank’s aggregate capital in relation to the 
risks which arise from its assets, its off-balance sheet transactions, its dealing 
operations and all other risks associated with its business.2 
 
Conglomerates According to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) definition, conglomerates are referred to as heterogenous financial groups 
whose activities for the most part, span all institutional sectors. 
 
Corporate Governance According to the Cadbury Committee definition, “The system by which companies 
are directed and controlled”  
 
Creative Accounting The manipulation of financial figures to achieve a desired result. 
 
Defensive Auditing The practice whereby auditors, rather than exercising their professional 
judgment, resort to excessive application of rules or audit standards as a 
means of justifying the results of the audit report. 
                                                 
1 Knapp; 1985 
2 J Hitchins, M Hogg  and  D Mallet,   Banking : A  Regulatory  Accounting  and  Auditing  Guide   (Institute of 
Chartered Accountants  2001) 163 
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Deregulation Deregulation refers to the relaxation or removal of regulatory constraints on firms or 
individuals.3 Deregulation has become increasingly equated with promoting 
competition and market-oriented approaches toward pricing, output, entry and other 
related economic decisions.4  
 
Expectations Gap The difference between what users of financial statements, the general public 
perceive an audit to be and what the audit profession claim is expected of 
them in conducting an audit. 
  
Meta Risk Regulation The use of firm’s own internal risk management systems to achieve 
regulatory objectives. It differs from the FSA’s risk regulatory procedures 
which involve a consideration of external risks. 
 
Moral Hazard A situation which occurs when risks are taken because of the absence of 
incentives to deter from taking such risks. 
 
Off-site Supervision is synonymous with monitoring and involves the regulator making use of 
external auditors. 
 
On-site Supervision is usually done by the examination staff of the bank supervisory agency or 
commissioned by supervisors but may be undertaken by external auditors. 
 
Over regulation This can be regarded as a situated whereby rules are excessively imposed. This 
usually has the effect of minimising competition. 
 
Prudential regulation  Regulation which focuses on the solvency and safety and soundness of financial 
institutions. 
 
                                                 
3 ibid 
4 ibid 
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Regulation Regulation can broadly be defined as the imposition of rules by government, 
supported by the use of penalties that are intended specifically to modify the 
economic behaviour of individuals and firms in the private sector.5 
 
Regulatory capture Generally defined as capture of the regulator by the regulated . 
 
Self regulation This form of regulation is one which professions adopt to develop and self-enforce 
rules which are commonly arrived at for the mutual benefit of members.6 Self-
regulation may be adopted in order to maintain professional reputation, education 
and ethical standards.7 They may also act as a vehicle to set prices, restrict entry and 
ban certain practices (e.g., advertising in order to restrict competition).8 
 
Supervision  The process of monitoring imposed rules. 
 
Systemic risk Systemic risk refers to the risk of a bank-run affecting other parts of the 
financial system thereby resulting in economic instability. 
 
Threshold Conditions The minimum criteria for granting permission to carry out regulated activities as 
provided by the FSA. 
                                                 
5 See Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development Glossary of Statistical Terms, < 
http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=3295> (last visited 1July 2008) 
6 ibid 
7 ibid 
8 ibid 
 O 
  
 REFERENCES 
Chapters Two and Three 
 
Anderson B, Maletta M and Wright (1998) A 'Perceptions of Auditor Responsibility: Views of the Judiciary 
and the Profession' International Journal of Auditing   
Angermueller  NO, Eichhorn Mand Ramke T (2005) 'New Standards of Banking Supervision – A Look at 
the German Implementation Approach for the Second Pillar of Basel II' Journal of International Banking 
Law and Regulation 
 
BaFin Annual Report for 2004 
Basel Committee's Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision and the Relationship between Banking 
Supervisors and Banks' External Auditors (2001), International Auditing Practices Committee 
Cairns D (1997) 'The Future Shape of Harmonisation: A Reply' European Accounting Review Cameran  M 
(2005) 'Audit Fees and the Large Auditor Premium in the Italian Market' International Journal of Auditing 
Carnevali F (1997) British and Italian Banks and Small Firms : A Study of the Midlands and Piedmont 1945 
– 1973 (PhD Thesis London School of Economics and Political Science  
Carosio  G (2002) 'Italy,Europe and Financial Regulation'  Oxford Gazette 
 
Deutsche Bundesbank (1974) Geschaeftsbericht  
Deutsche Bundesbank (January 1993) 'The Fourth Act Amending the Banking Act – A Further Step Towards 
the European Banking Market'  Monthly Report   
Deutsche Bundesbank (November 1994)  'The Fifth Act Amending the Banking Act' Deutsche Bundesbank 
Monthly Report  
Deutsche Bundesbank (January 1998) 'The Sixth Act Amending the Banking Act' Monthly Report  
Deutsche Bundesbank (October 2002)  'Amendments to the Banking Act caused by the Fourth Financial 
Market Promotion Act 2002' Monthly Report 
Deutsche Bundesbank (June 2002) 'The Evolution of Accounting Standards for Credit Institutions, Deutsche 
Bundesbank Monthly Report  
 
 
Deutsche Bank (2004)  'Italy's Savings Banks: First Reforms Create Big Universal Banks with Untapped 
Potential' EU Monitor Financial Market  Special Deutsche Bank Research  November 25 2004 
Deutsche Bundesbank (April 2005) Monthly Report   
Deutsche Bundesbank (April 2005)‘Supervision of Financial Conglomerates in Germany’ Monthly Report    
Deutsche Bundesbank (October 2005) 'New Transparency Rules for Credit Institutions' Deutsche 
Bundesbank Monthly Report  
Evans L and Nobes C (1998)  'Harmonisation of the Structure of Audit Firms: Incorporation in the UK and 
Germany'  The European Accounting Review 
 
Ethical Statement 1 Integrity, objectivity and independence paragraph  28 
Fazio A (2002) 'The Reorganisation  of the Italian Bank System'  (Joint Session of the Sixth Committees of 
the Italian Senate and Chamber of Deputies 10 October 2002) 
 
Fearnley  S and Beattie V (2004)  'The Reform of the UK's Auditor Independence Framework after the 
Enron Collapse: An Example of Evidence-based  Policy Making'  International Journal of Auditing 
Federation des Experts Comptables (2001) Europeens  Enforcement Mechanisms in Europe: A Preliminary 
Investigation of Oversight Systems   
Filipova T (2003) ‘ Concept  of  Integrated Financial  Supervision  and  Regulation  of Financial 
Conglomerates: The Case of  Germany and the UK’   
Filipova T (2006) ‘ Concept  of  Integrated Financial  Supervision  and  Regulation  of Financial 
Conglomerates: The Case of  Germany and the UK’  Nomos 
 P 
  
 
Goglio  A (2001) 'Sectoral Regulatory Reforms in Italy: Framework and Implications' OECD Economics 
Department Working Papers 294, OECD 
Goodhart  CAE (1998) (ed)  'The Emerging Framework of Financial Regulation   ( Central Banking 
Publications Ltd  London 1998) 
Gray  SJ (1988) 'Towards a Theory of Cultural Influence on the Development of Accounting Systems 
Internationally Abacus, Vol. 24 No.1, pp.1-15 
Gray J and Hamilton J (2006)  Implementing Financial Regulation: Theory and Practice Second Edition , 
John Wiley and Sons 
 
Hitchins  J Hogg M and Mallett D (2001) Banking: A Regulatory Accounting and Auditing Guide (The 
Institute of Chartered Accountants) 
 
House of Lords Select Committee on the Accountability of the Financial Services Authority in general, and 
of the Accountability of the Government and of the Parliamentary Ombudsman Regarding the Equitable 
Debacle 
 
 
Huepkes E 'The External Auditor and the Bank Supervisor: Sherlock Holmes and Doctor Watson?'  (2005)  7 
No1/2 Journal of Banking Regulation 
 
ISA No 240 ( International Federation of Accountants 1996a) 
ISA No 570 (International Federation of Accountants 1996d) 
 
 
Llewellyn D (2001) 'The Creation of a Single Financial Regulatory Agency in Estonia: The Global Context' 
Paper Presented at Conference Organised by the World Bank and the Ministry of Finance of Estonia, 2001 
 
Moriconi M (2005)' Italy: Changes to the Legislative and Regulatory Framework post-Parmalat – Some 
Faster than Others!' Hill and Knowlton's Financial Services Newsletter  Number 5 May 2005 
Moscadelli M (2004) 'The Modelling of Operational Risk : Experience with the Analysis of Data collected 
by the Basel Committee' Banca D'Italia Temi di Discussione del Servizio Studi Bank of Italy, Banking 
Supervision Department Number 517, July 2004 
 
Mwenda K and Fleming  A (2001) 'International Developments in the Organizational Structure of Financial 
Services Supervision'   
 
Mwenda K and Mvula  J (2003) 'A Framework for Unified Financial Services Supervision: Lessons from 
Germany and Other European Countries'  
Nobes C 'The Future Shape of Harmonisation: Some Responses'  (1998) European Accounting Review 
Nobes C and Parker R (2006) Comparative International Accounting  (Prentice Hall London , Ninth edition) 
Paul T (2004) 'The New German Investment Act' Journal of International Banking Law and Regulation 
Pecchioli  RM (1983) 'Trends in Banking Structure and Regulation in OECD Countries, The 
Internationalisation of Banking: The Policy Issues  
Polizatto  V (1990) 'Prudential Regulation and Banking Supervision: Building an Institutional Framework 
for Banks' (January 1990) World Bank Working Paper 
 
SAS No 59 (American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 1988d)  
SAS No 82 (American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 1997) 
 
Scherer  P (2002) 'Regulatory Changes Proposed in Germany' Journal of International  Banking Law 
 
Skaife HA and Gassen  J (2006) 'Can Audit Reforms Change the Monitoring Role of Audits? August 2006 
 Q 
  
 
 
Singh  D (2007) Banking Regulation of UK and US Financial Markets 'Legal Aspects of Prudential 
Supervision' Ashgate 
Sridharan  U, Royce W Caines,  McMillan and  Summers S (2002) 'Financial Statement Transparency and 
Auditor Responsibility: Enron and  Andersen International Journal of Auditing 
 
Steck A and Loosen C (2002) 'New Legislation to Reform and Enhance Germany's Status as a Financial 
Centre'  Journal of International Banking Law 
Stevenson J (2002) 'Auditor Independence: A Comparative Descriptive Study of the UK, France and Italy' 
International Journal of Auditing 
 
The Federal Reserve System, Purposes and Functions (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 
July 2005) 
The Washington Post 
 
Tonello  M  (2006) 'Have Governance Reforms Spurred on by Parmalat's Collapse Given Investors a False 
Sense of Security?', The Conference Board 
'Trends in Banking Structure and Regulation in OECD Countries'  (1987)   
Trequattrini G 'The Role of the Bank of Italy as Antitrust Authority in the Banking Sector' Banca d'Italia 
Vieten H (1995) 'Auditing in Britain and  Germany Compared: Professions, Knowledge and the State'  
European Accounting Review   
Vieten  HR (1996) ‘Banking Regulation in Britain and Germany Compared: Capital Ratios, External Audit 
and Internal Controls 
 
<http://www.asb.co.uk/apb/publications/index.cfm> 
http://www.bafin.de/bafin/aufgabenundziele_en.htm#n1 
http://www.bancaditalia.it/vigilanza_tutela/vig_ban/pubblicazioni/rela/2001/Supervision.pdf> 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs78.htm 
http://www.bundesbank.de/bankenaufsicht/bankenaufsicht_bafin.en.php 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/enforcement/ 
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/history/vol2/panel2.pdf>   
 
 
Chapter Four 
 
Alexander K (October 2004) “ Corporate Governance and Basel II ” Paper Presented at the Institute of 
Advanced Legal Studies, Russell Square London  
Ayres I and Braithwaite J (1992) “Responsive Regulation : Transcending the Deregulation Debate” New 
York : Oxford Union Press  
Baldwin R and Cave M, Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy and Practice (1999) Oxford University 
Press 
Bank of Credit and Commerce International (Overseas) Ltd (in liquidation) and others v Price Waterhouse 
and Another (No 3)  
Barings Plc v Coopers and Lybrand [1997] 1 BCLC 427  
Basel Committee Publications No 87 (January 2002 ) “The Relationship between Bank Supervisors and 
 R 
  
External Auditors ”  
 
Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision 1997  
 
Barth JR Caprio Jr G and Levine R (November 2001) “Bank Regulation and Supervision: What Works 
Best?” The World Bank Development Research Group Finance and Financial Sector Strategy and Policy 
Department  
Beck U, Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity (1992) London: Sage Publications  
Black J ( 2003) ‘Decentring Regulation: Understanding the Role of Regulation and Self-Regulation in a 
"Post-Regulatory" World’ in M. Freeman (ed) 
Benoit R Decamps JP and Rochet JC (April 2002) “ The Three Pillars of Basel II : Optimizing the Mix in a 
Continuous Time Model ”  
Bonss W, Vom Risiko: Unsicherheit und Ungewissheit in der Moderne (1995) Hamburg: hamburger Edition  
Breyer S, Breaking the Vicious Circle: Towards Effective Risk Regulation (1993) Cambridge Mass  
Ciborra C, ‘Digital Technologies and the Duality of Risk’(2004) CARR Discussion Paper No 27, CARR, 
LSE London 
Dewing P and Russell PO (2005) The Role of Auditors, Reporting Accountants and Skilled Persons in UK 
Financial Services Supervision Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland  
Douglas M, Risk and Blame: Essays in Cultural Theory (1992) Routledge  
Ferran E (2003) “ Examining the UK's Experience in Adopting the Single Financial Regulator Model” 
Brooklyn Journal of International Law  
Foucault M, ‘Governmentality’ in G Burchell et al (eds), The Foucault Effect (1991) Hemel Hempstead: 
Harvester Wheatsheaf 
Gleeson S (2006) Prudential Regulation of Banks under the FSMA Second edition  
Gray J and Hamilton J (2006) “ Implementing Financial Regulation : Theory and Practice” Second Edition , 
John Wiley and Sons  
Goodhart C et al (1998) “Financial Regulation : Why, How and Where Now?” Routledge  
Goodhart CAE (1998) “The Emerging Framework of Financial Regulation” The Financial Markets Group of 
the London School of Economics  
Hadjiemmanuil C (1995) “Banking Regulation and the Bank of England ” Lloyds of London Press  
Hadjiemmanuil C (2003) 'Institutional Structure of Financial Regulation: A Trend towards 
 S 
  
‘Megaregulators’?', in Yearbook of International Financial and Economic Law 2000-2001 (London: BIICL, 
2003) 
Hall MJB (1996) “Banking Regulation in the European Union : Some Issues and Concerns , Rethinking 
Bank Regulation : What Should Regulators Do?” Federal Reserve Bank Chicago 32nd Annual Conference  
 
Hitchins J Hogg M and Mallett D 2001 “Banking : A Regulatory Accounting and Auditing Guide”  
Johnson Matthey Plc v Arthur Young and the Governor of the Bank of England [1989] 2 All ER 105  
Llewellyn (1999) “The Economic Rationale for Financial Regulation”  
MacNeil I (1999) “The Future for Financial Regulation : The Financial Services and Markets Bill” 62 MLR  
Polizatto V 'Prudential Regulation and Banking Supervision: Building an Institutional Framework for Banks' 
(1990) World Bank Working Paper January 1990 
Ottedal S, Moen B, Klempe H and Rundow T‘Explaining Risk Perception: An evaluation of Cultural 
Theory’ < http://www.svt.ntnu.no/psy/Torbjorn.Rundmo/Psychometric_paradigm.pdf> 
Quinn B (1995)  'The Bank of  England and the Development of Internal Control Systems'  in R Kinsella (ed) 
Internal Controls in Banking  (Oak Tree Press Dublin 1995) 
Quinn B (1996) ‘Rules v Discretion: The Case of Banking Supervision in the Light of the Debate on 
Monetary Policy’, Special Paper 85, July 1996 Financial Markets Group, London School of Economics 
Power M, The Risk Management of Everything: Rethinking the Politics of Uncertainty2004 Demos  
Power M Organized Uncertainty: Designing A World of Risk Management 2007 Oxford University Press 
Research Papers (1999) Houses of Parliament Research Paper 99/68 “Financial Services and Markets Bill” [ 
Bill 121 of 1998-99]  
Rothstein H, Huber M and Gaskell G “A Theory of Risk Colonization: The Spiralling Regulatory Logics of 
Societal and Institutional Risk” (2006) Economy and Society (35) 1 
Shapiro M (1983)‘Administrative Discretion: The Next Stage’, Yale Law Journal, vol. 92, 1487  
Sikka P (2001) 'Policing Knowledge by Invoking the Law: Critical Accounting and the Politics of 
dissemination'  Critical Perspectives on Accounting, Vol. 12 No.5 
Singh D (2007) Banking Regulation of UK and US Financial Markets Legal Aspects of Prudential 
Supervision  Ashgate 
 T 
  
Vieten HR (1997) “Banking Regulation in Britain and Germany Compared : Capital Ratios, External Audit 
and Internal Controls”  
Wagster JD (1996) “Impact of the 1988 Basel Accord on International Banks Rethinking Bank Regulation : 
What Should Regulators Do?” Federal Reserve Bank Chicago 32nd Annual Conference  
 
“The Economist” Publications 
 
“Financial Regulation : Beware of the Watch Dog” June 1999 The Economist  
“Basle Bust” April 2000 The Economist  
“Don't Bank on Brussels” April 2001 The Economist  
“Bubble and Squeak” September 2002 The Economist  
“A Bit of Give and Take” October 2002 The Economist  
 
Statutes 
Banking Act 1979  
Banking Act 1987  
Bank of England Act 1998  
Financial Services Act 1986  
Financial Services and Markets Bill  
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000  
 
Reports 
Annual Report under the Banking Act for 1994-95  
Bank of England Report and Accounts 1996  
Barings Bank and International Regulation; 23 July 1996 Minutes of Evidence.  
Barings Bank and International Regulation; 18 November 1996 Minutes of Evidence.  
Barings Bank and International Regulation Volume 1 December 1996  
Bingham Report, loc cit n 183 October 1992 ; Inquiry into the Supervision of the Bank of Credit and 
Commerce International , London : HMSO (hereinafter Bingham)  
Board of Banking Supervision Report on Collapse of Barings Bank ; July 19 1995 Minutes of Evidence  
Financial Services Authority Annual Report 2004/05  
Trade and Industry Committee Third Report ( 1989 -90) ; Company Investigations House of Commons  
 U 
  
Treasury and Civil Service Committee (1991-92) , Fourth Report : Banking Supervision and BCCI : 
International and National Regulation House of Commons  
Treasury and Civil Service Committee (1995) , Board of Banking Supervision ; The Report on the Collapse 
of Barings Bank, Minutes of Evidence : Mr Eddie George, Mr Brian Quinn and Sir Alan Hardcastle  
Treasury Committee Report No 1 1996 Barings Bank and International Regulation  
Treasury Committee Volume 1 Session 1996-1997 First Report Barings Bank and International Regulation  
 
http://www.badellgrau.com/legalbanking.html 
http://www.bafin.de/gesetz/kwg.htm  
http://www.bis.org/press  
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsca.htm  
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/history/vol2/panel2.pdf 
http://www.fs-pp.org.uk/stat_role.html  
http://www.fsa.gov.uk 
 
 
Chapter Five 
 
Auditing Practices Board, Ethical Statements on Integrity, Objectivity and Independence 
Ethical Standards 1 and 5 
Ayres I and  Braithwaite J (1992) Responsive Regulation : Transcending the Deregulation Debate  ( New 
York : Oxford Union Press ) 115  
Baldwin R and Cave M, Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy and Practice (1999) Oxford University 
Press 
Beattie V, .Fearnley S, Brandt R (2001) 'Behind Closed Doors : What Company Audit is Really About' 
Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales  
 
Beattie V., Fearnley S. August 2002 'Auditor Independence and Non audit services : A Literature Review' 
see <http://www.icaew.co.uk/publicassets/00/00/03/64/0000036464.PDF>  
Beck U, Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity (1992) London: Sage Publications 
 
Bittlestone R, 'Now for the quake test' , November 2003 Financial Times, ; also see 
 V 
  
www.metapraxis.com/publications/business/quaketest.html  
Blair M and Walker G (2006) Financial Services Law, Oxford University Press 
Caparo v Dickman (1990) 1 All ER 568-608  
 
Ciborra C, ‘Digital Technologies and the Duality of Risk’(2004) CARR Discussion Paper No 27, CARR, 
LSE London 
Cunningham L (2006) ‘Too Big to Fail: Moral Hazard in Auditing and the Need to Restructure the Industry 
Before it Unravels’ Boston College Law School Faculty Papers, Paper 165 
Dasgupta K and Whelan N May 2005 'A Strategic Overview of the New Accountancy Regulations' Paper 
presented at the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, Russell Square 
Dewing P and Russell PO (2005) The Role of Auditors, Reporting Accountants and Skilled Persons in UK 
Financial Services Supervision, Institute of Chartered Accountants Scotland 
Douglas M, Risk and Blame: Essays in Cultural Theory (1992) Routledge 
Fearnley S (1996) ‘Next Steps’ Auditing Practices Board 
 
“ Enron : The real scandal” Jan 2002 The Economist 
<http://www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=940091>  
 
Federation des Experts Comptables Europeens April 2002 “Enforcement Mechanisms in Europe” A 
Preliminary Investigation of Oversight Systems  
 
Financial Reporting Council Annual Report 2004/2005  
Financial Reporting Council Annual report 2005/2006  
 
Godfrey J. and Langfield-Smith I 2005 'Regulatory Capture in the Globalisation of Accounting Standards' 
WPG 04-08  
 
Grant P ( 2005 a ) 'Auditors' liability wishes in company law bill' Accountancy Age 17 March  
Grant P ( 2005 b ) ' Bill could mean jail for innocent auditors' Accountancy Age 2 June  
Grant P ( 2005 c) 'Auditors to get proportionate liability' Accountancy Age 18 July  
Grant P (2005 d ) 'A bit of a liability' Accountancy Age 28 July  
 W 
  
Grant P ( 2005 e )'Investors fear liability cap by the back door ' Accountancy Age 28 July  
Grant P ( 2005 f ) 'Watchdog urged to lead on liability' Accountancy Age 25 August  
Grant P (2005 g ) 'Reform means audit fees should fall : minister' Accountancy Age 11 November  
 
Hadjiemmanuil C (1995) Banking Regulation and the Bank of England Lloyds of London Press  
 
Higgs D (2003) Review of the Role and Effectiveness of Non-Executive Directors, Department of Trade and 
Industry, London 
Hitchins J, .Hogg M and Mallett D (2001) 'Banking: A Regulatory Accounting and Auditing Guide' 
PricewaterhouseCoopers  
 
House of Commons Select Committee on Treasury Minutes of Evidence; 2001 Appendix 8; Memorandum 
from the Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy  
 
House of Commons Select Treasury Committee, 2001/2002 Further memorandum submitted by Professor 
Prem Sikka 'The Institutionalisation of Audit Failures : Some Observations'  
 
House of Commons Select Committee on Treasury; April 2002 Examination of Witnesses : Mr Michael 
Groom, Mr Peter Wyman, Mr David Bishop, Mr Roger Adams, Mr Bruce Epsley and Mr Richard Mallett  
House of Commons , Select Committee on Treasury, June 10 2002 Minutes of Evidence on the inquiry into 
the arrangements for financial regulation of public limited companies in the United Kingdom  
Huepkes E (2005) ‘The External Auditor and the Bank Supervisor: Sherlock Holmes and Doctor Watson?’ 
Journal of Banking Regulation 
 
Keasy K and Wright M (1993) 'Issues in Corporate Accountability and Governance : An Editorial' 
Accounting and Business Research , 23 pp 291-303  
 
Laffont J and Tirole J (1991) ' The politics of Government Decision Making : A Theory of Regulatory 
Capture' 106 Quarterly Journal of Economics pp 1089-1127 
 
Legal and General Assurance Society (L&G) v FSA 
 X 
  
  
Mogg J.F 1995 ' Internal Controls : The EC Response to BCCI' Internal Controls in Banking Edited by Ray 
Kinsella Oak Tree Press Dublin  
 
Newsreporters 'The year that was 2005 ' ( 2005) Accountancy Age 15 December  
 
Quinn B 1995 ' The Bank of England and the development of internal control systems' Internal Controls in 
Banking Edited by Ray Kinsella Oak Tree Press Dublin  
 
Perrin S 'Duty Bound' 2005 Financial Director 24 November  
 
Posner R (1974) 'Theories of economic regulation' 5 Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science pp 
335-358  
Power M, The Risk Management of Everything: Rethinking the Politics of Uncertainty2004 Demos  
Power M Organized Uncertainty: Designing A World of Risk Management 2007 Oxford University Press 
 
Review of the Regulatory Regime of the Accountancy Profession, Report to the Secretary of State 
for Trade and Industry, see   www.dti.gov.uk/cld/post_enron.htm.   
Rothstein H, Huber M and Gaskell G “A Theory of Risk Colonization: The Spiralling Regulatory Logics of 
Societal and Institutional Risk” (2006) Economy and Society (35) 1 
Singh D 2003 'The role of third parties in banking regulation and supervision' Journal of International 
Banking Regulation Volume 4 No 3  
 
SAS 120 Revised: Consideration of Law and Regulations  
 
See SAS 620 Revised: The Auditor's Right and Duty to Report to Regulators in the Financial Sector  
Singh D (2003) ‘The Role of Third Parties in Banking Regulation and Supervision’ Journal of International 
Banking Regulation 
Stigler G (1971) ' The theory of economic regulation' 2 Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 
pp 3-21  
 
The Role of External Auditors in Financial Services Supervision, 2000 Report by PricewaterhouseCoopers 
 Y 
  
Financial Services Regulatory Consulting Group  
 
Tomlinson H (2004) 'Brussels Seeks to Tighten Audit Rules' The Guardian  
Turner R (2005) ‘The Interaction between FSA Enforcement Action and Compliance Culture: A Help or a 
Hindrance?’ Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance Volume 13 No 2, Henry Stewart Publications 
 
Vieten HR (1997) Banking Regulation in Britain and Germany compared: Capital Ratios, External audit and 
Internal controls  
 
Chapter Six 
 
Ali A and others (2007) ‘Practical Training and the Audit Expectations Gap: The Case of Accounting 
Undergraduates of Universiti Utara Malaysia’forthcoming in the Managerial Auditing Journal 
<http://www.mngt.waikato.ac.nz/ConferenceManager/report.asp?issue=5> 
Bromwich M (1992) Financial Reporting Information and Capital Markets London, Pitman 
Brown RE (1962) ‘Changing Audit Objectives and Techniques’, The Accounting Review  
Chandler RA Edwards JR and Anderson M (1993) ‘Changing Perceptions of the Role of the Company 
Auditor: 1840 – 1940' Accounting and Business Research Vol 23 Autumn  
Cooper D and Sherer MJ (1984) ‘The Value of Corporate Accounting Reports: Arguments for a Political 
Economy of Accounting’ Accounting, Organisations and Society 
Day RG (2000) ‘UK Accounting Regulation: An Historical Perspective’ Bournemouth University School of 
Finance and Law Working Paper Series No 20 
Dearing Report (1988) ‘The Making of Accounting Standards’ 
Dewing P and Russell PO (2005) The Role of Auditors, Reporting Accountants and Skilled Persons in UK 
Financial Services Supervision Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland  
Dicksee L (1892) ‘Auditing : A Practical Manual for Auditors’  
Edwards JR (1989) A History of Financial Accounting, London Routlegde 
Eu Jin T and Cobbin P (2005) A Re Visitation of the 'Audit Expectations Gap': Judicial and Practitioner 
Views on the Role of the Auditor in late- Victorian England  
 Z 
  
Ethical Statement 1 Integrity, Objectivity and Independence  
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000  
Financial Reporting Council Annual Report 2005/2006  
Frank EK, Lowe DJ, Smith JK (2001) ‘The Expectation Gap: Perceptual Differences between Auditors, 
Jurors and Students’ Managerial Auditing Journal 
Guy DM and Sullivan JD (1988) ‘The Expectation Gap Auditing Standards’ Journal of Accountancy 
Huepkes EHG (2005) The External Auditor and the Bank Supervisor: ‘Sherlock Holmes and Doctor 
Watson?’ Journal of Banking Regulation 
Humphrey C, Moizer P and Turley S (1992) ‘The Audit Expectations Gap – Plus Ca Change, Plus C’est La 
Meme Chose?’ Critical Aspects on Accounting 
Humphrey C, Moizer P and Turley S (1993) ‘The Audit Expectations Gap in Britain: An Empirical 
Investigation’ Accounting and Business Research 
Humphrey C (1997) Debating Audit Expectations M Sherer and S Turley (eds) Current Issues in Auditing ( 
Third Edition) Paul Chapman , London  
Humphrey C P Moizer and S Turley Protection Against Detection : The Case of Auditors and Fraud' 
Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal 
International Standards Auditing (UK and Ireland) 240 The Auditor's Responsibility to Consider Fraud in an 
Audit of Financial Statements  
ISA (UK and Ireland) 250 Section B : Material significance  
ISA (UK and Ireland) 320  
IFAC (2002) ‘Resource Accounting: Framework of Accounting Standard Setting in the UK Central 
Government Sector’ 
Lehman C and Tinker A (1987) ‘The Real Cultural Significance of Accounts’ Accounting, Organisations 
and Society  
Liggio CD (1974) ‘The Expectations Gap: The Accountant’s Waterloo’ Journal of Contemporary Business  
London and General Bank (No 2) [1895]  
Lowe DJ (1994) ‘The Expectations Gap in the Legal System: Perception Differences between Auditors and 
Judges’ Journal of Applied Business Research  
Macve RH (1981) A Conceptual Framework for Financial Accounting and Reporting: Possibilities for an 
 AA 
  
Agreed Structure, London ICAEW 
Monroe GS and Woodliff DR (1993) ‘The Effect of Education on the Audit Expectation Gap Accounting 
and Finance 
Ojo M (2006) Auditor Independence – Its Importance to the External Auditor's Role in Banking Regulation 
and Supervision (Paper presented at the 2006 Global Conference on Business and Finance, San Jose, Costa 
Rica June 2, 2006)  
Pierce B and Kilcommins M (1995/1996) The Audit Expectations Gap : The Role of Auditing Education' 
Dublin City University Business School Research Papers  
Porter B (1993) An Empirical Study of the Audit Expectation – Performance Gap Accounting and Business 
Research  
Porter B and others (2005) Principles of External Auditing John Wiley and Sons Ltd 
Power M (1999) The Audit Society: Rituals of Verification Oxford University Press  
Re Kingston Cotton Mill (No 2)[1896] 2 Ch 279 at 288, CA  
Sikka P Puxty A Willmott H and Cooper C (2003) ‘The Impossibility of Eliminating the Expectations Gap: 
Some Theory and Evidence’  
Sikka P, Willmott HC and Lowe T (1989) ‘Guardians of Knowledge and Public Interest: Evidence and 
Issues of Accountability in the UK Accounting Profession’ Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal 
Singh D (2006) The Role of Third Parties in Banking Regulation and Supervision Journal of International 
Banking Regulation Volume 4 No 3     
 
 
Chapter Seven 
Anderson B, Maletta M and Wright (1998) A 'Perceptions of Auditor Responsibility: Views of the Judiciary 
and the Profession' International Journal of Auditing   
Angermueller  NO, Eichhorn Mand Ramke T (2005) 'New Standards of Banking Supervision – A Look at 
the German Implementation Approach for the Second Pillar of Basel II' Journal of International Banking 
Law and Regulation 
 
BaFin Annual Report for 2004 
Bank of Italy, Circolare n. 229 of 21 April 1999, last amended on the 10 April 2007 (13th amendment), 
Titolo IV, Capitolo 2, Sezione II, n. 2.4 and „Nuove disposizioni di vigilanza prudenziale per le banche“, 
Circolare n. 263 of 27.12.2006 issued by the Bank of Italy in order to implement „Basel II“ (Nuovo accordo 
del Comitato di Basilea sul capitale e direttive comunitarie 2006/48/CE e 2006/49/CE), Titolo II, Capitolo 
II, Parte I, Sezione III, Sottosezione II, point n. 5.2. Both documents are available at: 
www.bancaditalia.it/vigilanza/banche/normativa/disposizioni/vigprud 
Basel Committee's Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision and the Relationship between Banking 
Supervisors and Banks' External Auditors (2001), International Auditing Practices Committee 
 BB 
  
Cairns D (1997) 'The Future Shape of Harmonisation: A Reply' European Accounting Review Cameran  M 
(2005) 'Audit Fees and the Large Auditor Premium in the Italian Market' International Journal of Auditing 
Carnevali F (1997) British and Italian Banks and Small Firms : A Study of the Midlands and Piedmont 1945 
– 1973 (PhD Thesis London School of Economics and Political Science  
Carosio  G (2002) 'Italy,Europe and Financial Regulation'  Oxford Gazette 
 
Deutsche Bundesbank (1974) Geschaeftsbericht  
Deutsche Bundesbank (January 1993) 'The Fourth Act Amending the Banking Act – A Further Step Towards 
the European Banking Market'  Monthly Report   
Deutsche Bundesbank (November 1994)  'The Fifth Act Amending the Banking Act' Deutsche Bundesbank 
Monthly Report  
Deutsche Bundesbank (January 1998) 'The Sixth Act Amending the Banking Act' Monthly Report  
Deutsche Bundesbank (October 2002)  'Amendments to the Banking Act caused by the Fourth Financial 
Market Promotion Act 2002' Monthly Report 
Deutsche Bundesbank (June 2002) 'The Evolution of Accounting Standards for Credit Institutions, Deutsche 
Bundesbank Monthly Report  
 
 
Deutsche Bank (2004)  'Italy's Savings Banks: First Reforms Create Big Universal Banks with Untapped 
Potential' EU Monitor Financial Market  Special Deutsche Bank Research  November 25 2004 
Deutsche Bundesbank (April 2005) Monthly Report   
Deutsche Bundesbank (April 2005)‘Supervision of Financial Conglomerates in Germany’ Monthly Report    
Deutsche Bundesbank (October 2005) 'New Transparency Rules for Credit Institutions' Deutsche 
Bundesbank Monthly Report  
Evans L and Nobes C (1998)  'Harmonisation of the Structure of Audit Firms: Incorporation in the UK and 
Germany'  The European Accounting Review 
 
Ethical Statement 1 Integrity, objectivity and independence paragraph  28 
Fazio A (2002) 'The Reorganisation  of the Italian Bank System'  (Joint Session of the Sixth Committees of 
the Italian Senate and Chamber of Deputies 10 October 2002) 
 
Fearnley  S and Beattie V (2004)  'The Reform of the UK's Auditor Independence Framework after the 
Enron Collapse: An Example of Evidence-based  Policy Making'  International Journal of Auditing 
Federation des Experts Comptables (2001) Europeens  Enforcement Mechanisms in Europe: A Preliminary 
Investigation of Oversight Systems   
Filipova T (2003) ‘ Concept  of  Integrated Financial  Supervision  and  Regulation  of Financial 
Conglomerates: The Case of  Germany and the UK’   
Filipova T (2006) ‘ Concept  of  Integrated Financial  Supervision  and  Regulation  of Financial 
Conglomerates: The Case of  Germany and the UK’  Nomos 
 
Goglio  A (2001) 'Sectoral Regulatory Reforms in Italy: Framework and Implications' OECD Economics 
Department Working Papers 294, OECD 
Goodhart  CAE (1998) (ed)  'The Emerging Framework of Financial Regulation   ( Central Banking 
Publications Ltd  London 1998) 
Gray  SJ (1988) 'Towards a Theory of Cultural Influence on the Development of Accounting Systems 
Internationally Abacus, Vol. 24 No.1, pp.1-15 
Gray J and Hamilton J (2006)  Implementing Financial Regulation: Theory and Practice Second Edition , 
John Wiley and Sons 
 
Hitchins  J Hogg M and Mallett D (2001) Banking: A Regulatory Accounting and Auditing Guide (The 
Institute of Chartered Accountants) 
 
 CC 
  
House of Lords Select Committee on the Accountability of the Financial Services Authority in general, and 
of the Accountability of the Government and of the Parliamentary Ombudsman Regarding the Equitable 
Debacle 
 
 
Huepkes E 'The External Auditor and the Bank Supervisor: Sherlock Holmes and Doctor Watson?'  (2005)  7 
No1/2 Journal of Banking Regulation 
 
ISA No 240 ( International Federation of Accountants 1996a) 
ISA No 570 (International Federation of Accountants 1996d) 
 
 
Llewellyn D (2001) 'The Creation of a Single Financial Regulatory Agency in Estonia: The Global Context' 
Paper Presented at Conference Organised by the World Bank and the Ministry of Finance of Estonia, 2001 
 
Moriconi M (2005)' Italy: Changes to the Legislative and Regulatory Framework post-Parmalat – Some 
Faster than Others!' Hill and Knowlton's Financial Services Newsletter  Number 5 May 2005 
Moscadelli M (2004) 'The Modelling of Operational Risk : Experience with the Analysis of Data collected 
by the Basel Committee' Banca D'Italia Temi di Discussione del Servizio Studi Bank of Italy, Banking 
Supervision Department Number 517, July 2004 
 
Mwenda K and Fleming  A (2001) 'International Developments in the Organizational Structure of Financial 
Services Supervision'   
 
Mwenda K and Mvula  J (2003) 'A Framework for Unified Financial Services Supervision: Lessons from 
Germany and Other European Countries'  
Nobes C 'The Future Shape of Harmonisation: Some Responses'  (1998) European Accounting Review 
Nobes C and Parker R (2006) Comparative International Accounting  (Prentice Hall London , Ninth edition) 
Paul T (2004) 'The New German Investment Act' Journal of International Banking Law and Regulation 
Pecchioli  RM (1983) 'Trends in Banking Structure and Regulation in OECD Countries, The 
Internationalisation of Banking: The Policy Issues  
Polizatto  V (1990) 'Prudential Regulation and Banking Supervision: Building an Institutional Framework 
for Banks' (January 1990) World Bank Working Paper 
 
SAS No 59 (American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 1988d)  
SAS No 82 (American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 1997) 
 
Scherer  P (2002) 'Regulatory Changes Proposed in Germany' Journal of International  Banking Law 
 
Skaife HA and Gassen  J (2006) 'Can Audit Reforms Change the Monitoring Role of Audits? August 2006 
 
 
Singh  D (2007) Banking Regulation of UK and US Financial Markets 'Legal Aspects of Prudential 
Supervision'  
Sridharan  U, Royce W Caines,  McMillan and  Summers S (2002) 'Financial Statement Transparency and 
Auditor Responsibility: Enron and  Andersen International Journal of Auditing 
 
Steck A and Loosen C (2002) 'New Legislation to Reform and Enhance Germany's Status as a Financial 
Centre'  Journal of International Banking Law 
Stevenson J (2002) 'Auditor Independence: A Comparative Descriptive Study of the UK, France and Italy' 
International Journal of Auditing 
'Trends in Banking Structure and Regulation in OECD Countries'  (1987)   
 
 DD 
  
 EE 
<http://www.asb.co.uk/apb/publications/index.cfm> 
http://www.bafin.de/bafin/aufgabenundziele_en.htm#n1 
http://www.bancaditalia.it/vigilanza_tutela/vig_ban/pubblicazioni/rela/2001/Supervision.pdf> 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs78.htm 
http://www.bundesbank.de/bankenaufsicht/bankenaufsicht_bafin.en.php 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/enforcement/ 
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/history/vol2/panel2.pdf>   
 
 
The Federal Reserve System, Purposes and Functions (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 
July 2005) 
The Washington Post 
  
Tonello  M  (2006) 'Have Governance Reforms Spurred on by Parmalat's Collapse Given Investors a False 
Sense of Security?', The Conference Board 
Trequattrini G 'The Role of the Bank of Italy as Antitrust Authority in the Banking Sector' Banca d'Italia 
Vieten H (1995) 'Auditing in Britain and  Germany Compared: Professions, Knowledge and the State'  
European Accounting Review   
Vieten  HR (1996) ‘Banking Regulation in Britain and Germany Compared: Capital Ratios, External Audit 
and Internal Controls 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      
 
 
 
 
 
